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FBIS-SOV-90-043 CONTENTS *5 March 1990*

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

- Karpov Assesses ‘Open Skies’ Talks in Interviews 1
  - PRAVDA, 4 Mar 1
  - IZVESTIYA, 5 Mar 2
- Zorin Discusses National Security Concerns *[Moscow International]* 3

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

- Options for Future of Warsaw Pact Weighed 4
  - German Role in NATO Examined *[Bovin on Moscow TV]* 4
  - ‘Dissipation’ of Pact Viewed *[Solton on Moscow International]* 4

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- Shevardnadze, Council of Europe Leaders Meet *[TASS]* 6
- Club of Rome Executive Members Visit USSR 6
  - Shevardnadze, President Meet *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* 6
  - Primakov Receives Club Members *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 6
- Primakov, Goerens Discuss Europe Situation *[TASS]* 7
- EC’s Israeli Settlement Policy Discussed 7
  - Gerasimov Rejects Direct Flights *[Moscow Radio]* 7
  - Perfilyev Cites ‘Illegal’ View *[PRAVDA 23 Feb]* 7
- Bush, Kohl Discuss German Reunification 8
  - Views Shared on NATO *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 8
  - Kohl Remarks on Borders *[PRAVDA 27 Feb]* 8
- Zholkver on German Unity, Responsibility *[Moscow Radio]* 9
- Proektor on Pros, Cons of United Germany *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Feb]* 9
- Boehme, Kohl Stands on German Unity Assessed *[Levin on Moscow Radio]* 11
- Cartagena Summit Assessed as ‘Assault’ *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 12
- Delegation, European Parliament Discuss Reforms *[TASS]* 13
- Adamishin Addresses UN Human Rights Commission *[TASS]* 13
- UN Approach to USSR Debt Problem Hailed *[TASS]* 14
- Security Issues in Wake of Cold War Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Feb]* 14
- ASEAN, EEC Ministers Confer on Trade Issues *[PRAVDA 19 Feb]* 16
- Cooperation Agreement Between CEMA, Italian Bank *[TASS]* 16
- Kozyrev Discusses Foreign Policy on Arms Trade *[IZVESTIYA 21 Feb]* 16
- Interpol Official on Possible Soviet Membership *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 17
- TASS To Have Communication Satellite System *[TASS]* 18
- East, West Journalists Discuss E. Europe Changes *[TASS]* 18

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

- U.S. Radio Broadcasts Promote ‘Cold War Spirit’ *[TASS]* 20
- Commentary Examines News Broadcasting Styles *[Moscow International]* 20
- REUTER Cites Bush on Call to Gorbachev *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 21
- Second Round of USSR-U.S. Trade Talks Opens *[TASS]* 21

Northeast Asia

- Mongolian Rally Demands Emergency Party Congress *[TASS]* 21
- Mongolia’s Batmonh Pleased With Withdrawal Talks *[TASS]* 22

  Protocol Signed on Troop Withdrawal *[PRAVDA 3 Mar]* 22
  More on Troop Withdrawal Protocol *[Moscow TV]* 22

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Gerasimov Queried in Manila *[Quezon City Radio-TV]* 22

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev, Najibullah Exchange Anniversary Tidings *[TASS]* 30
Commentary Reviews Soviet-Iranian Relations *[Moscow International]* 30
Supreme Soviet Appoints Ambassador to Morocco *[TASS]* 31
Kuwaiti Envoy Interviewed on National Day *[Moscow International]* 31

East Europe

Shevardnadze, GDR's Boehme View German Issue *[TASS]* 31
  GDR SPD Officials Assess Talks *[East Berlin ADN]* 32
GDR's Maleuda Visits, Meets With Lukyanov *[East Berlin ADN]* 32
  Further on Talks With Lukyanov *[Moscow Radio]* 33
TASS Reports GDR Premier's Upcoming Visit 33
FRG Parties Hit Kohl Stance on Polish Border *[TASS]* 33
Text of USSR-CSSR Troop Withdrawal Accord *[Prague RUDE PRAVO 28 Feb]* 34
Troops Continue Leaving CSSR on Schedule *[TASS]* 34
CSSR Press Coverage of Troop Withdrawals Hit *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 25 Feb]* 34
New Name, Coat of Arms for CSSR Proposed *[PRAVDA 16 Feb]* 35
Parliamentary Session Ends After Tax Debate *[Budapest MTI]* 35
Hungary's Horn, Karpati on NATO, Pact Links *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Feb]* 36
CPSU's Girenko Meets With MSZMP Visitors *[PRAVDA 22 Feb]* 36
Gusev Meets With Hungarian Industry Minister *[Moscow International]* 36
Taxis Offer To Carry Soviets Free to Border *[Budapest Radio]* 36
Polish 'Concern' Over German Unification Voiced *[IZVESTIYA 17 Feb]* 37
Siwicki Speaks on Withdrawing Troops From Poland *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Feb]* 37
Michnik on Anti-Polish, Anti-Gorbachev Attacks *[MOSCOW NEWS No. 7]* 37
Paper Cites Walesa Call for 'Dictatorship' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 20 Feb]* 38
Romanian Defense Minister Grants Interview *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Feb]* 38
New Romanian Ambassador to USSR Interviewed *[MOSCOW NEWS No. 7]* 39
IZVESTIYA Describes Anti-Iliescu Riot *[20 Feb]* 40
Miners' Pro-Iliescu Rally Ends in Violence *[IZVESTIYA 21 Feb]* 40
PRAVDA Assesses Bucharest Demonstrations *[22 Feb]* 41
Cooperation Protocol Signed With Romania *[TASS]* 42
REUTER Interview With Albania's Plaka Cited *[IZVESTIYA 22 Feb]* 42
Albania May Soften Stance on Superpowers *[PRAVDA 20 Feb]* 43
Commentary on 'Winds of Change' in Albania *[Moscow International]* 43
Union of Democratic Forces Holds Rally in Sofia *[TASS]* 44

West Europe

Council Of Europe Holds Meeting in Moscow 44
  Shevardnadze Meets Officials *[TASS]* 44
  Leaders Brief Press 2 Mar *[TASS]* 45
  Officials Leave Moscow *[TASS]* 45
Soviet-Swiss Conference Opens in Geneva 1 Mar 45
  Security, Disarmament Discussed *[TASS]* 45
  Conferences Addresses German Issue *[TASS]* 46
Pact's Lobov Meets Swiss Military Officials *[TASS]* 46
Adamishin Receives Visiting Swiss Official *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 46
Compensation Due for Occupied Swiss Property *[Moscow International]* 46

Latin America & Caribbean

Chamorro Hopes for Continued Aid From USSR *[TASS]* 46
Messages Assure Cooperation With Nicaragua *[TASS]* 47
USSR Sends Messages to Ortega, Chamorro *[PRAVDA 3 Mar]* 47
Process of Transfer of Power in Nicagarua Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 48
Cuban Preparations for U.S. Invasion Cited *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 48

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Joint Sitting Begins 5 Mar *[Moscow Radio]* 51
  To Discuss Ownership *[Moscow Radio]* 51
Lukyanov on Absence of Quorum at Supreme Soviet *[Moscow Radio]* 51
Gorbachev Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Session *[Moscow Radio]* 51
Commission Chairman Tarazevich on Presidency Bill *[Moscow TV]* 51
Youth Affairs Committee Official on Presidency *[Moscow TV]* 52

Political & Social

Gorbachev Votes, Meets Reporters 4 March *[PRAVDA 5 Mar]* 53
  Further Remarks 55
People's Congress To Discuss Presidency 12 Mar *[TASS]* 56
  Draft Law Detailed 56
Central Committee Schedules 11 March Rules Meeting *[AFP]* 57
Yeltsin Warns Gorbachev May Not Finish Year *[London PRESS ASSOCIATION]* 57
Zamyatin Views Gorbachev's Powers, Prospects *[London PRESS ASSOCIATION]* 57
Writer Discusses Gorbachev Statement *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 6]* 58
'Top Priority' Debates Presidency Issue *[Moscow International]* 59
Presidency Said To Strengthen Democracy *[PRAVDA 1 Mar]* 62
Yakovlev Addresses Metro Workers 2 March *[Moscow TV]* 63
  Terms Election 'Colossal Step' *[TASS]* 64
Kashlev Urges Faster Adoption of Rights Laws *[IZVESTIYA 3 Mar]* 65
Journalists Union Holds Plenary Session 66
  Congress Planned for Jul-Aug *[TASS]* 66
  Medvedev Addresses Session *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 1 Mar]* 67
Medvedev Meets Party Committee Secretaries *[Moscow Radio]* 67
Medvedev Comments on Plenum Discussions *[Moscow TV]* 67
Abalkin Discusses Struggle Against Conservatives *[Vienna TV]* 68
'Arrogant' Statements on Perestroyka Cited *[Pogodin on Moscow International]* 68
Bakatin Hits 'Profound Failure' of Law Enforcement
  [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 11 Feb] 69
Razumovskiy Chairs Cadre Policy Session *[Moscow Radio]* 69
PRAVDA Carries 'Democratic Platform' *[3 Mar]* 70
Official Discusses Draft Party Rules *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Cooperatives' Emergency Conference Held *[IZVESTIYA 19 Feb]* 76
Poor Forecasting Compounds Societal Problems *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 76
Poll on Citizens' Socioeconomic Concerns Cited *[IZVESTIYA 26 Feb]* 78
Illegal Petroleum Exports Exposed *[Moscow TV]* 78
Government To Combat Narcotics Abuse *[TASS]* 79
MVD Briefing on Weapon Confiscation Effort *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* 79

Economic

Defense Industry Conversion Problems Discussed 79
  Future of Conversion *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Mar]* 79
  Conversion in Moscow *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Mar]* 82
  Chemical Plant Converts *[Moscow Radio]* 83
  Conversion Completed in Kishinev *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 20 Feb]* 83
Foreign Loan, Aid Figures Published, Explained *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 83

- Republic Statistics Committees Release Reports *[TASS]* 85
- Bankers Conference Views Role of Budget Deficit *[Moscow Radio]* 85
- Moscow TV Shows Steel Being Exported as Scrap 86

Scientific

- Cargo Vessel Progress M-3, Mir Dock Smoothly *[TASS]* 86
- Moscow-Antartic Station Satellite Hookup Shown *[Moscow TV]* 87
- 'Zenit' Rocket Launchers To Be Used in Australia *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 27 Feb]* 87

Military

- Internal Troops Structure, Functions Described *[IZVESTIYA 4 Mar]* 88
- Accomodations for Returning Troops Poses Problems *[Moscos TV]* 89

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

- Heritage Society Leads in Estonian Elections *[Tallinn Radio]* 90
- Estonian Party Organizations Halt Activities *[Moscow Radio]* 90
- Tallinn Militia Purged of Russian-Speaking Chiefs *[TASS]* 90
- Estonian Deputies Discuss Status of Republic *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 3 Feb]* 90
- Latvians Protest Possible USSR Troop Stationing *[Riga Radio]* 91
- Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Issues Laws *[TASS]* 92
- Ethnic Tension in Latvian Society Examined *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 24 Feb]* 92
- 'Run-up' Elections Under Way in Lithuania *[TASS]* 95
  - Partial Poll Results *[AFP]* 95
- Lithuanian Communist Party Plenum Opens *[TASS]* 95
  - Seeks To Regain 'Lost Influence' *[TASS]* 96
  - Burokevicius Elected 1st Secretary *[Moscow Radio]* 96
  - Party Official Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 96
- Lithuanian Communists End Law-Enforcement Ties *[Vilnius International]* 97
- Lithuanian Commission Discusses Armed Forces *[Vilnius International]* 97
  - New Commission Chairman Elected *[Vilnius International]* 97
- Lithuanian Press Examines KGB Activities *[Vilnius International]* 97

RSFSR

- Parliamentary Elections in RSFSR Reported 98
  - Vlasov Vorotnikov, Yeltsin Elected *[TASS]* 98
  - Yeltsin 'Scores 72 Percent' *[East Berlin ADN]* 98
  - Further on Elections *[TASS]* 98
  - Gorbachev, Ryzhkov Shown Voting *[Moscow TV]* 99
  - Justice Minister on Elections *[Moscow Radio]* 99
  - High Turnout in Local, Republican Elections *[TASS]* 99
  - Voters Have 'Much Food for Thought' *[TASS]* 100
  - Preelection Situation Viewed *[TASS]* 100
  - Committee Examines Election Preparations *[TASS]* 100
- Briefing Held on Moscow Crime Figures *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Feb]* 101
- 'Thousands' Attend Saransk Rally *[Moscow Radio]* 101
- Vlasov Discusses Visit to Yakutiya *[Moscow Radio]* 102
- Orel Deputies Urge Abolition of Party's Control *[Vilnius Radio]* 102
- Orel Authoritities Criticized for Oka Pollution *[IZVESTIYA 10 Feb]* 102
- Leningrad's Gidaspov Interviewed *[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 1 Mar]* 103
- CPSU Official Comments on Leningrad Referendum *[Moscow Radio]* 104
- Frolov Explains Plenum Decisions to Rayon Party *[PRAVDA 14 Feb]* 105
- Karelian KGB Invites Journalists to Session *[Moscow Radio]* 105
- Kostroma Obkom Expresses Confidence in Toropov *[Moscow Radio]* 105
- Vladivostok Workers Want Boondogglers Punished *[IZVESTIYA 12 Feb]* 105
- Babies Reportedly Sold on Black Market *[PRAVDA 15 Feb]* 105

Western Republics

Ukrainian Candidates for People's Deputies *[IZVESTIYA 18 Feb]* 107
Preliminary Election Results From Ukraine *[Kiev Radio]* 108
Donetsk Calm on Polling Day Despite Fears *[Moscow TV]* 108
Donetsk Strike Committee Calls for Resignations *[Moscow TV]* 108
  Most Miners Against Strike *[TASS]* 108
Official Comments on Chernobyl Zone Guard Duties *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* 109
Firearms Thefts Concern Ukrainian Officials *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 26 Jan]* 109
Archbishops Synod Holds Moscow News Conference *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 7]* 109
Belorussian Komsomol Discusses Growing Tension *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 111
Belorussian CP Finances Made Public *[TASS]* 111

Caucasus

Transcaucasus Air Defense Unit Repels Raiders *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Feb]* 111
Demonstrations Mark Anniversary of Baku Violence 112
  Mourners March to Nagorny Park *[AFP]* 112
  Muslims Gather at Burial Place *[Tehran IRNA]* 112
  Civic Memorial Service Held *[Moscow TV]* 112
  Muslims Gather in Julfa Area *[Tehran Radio]* 112
Nagorno-Karabakh Situation Termed 'Contradictory' *[TASS]* 112
No Deterioration on Azerbaijan-Iranian Border *[IZVESTIYA 1 Mar]* 113
Measures To Assist Azerbaijan Refugees Attacked *[Baku Radio]* 114
KGB Gives Thanks for Help to Refugee Families *[PRAVDA 27 Feb]* 114
Azerbaijani, Armenian Rayon Officials Meet *[Baku Radio]* 114
Speeches by Armenian Deputies Deepen Conflicts *[Baku Radio]* 114
Armenians Being Moved From Village in Azerbaijan *[Yerevan Radio]* 114
ARTSAKH Bimonthly Literary Magazine Debuts *[Yerevan International]* 115

Central Asia

People Killed Following Tashkent Oblast Rally *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 4 Mar]* 115
  Situation Described *[IZVESTIYA 5 Mar]* 115
Uzbek Prosecutor Cited on Organized Crime *[IZVESTIYA 1 Mar]* 115
Meskhetian Turks Speak of Desire To Return Home *[IZVESTIYA 21 Feb]* 116
  Group Evacuated From Town *[AFP]* 116
Aspects of Uzbek Election Campaign Faulted *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 18 Feb]* 116
Expanded Tajik Central Committee Plenum 3 Mar *[Moscow Radio]* 118
  Results Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 118
Tajik Commission Summarizes Election Results *[Dushanbe Radio]* 119
Soccer Match Allowed Despite State of Emergency *[TASS]* 119
Kirghiz Presidium Issues Decree on Public Order *[Frunze Radio]* 119
Kirghiz MVD Views Rumors, Meetings *[SOVETSKAYA KIRGHIZIA 16 Feb]* 120

Karpov Assesses 'Open Skies' Talks in Interviews

PRAVDA, 4 Mar

PM0403180790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

["Interview for PRAVDA" with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov, by own correspondent V. Shelkov, datelined Ottawa; no date of interview specified; first two paragraphs are an introduction: "Is It Easy To 'Open' the Sky"]

[Text] Ottawa—The first stage of the international "Open Skies" conference ended in the Canadian capital. Official delegations from 23 Warsaw Pact Organization [WPO] and NATO countries spent two weeks comparing each other's positions regarding proposals to institute a system which would enable unarmed aircraft to overfly the territories of states belonging to the opposite military-political alliance. The conference's work proved that substantial differences remain in the delegations' approaches to the elaboration of a series of fundamental conditions and provisions of the future agreement. As was to be expected, the talks will continue. Their second stage is scheduled to be held in Budapest 23 April-12 May this year.

Following the conclusion of the conference's Ottawa phase, PRAVDA's correspondent asked V.P. Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation and USSR deputy foreign minister, to answer a series of questions.

[Shelkov] What is the Soviet Union's approach to the "open skies" idea? Could it be said that Ottawa produced a similarity of this idea's interpretation by representatives of the two military-political blocs?

[Karpov] First of all, I would like to note that the sides in Ottawa agreed that such a system is necessary. We still have to do quite a lot of work on the ways to implement it. The Ottawa meeting marked the beginning of a serious discussion.

What does "open skies" mean? We take this proposal, made by U.S. President G. Bush, to mean a real manifestation of openness. But when we embarked on the specific discussion, it transpired that the U.S. delegation was, in essence, not implementing what the President had outlined in general terms. This is because the main content of the position expounded by U.S. representatives in Ottawa boils down to the fact that the United States, taking advantage of its technological potential, intends to overfly other countries' territory, collect information, and tuck it safely away. So, where is the "openness?"

[Shelkov] The final press conferences by several participants in the talks indicated that differences had emerged on, for example, details like these: Whose aircraft should do the overflying, with what equipment should they be fitted, how is the resultant information to be shared....

[Karpov] We propose to create a pool of aircraft through joint efforts. Each party would pay an agreed share of the costs so that nobody pays more than they could afford. The USSR and the United States could pay more, others could pay less. The data would be processed in a single center sited in any country. Parties to the agreement would pay for this also according to an agreed scale. The information arriving in this center should be available to all regardless, of course, of the financial contribution made by different countries. This proposal of ours was rejected out of hand.

We then put forward an alternative suggestion. Let each alliance create its own pool of aircraft to be used for overflying the territory of its own member countries. These aircraft would have international crews and teams of monitors. The aircraft should be equipped with standardized optical and optical-electronic equipment. Why do we insist on this? The present level of the development of electronics makes it possible to fit an aircraft with a tiny sensor which could collect a vast quantity of information having nothing to do with "open skies" and would be very difficult to detect by inspectors when checking someone else's aircraft.

But even a third option is possible. If, for example, a WPO country wants a U.S. aircraft to overfly its territory, this would be up to the state in question.

As regards the elaboration of specific proposals, matters have so far not reached the stage of serious solutions.

The main point is to strive to ensure that openness really is openness, and that equality really is equality.

[Shelkov] The Western press has carried numerous reports claiming that, since the USSR lacks advanced technology and state-of-the-art equipment, it wants the aircraft to be fitted with yesterday's instruments. Hence, they say, the unwillingness to allow Western countries to use their own aircraft....

[Karpov] We are prepared to accept any technology, even the most advanced. But it should be agreed technology making it possible to compare the information gathered by the parties. As for the United States, it wants to benefit from its technological advantage so as to secure information which it is in fact unwilling to share with anyone.

[Shelkov] Is it true that the Soviet Union advocates "open skies" only in daylight?

[Karpov] We never said that we do not wish to fly after sundown. Take flight duration for example. We believe that three hours are perfectly adequate to obtain reliable information. As a matter of fact, there are no serious objections to our stance. At the same time, there are attempts to legalize a presence in the airspace of specifically the Soviet Union for a longer duration.

We propose 25-30 overflights a year by each alliance. It seems to us that such a regime would provide a sufficient amount of information. NATO representatives talk about as many as 130-140 overflights by each alliance. The Americans are willing to accept 52 inspections, in other words one per week. It must be borne in mind that these flights should create no excessive difficulties for civil aviation. And the cost should not be overlooked, either. We are talking in millions.

IZVESTIYA, 5 Mar

PM0403190590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. Karpov, by S. Guk; place and date of interview not specified; first two paragraphs are an introduction: "Does the USSR Advocate 'Open Skies' With Exclusion Zones? The Soviet Position Has Been Distorted. USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov Replies"]

[Text] The first stage of the "Open Skies" conference of 23 WPO and NATO countries ended a few days ago in Ottawa. Its goal was to agree on conditions enabling states to conduct flights by unarmed aircraft over each other's territory for the purpose of observing military activity.

The Western press is now carrying articles claiming that, toward the end, the USSR retreated from the initial idea, started presenting a series of unacceptable conditions (like overflight exclusion zones, for example), and even seemed to be thinking of withdrawing from the talks. IZVESTIYA approached V. Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister who headed the Soviet delegation of experts, for an explanation.

[Guk] The Western press appraises the outcome of Ottawa as fruitless, blaming the USSR for this. What is the essence of differences with NATO?

[Karpov] Three packages of problems emerged in Ottawa. Will the "open skies" system be built upon the equality of all participants? In other words, will all states or only some of them have access to the information that is obtained, with the rest having to be satisfied with the role of extras? How can real equality be ensured? And finally, the sides' legal rights and obligations—actually, here we encountered fewest differences.

[Guk] As far as it is known, we advocate the creation of some sort of "data bank," but the United States and its allies are opposed. How do they explain their refusal?

[Karpov] Officially, I would say, there is no explanation. In the course of unofficial conversations they say that they would not like the USSR and WPO countries to know the nature and extent of the information they have obtained. Since the United States would be using the latest means of observation....

[Guk] ...Which we evidently do not have.

[Karpov] We do not know what means of observation would be used by the United States, and cannot pass judgment. The main point is something else: It is unwilling to say what volume of information it would like to obtain, and whether this information would be in line with the tasks that will be assigned to the "open skies" system—observation of military activity—or would go beyond this framework. If we do not know the sort of information the other side is gathering and the purpose for which it is doing so, instead of trust we would achieve the exact opposite—mistrust.

[Guk] Information gathering criteria would evidently be determined by the underlying objective: If a country were preparing to attack, it would need a different sort of information....

[Karpov] Quite right. This is why we advocate that the gathering of information should not extend beyond the framework of confidence-building measures. And what is the main element of trust? It is that any party (including countries which themselves do not have an adequate technical potential to gather data) could at any time request any information and see what its neighbors are doing. As a matter of fact, we were supported on this issue not only by our own allies but also by NATO members. France, for example, gave us very active support.

[Guk] And how many states backed the United States?

[Karpov] Those which expect to join the U.S. "information pool," and Britain in particular. Generally speaking, though, I would not start drawing such lines—how many were on the one side and how many on the other; different points of view were expressed. Speakers frequently supported the Soviet stance on equal access to information and the U.S. stance on instrument utilization.

[Guk] The West is monolithic on one issue: Not to allow the USSR access to technologies which it lacks.

[Karpov] I already said that this is main U.S. motivation. The United States does not wish us to know the sort of information it gathers and the sort of instruments it uses. For our part, we are in favor of a single coordinating organization. Incidentally, the draft treaty which was composed in Ottawa contains a provision for the creation of a special commission to be entrusted with the solution of disputed questions. We believe that this commission could also monitor the collected information and its release to all parties.

[Guk] In other words, a single data bank and standardized equipment?

[Karpov] Yes, although the aircraft should not necessarily be of one single type. We proposed the setting up of a single pool—we found no support. But our main idea is that there should be freedom of choice. If some state wishes its territory to be overflown by aircraft of its own design with standard equipment, a mixed crew, and a group of observers, this wish ought to be respected. If it wants an aircraft belonging to some third country—by all means. And finally, aircraft belonging to the monitoring side could overfly another state's territory only subject to its consent. It seems to me that the last idea was not categorically rejected. The sides have yet to form their final opinion on the most preferable options.

[Guk] Why was it generally decided to limit the sphere of monitoring only to WPO and NATO countries?

[Karpov] This is how our Western partners want it. Our opinion differs: All neutral and nonaligned CSCE countries should be included in this process if they so wish. And they are not against this, either. I spoke with many of their representatives in Ottawa. They are perplexed: Why were they refused permission to participate, even if only as observers? We raised this question, but none of the Western countries, with the exception of France, supported us.

[Guk] And what about the charges that the USSR wants an "open sky" with overflight exclusion zones?

[Karpov] Not with exclusion zones—we are talking about limiting flights above installations like nuclear power stations, chemical industry enterprises, major cities. There is no necessity to fly over them—they could be bypassed. It is necessary to think about the population's safety—nobody can guarantee accident-free flights. France itself has an extensive network of nuclear power stations—does it need its own Chernobyl?

[Guk] Will there be a large territory outside the sphere of monitoring?

[Karpov] Minimal, insignificant. Moreover, everything will be subject to equal conditions for both the WPO and NATO.

[Guk] What other proposals by the USSR failed to find support?

[Karpov] There was another one: The USSR advocates that the monitoring of military activity should extend not only to the territory of the 23 states but also to their military bases located in third countries. According to the logic of things, these military activity installations should not evade observation.

[Guk] Despite all the differences of opinion, and in contrast to the Western press official NATO spokesmen nonetheless appraised the outcome of Ottawa as a promising beginning. You have also made statements to this effect. What is the source of such optimism?

[Karpov] It is based on the sides' agreement that the "open sky" is necessary as a major confidence-building measure, and mainly because the idea is feasible. Coincident points of view emerged, there was success in identifying differences in positions. All this was summarized in a common joint draft. I believe that we are over the main hurdle. Look at what happens at times. Through a fear of "selling too cheaply," the sides do not present their final position right away. "Open skies" was discussed really openly in Ottawa, everything that had to be said was said. There was a multitude of opinions, but I believe that this multitude contains the basis for compromise. The quest for compromise is the task of the conference's next stage which will begin in Budapest in April. In my view, there are no unsolved problems there. [sentence as published]

Zorin Discusses National Security Concerns

LD0403115990 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 4 Mar 90

["Moscow Viewpoint": weekly commentary by political analyst Valentin Zorin—read by announced]

[Text] National security was the theme of a recent Soviet television broadcast involving a number of leading experts and military officials, among them President Gorbachev's close aid, Marshal Akhromeyev, and deputy in charge of the Institute for United States and Canadian Studies, Andrey Kokoshin. With normalization in superpower relations and a better international environment, the local public's attention is increasingly rivetting for the country's own security matters. [sentence as heard] The speakers had all agreed about a crucial change for the better taking place in the past four of five years and said that the country was now less threatened by the United States than before.

For his part, Marshal Akhromeyev said there was not the chance of a surprise nuclear attack on Soviet territory, but others argued that the number of United States' long-range missiles targeted on Soviet cities was being left intact, let alone other types of United States weapons capable of dealing a strike on the country's territory.

On the possible emergence of a single Germany near Soviet borders and the implications that would follow, the speakers were unanimous on the need for realiable security safeguards for neighboring countries, given that Germany had been the source of threat to this country on two occasions in this century, with the last war carrying away 20 million Soviet lives.

A number of speakers, meanwhile, pointed to a weakening of the Warsaw Pact's military potential, which had for years been an important way of insuring this country's and its allies' security. Barring overtones, all the speakers agreed it was early yet to consider the military threat to the country as something long past, something the governments and the public in other countries—notably in the United States—may well (?do) to know. Given that a number of government officials in Washington continue to assure the United States public of the existence of the Soviet threat, albeit less than before, the Americans must know what the Soviet public is feeling about national security.

For his part, Andrey Kokoshin, who is just back from a tour of the United States, insisted that the issue of security must not be broken into two parts, since the problem of military threat is interlinked and cannot be severed. He said any upsetting of the existing balance can tip either way. He said it must be maintained at lower ceilings later. That, in itself, could provide equal security for both sides.

Options for Future of Warsaw Pact Weighed

German Role in NATO Examined

LD0303195890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Mar 90

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Excerpts] As you realize, the end of postwar Europe could not have failed to put the question of the unification of Germany onto a practical footing. The first steps are already being taken toward resolving it. There is an enormous number and variety of issues involved, but the most acute of them, perhaps, is that of the military and political status of a united Germany.

Well, the question is: Will a united Germany be a member of NATO, or will it remain outside the blocs—in other words, will it be a neutral state? Our government inclines, naturally, toward the second option—the neutralization of Germany. I understand very well both the logic and the psychology of that position, and yet some quite considerable doubts remain.

Suppose we get our way, and Germany becomes neutral. But will this strengthen stability in Europe? Let us put the question in that way. I fear that it won't. Germany is not Austria or Switzerland, and it isn't difficult to imagine that both in and around Germany itself, despite all statements to the contrary, we'd see the beginning of an endless struggle to incline the compass needle of German sympathies toward one's own side. And this tug-of- war between East and West—between us and, say, the Americans—could be a constant source of suspicion and distrust, a constant source of destablization in Europe. And that is the very thing we want to avoid. Well, my argument is of course hypothetical, but I think this hypothesis is quite within the bounds of reality.

Now another option: a unified Germany joins NATO. Well, of course there's no denying that this would underline what would be for us a major political defeat; but after all, comrades, the transformation of the GDR is only part of the picture. It's a consequence. The point is that we are forced--and here I'm using the old political language, the terminology of the old political thinking—we're forced to withdraw from East Europe, pull out our troops from there, and allow each country and each nation to choose its own path. And ultimately this is a victory for common sense, a victory for a really rational policy, a victory for democracy. But in order to reach that ultimate point, we've got to overcome a great many of the conventional stereotypes to which we've become accustomed.

Well, it's hardly likely—we can look at the map—it's hardly likely that the inclusion of the present territory of the GDR in the territory of NATO could affect our security in any degree. After all, in the nuclear age, comparisons with 1914, or 1939, or 1941 are entirely meaningless. And it's scarcely reasonable, either, to view one or another of the options for the status of Germany from the point of view of violation or nonviolation of the military-strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. That balance will be violated, and is already being violated, but by quite different factors. The Warsaw Pact has ceased to be an organization of fraternal states—that is, of states sharing a common political ideology. Interests have been purged of ideology. A completely different situation has been created. It's hard to imagine, say, that Poland, for example will leave the Warsaw Pact in the near future. [passage omitted: "An influential Polish newspaper" (unnamed) says Poland may remain in the Warsaw Pact, but would not take the side of the USSR in a war between the blocs; Horn cited as saying Hungary could join various NATO political organizations; the "conventional rhetoric" of the Warsaw Pact, Bovin says, should now be avoided]

But let's get back to the subject of Germany. The important thing is that a unified Germany should not become a threat to peace. [passage omitted: in itself, membership or nonmemberhsip of NATO would be no guarantee of a peaceloving new Germany; the West is seeking compromise; NATO forces should be kept out of GDR territory, or Soviet forces could remain there. Dienstbier quoted on "symbiosis of Good Soldier Svejk, Franz Kafka and Josef Stalin." The debate will be long and difficult and no possibility should be discounted in advance. Pro's and con's should be weighed from viewpoint of tomorrow's Europe, and what that will be like depends on perestroyka. The strengthening of democracy is "the dominant trend of the second half of the 20th century"]

'Dissipation' of Pact Viewed

LD0203231890

[Editorial Report] Moscow International Service in Czech at 1800 GMT on 1 March carries an eight-minute interview with Moscow radio commentator Yuriy Solton by an unidentified interviewer on the future of the Warsaw Pact. The date and place of the interview are not given. The interviewer speaks in Czech while Solton replies in Slovak.

Solton is asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn's recent statement on the possible joining of NATO by Hungary, and the NATO attempt to encompass a unified Germany are indications of a trend towards the dissipation of the Warsaw Pact.

He replies that the changes in both East and West Europe will naturally influence the nature of the Pact. "But I cannot see any prospects for its dissipation in the near future," he notes. He then goes on to recall that although the Pact and NATO and their approximate military parity in the past were a guarantee of European security, at the same time they led to tension and to a risk of military conflict. He goes on to say that the Vienna talks will considerably lower the threat of war and will build confidence, "but the two treaties will not disappear even then."

Asked whether this pronouncement means a forecast of their long existence, Solton points to the trend toward unification of Germany to show how risky it is to make forecasts. "But as far as the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance are concerned, then realism provides an incentive to preserve them in the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that they should be preserved forever." The USSR is always against the policy of alliances and advocates a system of collective security, he says.

Asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and perhaps even from Poland, as well as the ensuing disparity between the numbers of Soviet and U.S. troops, including British and French troops, is not likely to contribute to a weakening of the Warsaw Pact, Solton quotes Colonel General (Igor Sergeyev), deputy commander in chief of the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces. In his view, which was published in the press recently, the changes in the Warsaw Pact—including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from allied territories—"will be a loss for us from the military viewpoint and will shift the danger of war toward the Soviet borders." The general also maintains, says Solton, "that all considerations of replacing a military-political treaty with a political-military one are only a small joy; it is only a play on words." Solton disagrees with this view and says that the Pact and NATO will be able to contribute to strengthening European security in particular as a political treaty. However, he understands (Sergeyev's) concern as the concern of a soldier. He notes that these concerns stem from the stereotypes of the past. At present the Soviet Union will meet all its obligations within the pact, but will not force its military presence on anybody. Thus the question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary evoked no principal objections in Moscow. The correlations of forces will not be affected by these withdrawals. Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as other Pact states, confirmed the allegiance to their obligations even after their changes of leadership.

Speaking about the "negative" Polish stance on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Solton says "I think that Poland has felt the need to have reliable guarantees, including military ones, of her security with regard to the possibility of German unification and its joining NATO." Today we are facing the fact that germany, once unified, will join NATO. But since Chancellor Kohl refuses to guarantee the inviolability of the present European borders, then this stance, in Solton's view, reaffirms the necessity of preserving the Warsaw Pact.

Asked about a proposed special status for the GDR, which would take into account the security interests of all interested countries, including the Soviet Union, Solton says that the USSR has its own ideas of ensuring its future, "and the variants which presuppose the membership of a unified Germany in NATO do not fit these ideas."

Solton goes on to answer a question on the obsolete structure of the Warsaw pact. He says: This structure does not correspond to the present situation, and that it is necessary to earnestly and without delay take up the internal affairs of the treaty, to make a decision of how will the Political consultative Committee operate and to consider a more specific forms of coopertion with NATO. These questions are getting more and more topical, he says in conclusion.

Shevardnadze, Council of Europe Leaders Meet

LD0203203390 Moscow TASS in English 1948 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—A businesslike and specific conversation on the development of mutually advantageous ties between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe was held today by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze with chairman of the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe Portuguese Foreign Minister Deus Pinheiro and Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Catherine Lalumiere.

It was agreed to continue contacts and boost cooperation first of all in such areas as law, including human rights, culture, education, environmental protection, information, and health services, also by the Soviet Union's joining a number of conventions of the Council of Europe and participation in specialised institutions of the council.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions about the development of the European process. Its growing role as a very important factor of stability in Europe was emphasised.

The Soviet side declared that changes underway in Europe, also in relations between two Germanies should be synchronised with the European process which began with the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. The Soviet side declared that the emergence of any elements destabilising the situation in Europe is impermissible.

The sides arrived at a consensus about the importance of convening in 1990 a summit conference of European countries, the United States and Canada.

It was emphasised that the present favourable situation in Europe, the establishment of the philosophy of East-West cooperation necessitate constant increase of the potential of interaction between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe and put on the agenda upgrading their relations.

Shevardnadze also had a separate conversation with Pinheiro. They discussed Soviet-Portuguese relations and prospects for their further development.

Club of Rome Executive Members Visit USSR

Shevardnadze, President Meet

PM0103093190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "At the USSR Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] On 27 February E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, received A. King, president of the Club of Rome, who is in the USSR in connection with the sessions of the club's executive committee (council) in Moscow.

During the discussion E.A. Shevardnadze talked about the USSR's foreign policy efforts aimed at solving today's global problems and made an assessment of the renewal processes in the USSR and the East European countries. Support was expressed for the activities of the Club of Rome, which carries out wide-ranging socioeconomic research and comes up with interesting initiatives in the sphere of environmental protection. There was an exchange of opinions on questions relating to the 1992 UN conference on the environment and development, which is intended to define the main avenues for international nature conservation activity for many years to come, and which the USSR has proposed be held at summit level.

Taking part in the talks were K. Furgler [name as transliterated], vice president of the club; B. Schneider, secretary general of the club; and Academician D.M. Gvishiani, member of the club's executive committee from the Soviet Union.

Primakov Receives Club Members

PM0203171790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Moscow Meeting"]

[Text] The presidency is designed to be an instrument for overcoming difficulties in the current period of complex and ambiguous processes taking place in the USSR. This was stressed by Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, during a 28 February meeting in Moscow with members of the Club of Rome Executive Committee.

The guests' interest in the current activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the changes in the structure of power in the Soviet Union—which were discussed with them at their request—is no accident. In their assessment the members of the Soviet parliament are now creating modern history. It was noted that the European climate and the future of the entire world will largely depend on processes in our state, as will the continuation of detente and the deideologization of international relations as a counterweight to confrontation and the whipping up of tension. In the opinion of A. King, president of the Club of Rome, all the processes taking place in the USSR and worldwide—geopolitical, economic, ecological—are interlinked. During the talks he mentioned the results of the two-day session of the Club of Rome Executive Committee held this time in the USSR. The activity of this widely known nongovernmental organization is devoted to analyzing and forecasting overall global changes in the world.

Taking part in the talks were Ch.T. Aytmatov, member of the Club of Rome and USSR people's deputy, and

Academician D.M. Gvishiani of the USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the Club of Rome Executive Committee.

Primakov, Goerens Discuss Europe Situation

LD0303174290 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the Soviet Parliament, met and talked here today with Charles Goerens, president of the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly. They paid particular attention to the building of a common European home and the strengthening of the new world order.

The sides exchanged views on democratic transformations in East European countries and discussed in detail the situation in Europe in the light of the planned unification of the German Democratic Republic and West Germany. They voiced firm conviction of the inviolability of the present borders.

Primakov and Goerens emphasised the need to develop ties between Soviet and West European parliamentarians, which would undoubtedly have a salutary impact on the efforts to promote peace and security in Europe.

EC's Israeli Settlement Policy Discussed

Gerasimov Rejects Direct Flights

LD0203150290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Excerpts] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists has been held at the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry Comrade Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, spoke. [passage omitted]

To the question put by a journalist from the United Arab Emirates as to what the reaction of the Soviet side would be to the possible retention of trade restrictions for the USSR by the U.S. Congress in the event that it refuses to permit the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel on Israeli aircraft, Comrade Gerasimov replied:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] We do not have direct flights. Aeroflot has made several charter flights to Israel to transport groups of Soviet artistes and cultural figures for guest tours. We do not permit any direct flights to take Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality there, whether by our aircraft or the aircraft of the El Al air company. While Israeli plans exist to settle Soviet Jews on the occupied Arab territories we shall not give such permission. [end recording]

Perfilyev Cites 'Illegal' View

PM2802143390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] The EC member countries regard the creation of Jewish settlements in the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, including East Jerusalem, as illegal from the viewpoint of international law. V.P. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, reported this at a briefing 22 February, citing the statement adopted by the EC's Council of Ministers.

It expresses, he said, serious concern about the possibility of the settlement there of immigrants arriving in Israel. The foreign ministers of the "twelve" appealed to the Israeli Government "not to jeopardize the prospects for achieving peace in the region by allowing or encouraging Jewish immigrants to settle in the occupied territories."

Expressing satisfaction with the liberalization of the rules for leaving the USSR, the ministers of the "twelve" at the same time stressed that the implementation by the Soviet Jews of the right to leave their country should not be at the expense of the Palestinians' rights.

The position occupied by the EC is convincing testimony that the Israeli authorities' illegal actions regarding territories which do not belong to Israel are broadly condemned by the international community. This completely coincides with our approach, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted. As is known, the Soviet Union put forward the initiative for a Security Council examination of the question of Israel's illegal actions. We think that, relying on genuine international consensus on this question, including the coinciding principles of the USSR and the West European countries, the council will make an effective decision in the immediate future, which will prevent Israel's colonization of Palestinian lands, he said.

V.P. Perfilyev also commented on the statement by a White House spokesman that he sees no link between the organization of direct flights between the USSR and Israel and the settlement in the occupied territories of immigrants arriving in Israel. We adhere to a different viewpoint, the Soviet diplomat said, of which the U.S. side is well aware. There can be no question about the organization of air or any other link for the purpose of transporting to Israel persons of Jewish nationality who are emigrating there, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stated. The establishment of direct air links presupposes a certain level and character of relations between the two countries, he stressed.

Bush, Kohl Discuss German Reunification

Views Shared on NATO

*PM2802122390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Article prepared by A. Blinov in Washington and V. Ganshin in Moscow: "After the Camp David Meeting"]

[Text] German reunification problems were discussed at the weekend meeting between U.S. President George Bush and FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl held at the U.S. President's country residence. As a result of the discussions both leaders have advocated that, like the FRG today, a united Germany be a member of NATO; however, its eastern part should be granted "special status" in the light of the Soviet Union's security interests.

At a joint news conference following the meeting, President Bush expounded the two governments' stance in this way: "We share a common standpoint that a united Germany should remain a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty organization, including participation in its military structure. We are agreed now that U.S. Armed Forces should remain in a united Germany and in other regions of Europe, continuing their role of guaranteeing stability...." According to Chancellor Kohl, "A united Germany cannot belong to the systems of two different pacts." At the same time he did say that "transitional situations," including the presence of Soviet troops on present-day GDR territory, are possible.

Both leaders tried to dispel in every way fears that a united Germany is capable of posing a threat to its neighbors and the world as a whole from the economic, if not the military, standpoint. According to Kohl: "It is 1990 now, not 1945."

Kohl stated that "the question of German unity is a question of the right of self-determination, and all peoples on the earth have such a right."

Concerning the question of Poland, Bush said during the hour-long news conference that the U.S. stance consists in recognizing the existing postwar borders between Poland and Germany. In his opinion, the U.S. and FRG approaches to this question are at one. According to Bush, although Poland is not one of those countries holding talks according to the "two plus four" formula (the two German states and the four victorious powers), "it is obvious that no agreement concerning Polish borders can be concluded if Polish interests are not taken into account." As Kohl said, "No one intends to link the question of national unity with the question of state borders."

The chancellor, who was recently in Moscow, where he held talks with M.S. Gorbachev, also stated that Bush and he support the Soviet leader's reforms and will be making joint efforts to ensure their success.

THE WASHINGTON POST writes of Kohl's U.S. visit that the FRG chancellor came to the United States to provide necessary clarifications and assurances regarding the "fast-changing architecture upon which security and stability in Europe have been based for decades." However, he left many questions unanswered.

Kohl Remarks on Borders

*PM2802165890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6*

[Own correspondent Ye. Grigoryev "Rejoinder": "Two Logics"]

[Text] Bonn—Federal Chancellor H. Kohl returned today from distant Camp David, where he was the guest of U.S. President G. Bush. Among the problems discussed there, two topics are arousing the greatest attention on the Rhine—the question of Bonn's strict recognition of the Polish borders and the question of the future military-political status of a united Germany.

As for the borders, the chancellor repeated word for word: "No one wants to link German reunification to the question of the existing borders." But he still declined to "clarify" this question of principle. This is his argument: The FRG Government does not have the power to decide for a "pan-German sovereignty," and the final recognition of borders is exclusively a matter for a pan-German government and parliament.

Many people in the FRG consider these arguments invalid. But since that is how the head of the federal government reasons, he should follow this logic on all fundamental questions. But alas, the logic ends with the question of borders.

It is no accident that in connection with Camp David the West German newspapers are today reporting: "A united Germany should remain in NATO," "Germany to remain a full NATO member," and so forth. This condition put forward by Washington is presented as "unconditional support for the Germans' desire for unity on the part of the United States. And the most surprising thing is that today the chancellor is already expressing solidarity with this "essential condition." He speaks of the NATO membership of a possible united Germany as a settled matter.

Yet it is obvious that this is no less substantial a question than that of borders. As for confirmation of Poland's borders, this question does not provoke disagreements in the GDR as a whole or among the majority of the population and political forces of the FRG. NATO membership is a different matter, and that is common knowledge. Logically, this question should to a still greater extent be referred to the competence of a "pan-German sovereignty." But in this case the chancellor does not even mention it.

Or do they have two unpredictable logics in Bonn?

Zholkver on German Unity, Responsibility

LD0103201790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] The GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has put forward a memorandum on the question of including the unification of the two German states in the pan-European process. Here is a Latest News commentary. Our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver is at the microphone.

[Zholkver] The initiative of the GDR foreign policy department is more than topical. Now a broad international discussion of the German question is taking place. Both German states and other countries are putting forward the most diverse proposals on the problems of building German unity. Despite very substantial disagreements in their approaches and models, everyone recognizes the question of building [German unity] contains not only internal but external aspects that are no less immportant. After all, radical issues concerning security in Europe are at issue. To consider these problems, a special negotiating mechanism including, alongside the GDR and the FRG, four powers—the participants of the anti- Hitlerite coalition—has been set up. One can only welcome the fact that the GDR has already outlined, in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum, the principles of stage-by-stage German unification and its synchronization with the Pan-European process, with the creation of new structures for European security.

I think one cannot but see the most important aspect of this security is above all the inviolability of all European states. The question of the inviolability of the Polish border along the Oder and Neise is being posed with especial piognancy. The GDR has proposed that both German states, their governments, and parliaments should now make a ceremonial statement confirming the inviolability of this border. Until very recently, however, FRG Chancellor Kohl has been refusing to do this, referring to the fact that such a statement can allegedly be made only by a future government of a unified Germany. True, this argumentation has not found any support even in the Bonn provincial coalition itself. The leadership of the Free Democratic Party, of which Genscher is a member, the FRG foreign affairs minister, has been rather insistent in its demand not to postpone the decision of this most important issue, even threatening that otherwise it would pull out of the coalition.

At the same time, reports started to come in from Washington where Chancellor Kohl has just visited, that both the U.S. Administration and especially the U.S. Congress do not share his position on the question of the Polish borders. In this situation, the head of the FRG Government, as the West German press is writing today, has decided to undertake a maneuver leading to a way out of the deadlock. Bonn has made an official anouncement that Chancellor Kohl agrees to an identical statement by the FRG and the GDR parliament on the question of Poland's western border. Let us hope that all this is not just a maneuver. At any rate, the USSR, as stressed by Comrade Shevardnadze when accepting the GDR Foreign Affairs Ministry memorandum, treats with full seriousness the rights and the responsibility of the four powers in German affairs, and the need to ensure within the framework of a German peaceful settlement the lawful interests and beyond its borders.

Proektor on Pros, Cons of United Germany

PM0203114590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Prof. D. Proektor, by correspondent A. Bogomolov; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction: "'For' and 'Against' a United Germany"]

[Text] The current events in central Europe arouse diverse feelings in many of us. Sometimes you hear it said that the changes in East Europe, which for centuries was the source of many European and world conflicts, are reviving old fears.... And the greatest anxieties are probably aroused by the idea of Germany's unification.

So what attitude should be taken to this? Your correspondent put this question to a well-known Soviet Germanist—Dr. of Historical Sciences D.M. Proektor, professor of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, vice president of the USSR-FRG Society, and member of the Soviet Helsinki Group. It is possible to disagree with some points of his position, but this viewpoint has a right to exist within the framework of the current debate on the German question.

[Bogomolov] Daniil Mikhaylovich, many people are now concerned about the question of what the Germans' future unification will bring for the peoples of Europe and the peoples of our country. Many of us fear that, as a result, NATO's zone of activity will extend eastward, and we will lose our cordon sanitaire. Concern is also aroused by the fact that the FRG Government refuses to give guarantees of the inviolability of Germany's eastern borders. In general, what guarantees against a revival of the "German danger" is it possible to speak of now?

[Proektor] I can understand these anxieties, particularly for people of the older generation. We must, of course, shape our policy with due regard for the lessons of history, but while placing the chief emphasis on analysis of the present time. We must always remember that the world has changed greatly over recent decades. It is difficult to make any forecasts now—everything is in flux—but the fact that the government in Bonn has not yet given guarantees with regard to its eastern borders must not trouble us. An entire system of talks still lies ahead, and this question will be raised and the reply received. But if I am to speak frankly about the anxieties to which many of our people are prey and about the guarantees, I would say the following:

First, the profound changes in the world have chiefly affected European states, including Germany, which is being united. It is impossible to imagine now that a European state would resort to the military methods characteristic of the first half of our century to achieve its ends. Categories of economic and technological development—for example, characteristics of the postindustrial or information society—are now coming to the fore. Military methods have already been devalued within the framework of this community. And guarantees against unnecessary anxieties in the face of a uniting Germany consist, in my view, in the fact that the present conditions differ fundamentally from those prevailing on the eve of World Wars I and II.

It is absurd to resort to military methods today. I will refer, for example, to the fact that there are more than 200 nuclear power stations in Europe. Will a government really be found that is ready to arrange for 200 Chernobyls in Europe? All problems in Europe can and must be resolved by political methods alone. We were the first to acknowledge this, and now, to our satisfaction, this idea enjoys universal support.

Second, we now have to hold numerous talks. Both bilateral and multilateral (in particular, according to the "four plus two" formula). A collective system of security guarantees will be created within the framework of these talks.

Third, it must be pointed out that all European states are interested in coordinating their actions in connection with the German question. We say that German unification must take place within the framework of an overall European security program or the building of the common European home. This means that the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act (i.e. the inviolability of borders, the nonuse of force, human rights, broad European cooperation, etc.) must be observed by all without exception, and on this basis any revanchist, aggressive impulses will be limited and suppressed by collective actions. I see this as the strongest guarantee.

There are different models for the future Germany's military-political allegiance. Of course, if it stays in NATO, this will create certain difficulties, primarily of a moral and psychological nature, particularly with regard to the Warsaw Pact's present situation. In my view, and I know that my political scientist colleagues in the FRG are pondering this, the French option is the most promising—for example, membership of NATO's political organization—not its military one. Here some Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops would remain in the eastern part of Germany to denote their presence, while the Bundeswehr and NATO would not advance east of the present limit of their stationing.

[Bogomolov] Analyzing the options for Germany's future, THE NEW YORK TIMES recently wrote: "The Western leaders say that there is no cause for concern, for the united Germany will be 'tied' to NATO, and that it will be contained within the framework of the Western economic system. Does anybody really believe this nonsense—that in 10 or 12 years' time, if the Germans want to embark on a path of political or economic expansionism, they will submit to ties with an obsolete alliance or that they will be restrained by Western economies, which by then will be dependent on the new united Reich?"

[Proektor] I take a very negative attitude toward forecasts of this kind. It is, of course, possible to think up absolutely anything. But we must make assumptions proceeding from a) past experience and b) substantiated forecasts for the foreseeable future. Let us recall: For a number of decades now war has never stemmed from German soil or, as the author of the article puts it, from the "Reich." And its NATO membership has only strengthened this nonaggression because, however negative our attitude toward NATO, it is an alliance of democratic states in which there are institutions restraining any negative actions, if anyone were ever to take them.

I also do not see any stimuli that would make not only the present German Government but also future ones switch to an aggressive policy. They do not need any land gains, nor do they need a change in borders, taking account of the fact that borders are themselves changing qualitatively and soon there will be none in West Europe at all.

Now about Germany's neutralism. As Comrade Shevardnadze has pointed out, we have long advocated a neutral, peace-loving Germany. In the conditions of the "cold war" they did not come to meet us halfway, and the West evidently had its reasons then. Now, as is known, there are many different options, and history will show which will be chosen.

[Bogomolov] Addressing an election rally of the GDR conservative grouping "Alliance for Germany" a few days ago, Chancellor Kohl declared that unification will take place as early as this year. At the same time our politicians say that the unification process will take at least several years. What can account for Bonn's desire to accelerate events?

[Proektor] When any revolutionary changes take place, and we are dealing with just such a development in Germany, at the first stage their participants are always seized by euphoria when it seems that the goal is already palpable and it only remains to apply a little pressure. We are familiar with this, including in the example of our own revolution. Only later does the realization come that it is not all so simple and that it takes considerable time to achieve the tasks set by the revolution.

What is now happening in the FRG fits within this scheme. It is very simple to proclaim German unity. But it is difficult to unite the economic and social infrastructure of the two German states, which are so different. It is known that, according to both the Modrow government's calculations and other estimates, it will take astronomic sums of money to equalize the GDR economy with that of the FRG.

So why is Bonn in a hurry? It is only possible to make assumptions here. Maybe electoral considerations have a role to play. And the present general development of events in Europe.

[Bogomolov] It is sometimes possible to encounter the following thought in the FRG press: The Soviet position need be heeded only through 18 March, for after the elections it will be possible not to take any of its objections seriously.

[Proektor] There is still no peace treaty with Germany. Consequently, both German states still have a whole range of commitments. There is the Helsinki Act, the package of "Eastern treaties," and a whole number of other international-law documents signed by official representatives of both German states. Finally, there are the documents signed by M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl last summer. Consequently, we have considerable legal grounds for upholding our interests in relations with a future united Germany.

[Bogomolov] Does it not seem to you that Germany's unification nonetheless poses a threat to one of the most impressive political projects of recent years—the plan to eliminate all stockpiles of nuclear weapons by the year 2000? For in the face of a German giant the nuclear states may perceive these weapons as a natural guarantee against its likely aggressiveness (after all, politics remains the art of the possible)?

[Proektor] If there is a united Germany, very many military categories will have to be revised. Let us debate the matter. A united Germany means that the nature of the confrontation between the two blocs changes. This means that, in the case of success in building the common European home, the "forward borders" strategy might change, amendments will be made to the "flexible response" doctrine, and a decisive step is taken toward nonoffensive defense—for example, the reduction of armed forces to the minimum. We have already adopted the Bush plan to maintain the upper ceilings for the two powers' armed forces in central Europe at the level of 195,000 men.

Thus, nuclear categories will also change. Will there be any need under these conditions to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe in the mid-nineties, at their present volumes at least? I very much doubt it. In particular, I believe that Germany's unification will necessitate a new look at the problem of the "third zero,"—for example, the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons—in the sense that it could accelerate their destruction. And after this it will be possible to proceed in Europe to a strategy of minimal deterrence, as the French say. Of course, on condition that there will be a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. offensive arms and, maybe, more later.

Let us look as soberly and amicably as possible at Germany's inevitable unification. We must understand that, apart from the tragic interlacing of the fates of Russians and Germans, bright pages predominate in the history of our relations. Always in the history of Russia—during the times both before and under Peter, under Catherine, and later—ties with Germany were mutually advantageous politically, economically, and spiritually. I do not believe that our ancestors behaved unwisely by developing broad cooperation with the Germans.

I know the Germans, and not only from the war years. I am sure that they will not forget the constructive stand of the Soviet Union and Russia at such a crucial historic moment—a turning point for them.

I consider our policy on the German question to be correct, and I believe that it is necessary right now to lay the foundations of new cooperation with the future Germany in the form which it will assume in the foreseeable future.

Boehme, Kohl Stands on German Unity Assessed

LD0303092790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0530 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] Boehme, the chairman of the GDR Social Democratic Party, highly commended the conversations he held in Moscow with the leading figures in the CPSU. It became clear from the conversations in Moscow, Boehme said, that the unification of both German states is impossible, from the USSR's point of view, if the new Germany that arose became a member of NATO. This is commented on by Viktor Levin:

I won't say that we didn't talk about it previously, but, perhaps, the idea of the categorical unacceptability of the entry of a unified Germany into NATO had not been so clearly or definitely formulated. But such clarity is essential. It is essential for the Soviet people, who remember the war and the enormous losses inflicted during the struggle with Hitlerite Germany, and who, naturally, wish to have a reliable guarantee that the accursed past will not repeat itself. Clarity is essential for the Germans, so that they know what international factors they are obliged to take into account. I can easily imagine that certain circles on the Rhine will react to the Soviet position with dissatisfaction. There, many cannot imagine the future of a united Germany outside NATO. To justify that position, an argument is cited to the effect that Germany's departure from NATO would undermine the balance of forces in Europe. But it is legitimate to ask if the GDR's departure from the Warsaw Pact would not upset that balance. From the point of view of Chancellor Kohl, who clearly sees the unification process as being the absorption of the GDR by the Federal Republic, it would not upset it. But then, that opinion ignores both the position of the USSR and all Germany's neighbors, and also that of GDR citizens.

I consider that Ibrahim Boehme's statement that, in his view, the unification of both German states is impossible if the new Germany that emerges becomes a member of NATO—from the German viewpoint, too—deserves particular attention. After all, Boehme is the most likely head of the next GDR government. What he declared after the Moscow talks should, in my view, cool down the hotheads in Bonn. It is a fact that there are such hotheads, and that German arrogance—not the best quality, to put it bluntly—is already now, before the creation of a single German state, making itself felt.

Recall, if nothing else, the statement by FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg about the intention, following unification, to deploy Bundeswehr troops on the territory of the present GDR. Admittedly, that statement was harshly criticized, primarily by Foreign Minister Genscher, and Stoltenberg retracted his words. But it is a good saying that a word is not a sparrow—if it flies away, you won't catch it. It is hard to treat the defense minister's statement as a chance slip of the tongue. I know that very many Germans in the FRG do not think like Stoltenber. Moreover, they are frightened by such statements. But we too cannot—we do not have the right—just ignore them.

I once again recall our principled position. Unification of the two German states is the soveriegn right of the Germans themselves. But what will a united Germany be like in international affairs? That is a question that affects everybody. And on that subject, there seems to be a common viewpoint, which is that a unified Germany must not disturb the stability of Europe. But its membership of NATO does definitely disturb this stability. The choice must therefore be made in favor of stability.

Cartagena Summit Assessed as 'Assault'

PM2202130590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Pavel Bogomolov "Point of View" article: "The Fourth Assault on Cartagena. On the Results of the Meeting Between the Presidents of the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru"]

[Text] The annals of the Colombian port of Cartagena list three extremely fierce sieges. Back in 1586, the "jewel of the Caribbean" was captured by Sir Francis Drake, who did not burn the city to the ground only because he received a ransom of 10 million pesos. A century later Cartagena was occupied by the French. Finally, in 1741, the city's defenders successfully fought off an assault by a host of 27,000 pirates headed by Sir Edward Vernon...

The Western press described the meeting between the presidents of the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru held a few days ago in Cartagena as a kind of assault. Despite some exaggeration, this graphic description was based on perfectly serious grounds. After all, the conference did discuss immediate tasks and even a detailed schedule for a joint offensive by the governments of these countries against criminal drug trafficking, which ranks first in the pecking order of crime.

It is indeed necessary to launch an assault against the drug mafia's strongholds, whether in Medellin, "famous" for unbridled gangsterism, or in Cartagena itself, whose status as a resort is threatened by the selfsame "cocaine barons." As a matter of fact, this tourist center has been repeatedly shaken in recent months by the explosions of bombs planted by terrorists in the "Hilton" Hotel, in stores, or at its marinas. It is no wonder, as REUTER reports, that not a single cruise ship has dropped anchor there this season.

Yes, the situation is highly alarming, and this applies to the whole of Colombia and even to the entire region. In these conditions the firm resolve displayed by the participants in the Cartagena meeting deserves understanding and support: the resolve to finally pool their efforts in the struggle against organized crime and to jointly place a reliable barrier in its path. These are the intentions shown in the joint statement signed by the four presidents and by the series of special documents.

The aim of these agreements is noble indeed: to besiege the drug mafia in its nests, to cut off the "laundering" of drug dollars, and to deprive the merchants of "slow death" of broad access to the "black market" in the United States, where, as a matter of fact, the lion's share of South America's poisonous export is consumed. In other words, an important step has been taken to combat one of the main "evils of the 20th century," and it was not for nothing that the meeting's results were positively appraised by UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar.

Here is a different question: Emphasis in Cartagena was placed on administrative and police measures and on Washington's primarily militarized forms of cooperation with the Andean states, but does this conform with their long-term national interests, with their desire to put an end to backwardness and attain a qualitatively new level of socioeconomic development? After all, a radical solution of the drug problem primarily demands neither combat aircraft not armored personnel carriers, but something quite different. It is necessary to change the economic profile of vast provinces where the cultivation of coca and marijuana is the sole source of the population's existence.

True enough, the United States has now expressed readiness to assist also in this sphere. On the other hand, there is an almost total lack of readiness to import from South America the crops which could, in principle, squeeze out coca and marijuana. It was not for nothing that Colombia's President Virgilio Barco, the White House's closest ally in the struggle against drugs, was forced to declare in Cartagena that the U.S. Government's rigid protectionist measures are jeopardizing the very future of "alternative" sectors of tropical crop farming—the cultivation of coffee, flowers, and sugar cane. And so the "senior partner" appears to be tightening with the one hand the vise in which the drug mafia now finds itself, while using the other hand to protect its market from legal Latin American exports.

Finally, the last but, I think, most substantive argument. Actually, it also casts an unfavorable light on the role of consistent fighter against the drug mafia which Washington has now assumed. This argument is perfectly encapsulated in just one short word: "Panama." Indeed, did the recent aggression against this sovereign state, one of whose main motives was actually "to punish the drug business bosses," not demonstrate all the flaws of Washington's "strongarm approach" toward Latin America? And are there any guarantees that the Pentagon will not start "copying" its Panamanian experience in other countries in the continent on the pretext of pursuing the "cocaine barons"?

These are far from rhetorical questions, and it is a pity that Cartagena simply failed to provide even the slightest clear-cut answers to them.

Delegation, European Parliament Discuss Reforms

LD1602103990 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Strasbourg February 15 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sorokin:

The present-day situation in Europe and further development of the European process were discussed at a meeting between the Soviet delegation and chairman of the main parliamentary groups in the European Parliament today. This meeting in the Palace of Europe culminated the second inter-parliamentary meeting between delegations from the USSR Supreme Soviet and the European Parliament.

Aims and purposes of the follow-up Helsinki Conference and of Germany's unification were discussed.

Soviet deputies told members of the European Parliament about political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union.

Members of the European Parliament showed exceptional interest in the Soviet Communist Party's platform for the 28th party congress.

This document is of exceptional importance not only to the Soviet Union but also to the development of the European process, deputy from the West German Social Democratic Party Magdalene Hoff, who presided over the meeting, told TASS.

Members of the European Parliament described the movement towards a European community and summed up the prospects for the creation of a joint market in Western Europe.

The sides thoroughly discussed prospects for the development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Community, specifically in environmental protection, energy, transport and tourism, technological research, culture and education.

The interparliamentary meeting showed the necessity of such contacts, Maira Geoghegan-Quinn, Ireland's minister of state for coordination of government policy and EC affairs, told the meeting.

Members of the European Parliament were interested in the processes in the Soviet Union and expressed understanding for difficulties experienced by the USSR, A.I. Volskiy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence and State Security, told TASS.

The participants in the meeting agreed that interparliamentary dialogue should be developed. Members of the European Parliament said that the USSR Supreme Soviet should form a permanent delegation for cooperation with the European Parliament.

Adamishin Addresses UN Human Rights Commission

LD0203020490 Moscow TASS in English 2114 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Geneva March 1 TASS—People can have different opinions of changes that swept the world, especially Europe, but one cannot fail to see that a real breakthrough towards democracy is taking place, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin said today at the 46th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. This democratic revolution is fully supported by the Soviet Union.

Adamishin said that the Soviet Union favoured the development of constructive elements in the work of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. This calls for the universalisation of the basic norms and agreements. This is why the Soviet Union again urges the countries which have not signed international human rights pacts to join the majority of the world community.

Universalisation has one more aspect, Adamishin stressed further. An urgent need has emerged to analyse all international problems—from disarmament to ecology—from the point of view of ensuring human rights and the right of the freedom of choice for all nations. The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate in the sphere of human rights, but it is also open for criticism, advice and visits. However, we do not recognise anybody's right to ultimate truth.

According to Adamishin, the USSR supports the work of the commission which opposes gross and massive human rights violations on occupied Arab territories, in the south of Africa and in other parts of the world. Progress in the protection of human rights is the main meaning of international cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. The Soviet Union proposes to consider confidence-building measures in the humanitarian sphere, because they can play a positive part there no less than in the military sphere.

UN Approach to USSR Debt Problem Hailed

LD0103165490 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 1 Mar 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—The Soviet Union hails the United Nations' search for ways to resolve the problem of debts, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS. The spokesman was commenting on the Soviet Union's attitude towards the appointment last December of former Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi as the U.N. secretary-general's personal representative to settle the problem of foreign debt.

The Soviet Union hopes that consultations of the U.N. secretary-general's representative in various countries will widen the basis for joint activities on the debt issue.

The Soviet Union favours the internationalisation of aproaches to the problem, for the search for mutually acceptable ways to it and the consideration of all of its aspects—financial, economic, social and political, the spokesman said.

The Soviet Union considers the failure to bring together the two approaches to this problem—the individual approach based on each debtor's specific profile and the global approach envisaging equal distribution of preferences between all debtors—as one of the main reasons for the futility of the measures taken. At the same time these two approaches supplement each other, he said.

The USSR suggests the coordination of the general principles of the settlement of the debt problem which could be the pattern for further negotiations between debtors and creditors, the diplomat said.

The Soviet Union is seeking ways it may be included in the process, which could become an important material guarantee of equal and responsible developing countries' participation in the world economic process.

The Soviet Union has invited the international community to discuss a number of proposals to alleviate the developing countries' debt burden with due account of world credit experience. The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said, in particular, broader market debt regulation mechanisms should be applied, safeguarded by governmental support both on a national and international level.

Security Issues in Wake of Cold War Viewed

PM2102161190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Observer Vasiliy Pustov article under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Views": "In the Name of Stability and Security"]

[Text] The legacy of World War II and the cold war—the presence of troops and bases on foreign territories—is still having a very adverse effect on the situation in the world. The United States firmly retains first position in this respect: Approximately 1,500 bases and other military installations are located in more than 30 countries and accommodate half a million U.S. servicemen. Concentrated around the perimeter of the Soviet Union and its allies, these bases are crammed with the most modern combat means, including nuclear weapons.

The Soviet countermeasure—the presence of our troops in four countries—the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—is in vivid contrast with the Pentagon's global web of bases. The Soviet Government has adopted a decision to withdraw our troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Corresponding talks are now taking place intermittently. Working groups have been set up to resolve military-technical and other problems. And the problems, it has to be said, are very complex. For more than 35,000 officers and ensigns and approximately 30,000 families who, as a rule, do not have apartments have to be brought back to the motherland. It will be necessary to assign 19,000 children to schools. Another complexity is connected with the fact that the border railroad junction at Chop, through which freight flows to and from several European countries, can handle a strictly limited number of troop trains every 24 hours.

Mindful of these problems, the Soviet side has declared its readiness to resolve all questions connected with the withdrawal of its troops on a mutually acceptable basis. Thus, during talks between Soviet and CSSR experts a schedule was drawn up under which our troops will leave Czechoslovakia. The first stage of the withdrawal will begin 26 February and end 31 May this year.

As a spokesman for the president of the Republic of Poland declared, the Soviet troops in that country constitute an element of a structure which ensures equilibrium in Europe and are an important factor in guaranteeing the security of Poland's western borders. Their withdrawal could result from favorable developments on the territory of Germany and of Europe, including the definitive recognition of Poland's borders. Poland must also receive guarantees from the great powers on this question. The USSR has given such guarantees.

At the same time the question of the Soviet troops is being actively debated in the Polish mass media. Some people—among them L. Walesa, the influential chairman of the "Solidarity" trade union—believe that the Soviet troops must be withdrawn before the end of this year, while others think that this should not be before three years are up, otherwise the equilibrium of forces in Europe will be upset.

Thus, it seems to me that the formulation of the question of a Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland should not be ruled out. It is better to prepare in advance for such a turn of events. "If the government of the Republic of Poland expresses a corresponding desire, then we could also discuss with its representatives the question of the Soviet troops in that country," the Soviet Government statement reads.

As for the Western Group of Forces, its presence on GDR territory, just like the presence of troops of the United States and other countries in the FRG, is a special question connected with the four powers' commitments with regard to the results of World War II. It can be resolved only with due regard for the security interests of all the states involved. The USSR is already making a unilateral reduction of its troops stationed in the GDR. Their further reduction will be possible within the framework of reaching accords at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Incidentally, an accord was reached recently which removes one of the most serious obstacles in the way of concluding a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe this year. It has been agreed that the United States and the USSR will not station more than 195,000 ground force and air force personnel on foreign territory in the central zone of Europe. In addition, the United States has agreed that it will not station more than 30,000 servicemen on foreign territory in Europe outside the central zone.

The Soviet policy of strengthening stability and security is not confined to the European continent alone. As long ago as 1988, at the Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation officially raised the question of foreign bases and troops on foreign territories. And the USSR now confirms its adherence to the earlier declared position—to withdraw all foreign troops from foreign territories in Europe by 1995-1996 and to eliminate all military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000.

The Soviet initiative elicited ardent responses and support at the United Nations, but it was ignored by official Washington and its closest allies.

However, the cold war period is over. And although the world is not yet free from the dangers of war, the new political thinking, which is successfully being introduced into the practice of international relations, is causing the question of the need to end military confrontation and to supplement political detente with military detente to be posed increasingly insistently. And the makers of the West's military policy cannot disregard this. Just as they cannot disregard the burden of colossal military expenditure, which is becoming intolerable under the conditions of the diminishing threat of war.

Washington has called its decision to cease military activity at 12 U.S. bases and military installations in Europe and Asia within four years a response to the changes in the USSR and in East European countries. Specifically, it is a question of three bases in the British Isles, one in the FRG, one in Italy, two in Greece, two in Turkey, and three bases in South Korea.

This can undoubtedly be considered a step forward in the sphere of limiting military activity. And yet the question arises: Is this a lot or a little? The answer suggests itself when you notice that there are more than 300 U.S. bases and other military installations on the territory of the European NATO countries alone. Many of them have been adapted to receive additional large troop contingents, which can be brought from the United States within a short space of time. Many others—bases and installations in Europe which are not to be eliminated—are delicately described as "having nuclear potential." All the bases serving the U.S. 6th Fleet will remain in place.

People in Britain, for example, do not overrate the planned limiting of the U.S. military presence. Thus, the Americans must in any case eliminate the base at Greenham Common, which has been adapted for cruise missiles, in accordance with the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The U.S. KC-135 tanker aircraft stationed at the Fairford base will be relocated to the base at Mildenhall.

The Greek public is not being calmed either, seriously fearing that the infrastructure will be transferred from the Hellenikon and Nea Makri bases, which are to be cut, to the other U.S. bases remaining in Greece, with additional functions being attached to them. The country's democratic forces are demanding the withdrawal of all U.S. military installations.

A still more modest reduction in the U.S. military might is planned in Asia. The airbases at Suwon, Taegu, and Kwangju (South Korea) will be mothballed so they can be used in the event of "extraordinary circumstances." It has been decided to relocate the units stationed there to the bases at Osan and Kunsan.

The United States intends to reduce its troops in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines by 10-12 percent over three years. At the same time nothing is said about hundreds of bases and military installations in these and other countries in the Asia and Pacific region. And this is not accidental. Washington is seeking to preserve there its dominant economic and political influence, above all, on the basis of its military superiority. Hence its virtual ignoring of the well-known constructive initiatives concerning the Asia and Pacific region advanced by the Soviet leader in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. position can hardly help to stabilize the situation in the region or contribute to a settlement in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula.

Even the Pentagon is beginning to realize that it is now a hopeless task to blame everything on the "Soviet threat," as it were, and that different "arguments" are required. "Even if the Soviet threat disappears forever, and this has not yet happened," Defense Secretary R. Cheney declared, "U.S. might will be needed in order to respond to various circumstances and obligations all over the world." And this cannot fail to cause concern in many countries. Particularly as the colossal military might of the United States together with that of NATO is the material basis of far from defensive doctrines and concepts: "nuclear deterrence," "flexible response," "follow-on forces attack," and others.

It is necessary and possible to resolve all vexed questions without the threat of force and with due regard for the established realities in the world and the requirements of strengthening international stability and security.

ASEAN, EEC Ministers Confer on Trade Issues

PM2702135790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Skvortsov dispatch: "Complex Dialogue"]

[Text] Singapore, 18 Feb—The foreign and economics ministers of countries belonging to ASEAN and the EEC have conducted a routine dialogue over two days in the Malaysian city of Kuching.

In accordance with established practice, any participant could raise any questions, although this time the ministers concentrated on economic and financial problems. The Asian ministers are most anxious about the EEC's being turned into a closed market in 1992.

The Europeans aver that nothing will change in their approaches to trade and financial cooperation with ASEAN even after 1992. It is no secret that people in Europe increasingly frequently view goods with ASEAN countries' markings as "Trojan horses" from Japan. After the end of the dialogue many foreign ministers on the Asian side did not hide their disappointment at its outcome as regards economic ties between the two groupings.

In a joint declaration the participants in the dialogue advocated a settlement in Cambodia on the basis of a cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, and an end to foreign military aid to the opposing sides.

Cooperation Agreement Between CEMA, Italian Bank

LD2102101790 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—A protocol on cooperation between the International Bank for Economic Cooperation [IBEC] (a bank established by member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and Instituto Bancario San Paulo di Torino, a major Italian commerical bank, was signed in Moscow on Monday.

The protocol provides for the development of business relations between the two banks in a broad range of banking operations, including the servicing of new forms of economic cooperation between partners in Italy and IBEC member countries.

Kozyrev Discusses Foreign Policy on Arms Trade

PM2602152590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with A.V. Kozyrev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Organizations Administration, by E. Guseynov; date and place unspecified: under the rubric "Competent Sources": "Our Weapons and Us"—; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The arms trade is a side of our state's foreign policy and foreign economic activity which has hitherto remained top secret. We still know nothing about how many of these specific goods our country sells to whom and for how much. Until recently another important question—how justifiable this trade is from the moral standpoint—had remained outside the sphere of public attention. We asked A.V. Kozyrev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Organizations Administration, to share his opinion with us and to give us as much information as possible on these problems.

[Guseynov] Andrey Vladimirovich, maybe we should start with the most important point: What is the arms trade from the moral standpoint—a bad thing or, perhaps, a good thing?

[Kozyrev] I would say that the trade in weapons—and the arms trade in general—is currently an unavoidable evil. Unavoidable because most states currently pin their security on acquiring weapons in foreign markets. The basis in international law for this activity is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which enshrines the right of all countries to individual and collective self-defense. [passage omitted]

[Guseynov] What is the scale and thrust of our "weapons exports"?

[Kozyrev] Unfortunately, I do not have that information. I can only recall that when asked by deputies "who controls arms sales abroad and should it not be the Supreme Soviet?", USSR Defense Minister D.T. Yazov replied: "Arms sales abroad are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in conjunction with the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry." As for controls, the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security has now been set up. The committee should assume this mission. I agree that we need also to implement the principles of glasnost in this sphere. After all, the United States, for instance, publishes very detailed information on its military exports. But we do not even publish general figures.

In civilized countries any major arms deal is controlled by parliament, while small deals are controlled by the government, without whose permission the arms trade cannot be carried out. Arms sales in the West are strictly and painstakingly regulated by special acts of legislation—they are legal in principle, and therefore there is no point making them secret.

The secrecy on our side is senseless because the scale and, therefore, the approximate cost of any weapons shipments—including ours—is no secret. They are nowadays accurately listed sometimes down to the tank—as is regularly done, for instance, by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It turns out that we are keeping secrets from our "own people."

[Guseynov] I have figures recently quoted by the West German newspaper DIE ZEIT. If they are to be believed, in 1984-88 the Soviet Union sold weapons worth $45.9 billion. This prompts a whole series of questions, not to mention the fact that this figure is almost twice as much as U.S. sales—they amounted to $23.5 billion. The main question is: Where did this money, which is comparable in size to our notorious oil exports, go?

[Kozyrev] You know, I would not want to comment on the figures you have quoted, although I would reiterate yet again that the size of international arms sales in the world is determined quite accurately. As for commercial results, I would advise you not to delude yourself. Unlike Western countries, where arms producers will in any event receive the money due them from the state or from their foreign partners, our banks may not see the billions you have mentioned.

The fact is that the overwhelming majority of Soviet arms shipments are to countries which we have traditionally considered it necessary to support for political or other reasons. That is, these are not entirely commercial or not quite commercial shipments. Soviet weaponry is often provided on preferential terms or simply gratis, as aid. At best, it is financed by soft loans. Most of the recipients of our weapons are the developing countries. Today, as a rule, they are incapable of paying their debts on the former terms. That is why it is quite possible that our arms trade will not only fail to produce the profits running into the billions you mentioned, but will show a loss.

[Guseynov] There is one other question which clearly cannot be sidestepped. I admit that many of our countrymen, worn out by our economic adversity, would say if they were asked whether the arms trade is a good or bad thing that they do not care provided that the trade made the country's economic position even a little bit easier. Are we not threatened by some moral distortion if we raise the arms trade to the level of ordinary business?

[Kozyrev] Of course, the arms trade is not an ordinary business, but it is a business. The question is simply which moral criteria should be the basis for the policy and legislation—international or internal—which regulate this trade.

Naturally, laws and practice are different everywhere. In a number of countries with many centuries' experience of this trade, when licences are issued for arms sales, an analysis is made of the character of the type of weapon in question, the position in the client country and, specifically, the human-rights situation. Also taken into account are the employment position at the manufacturing enterprise and the existence of embargoes by the United Nations or other international organizations.

We will inevitably have to introduce such legislation in our country too. It should accord with the principles of the policy of new thinking which we have implemented in recent years in the international arena and with the demands of international law, and it should take our country's economic interests into account.

Interpol Official on Possible Soviet Membership

PM0203125790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[A. Urvantsev report under the rubric "At the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs": "Will We Join Interpol?"]

[Excerpts] It has already been announced that an international seminar on problems of crime prevention is under way in Moscow at the Oktyabrskaya Hotel. Its participants—representatives of law-enforcement bodies and government and nongovernmental organizations from 24 countries—are elaborating joint actions on crime prevention and reduction.

R. Kendall, secretary general of Interpol and a participant in the seminar, addressed a briefing at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] devoted to the seminar's work. He first explained the nature of Interpol.

The headquarters of our own international criminal police organization is in the French city of Lyons. At present, it includes 150 countries. Interpol is a vast data bank relating to events and facts linked with crimes, the drugs business, thefts of valuables, and forgers' activities.

[Unidentified correspondent] When will the USSR join Interpol and what conditions are necessary for that?

[Kendall] The procedure for any country to enter our organization is quite simple. An application form is sent to me, it is then discussed by the executive committee. After a positive decision is made, the country's request is examined at the general assembly, which is held once a year. It makes the final decision. Throughout Interpol's existence the general assembly has never adopted a negative decision.

This year the general assembly will be held in Ottawa in October and if the Soviet Union submits its application at the proper time and in the requisite form, the decision will be made in Ottawa.

[Unidentified correspondent] What subscription fees would the USSR have to pay?

[Kendall] I have already discussed this question with the Soviet authorities, no final decision has been adopted as yet. But I want to stress that this does not mean that there have been any difficulties here. This question is quite complex and it is simply impossible to name a specific sum straight off. Consultations and talks are needed. I would add that, as far as I am aware, the Soviet Union has serious intentions of entering Interpol. [passage omitted].

[Unidentified correspondent] After paying the entry fee will our national center be equipped with various equipment at Interpol's expense?

[Kendall] The country is responsible for equipping the national Interpol center. I would point out that the communications equipment is not expensive now, it can be acquired by any country. We make recommendations as to what apparatus should be installed to ensure that it is compatible with the global communications system.

I believe that a vast country like the Soviet Union will need the international cooperation that Interpol can provide.

TASS To Have Communication Satellite System

LD0203140090 Moscow TASS in English 1154 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Washington March 2 TASS—By TASS correspondents Igor Borisenko and Vladimir Prosviryakov:

Prospects to develop global satellite communication systems, technical, economic and legal aspects of broad international information exchange, and new areas of development of technology are on the agenda of the international conference "Satellite-9". Problems of the Next Decade," which is under way here.

The conference is being held by the SATELLITE news journal and the International Society of Satellite Communication Professionals.

United States Vice President Dan Quayle, head of the National Space Council, urged the conference to discuss problems not only of this decade but also of the early 21st century.

In a special address at the conference he expressed satisfaction with the fact that the conference focused its attention on the possible commercial utilisation of outer space.

Successful development of space enterprises, he stressed, will undoubtedly be of vital significance for the economic development of the United States and help increase U.S. industrial competitiveness, he stressed.

Meeting in seminars and working groups, participants in the conference discussed the more efficient utilisation of communication satellites of the major international Intelsat and Utelsat organisations.

Users of satellite communications systems should be able to have direct negotiations with these international organisations, Peter Marshall, a representative of the Schafer Corporation Telecommunication firm, said. National communication ministries have increasingly hampered the expansion of international information exchange, he underscored.

A report, made at the conference on behalf of Soviet news agency TASS General Director Leonid Kravchenko, has been received with lively interest. The report assesses possibilities of designing and developing contemporary telecommunication systems in the USSR.

The report said that TASS, one of five world news agencies, should have its own communication satellite system. The Soviet Communication Ministry has decided to grant TASS the right to organise such a system. This is an unprecedented decision, illustrating the Soviet state's new approach to information exchange.

"Relying on opportunities offered by satellite communication, we are planning to introduce stage-by-stage, within two or three years, a circular subsystem to distribute news and photo services among subscribers. Then, a subsystem will be formed to ensure bilateral exchanges of textural, facsimile, audio and photo information between the TASS central apparatus in Moscow and its local bureaus, as well as other news agencies and subcribers," the reported noted.

The satellite communication system will be global, since TASS bureaus and subcribers are scattered all over the world. To transmit its information TASS plans to use Intelsat satellites that are already in orbit.

As an example of fruitful international cooperation, the report pointed to the trial transmission of information through Soviet communication Gorizont satellites and equipment from the American firm Contel.

Trial transmissions of information through a satellite channel, relying on a powerful television beam, have proved a success. Such a method of transmitting information was earlier used for military purposes and for radio astronomy.

It can be used in areas that require enhanced noise immunity—for instance, in major cities with a high level of electromagnetic disturbances.

East, West Journalists Discuss E. Europe Changes

LD2702221490 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Paris February 27 TASS—By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev:

The first informal meeting of journalists from the East and the West is being held here under the auspices of UNESCO. More than 70 representatives of the media and journalist organisations of 18 European countries, the United States and Canada are participating in the meeting.

The Soviet delegation includes chief editor of OGONYOK magazine V. Korotich, chief editor of the weekly "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY" V. Starkov, representatives of IZVESTIYA newspaper, of publications in the Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as of the USSR Journalists' Union.

The two-day meeting is to discuss the present state of the press, radio and television in East European countries, problems of news organisations in light of radical changes taking place in East European countries and possible ways to develop international cooperation in journalism.

An important task of UNESCO is to support all efforts aimed at the creation of independent, free and pluralistic press in Europe and in all other parts of the world, said UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor, welcoming the participants in the meeting.

He said that the press, radio and television make a substantial contribution to democratisation, as was confirmed once again by the events that have taken place in East Europe.

They provide information about the life of society. They help people engage in political debates, ensure a dialogue with the authorities and are used as an instrument of public control to prevent abuses.

But all this is possible only if genuine freedom exists in society and the media are independent and varied, he said.

Bulgarian journalists have an opportunity to state their views openly, said Encho Gospodinov, editor-in-chief of the weekly POGLED.

An independent union of journalists has been formed. New publications, including those that reflect the interests of the opposition, now exist.

Journalists still face certain problems: Their lack of experience in organising the activity of newspapers in a market economy, and the need to adopt new criteria to a journalists' training.

Secretary-general of the Hungarian Journalists' Association Gabor Bencsik summed up the experience of independent commercial television in Hungary.

It seems that many journalists are unprepared to work in the new conditions, said Katarzyna Kolodzecza, secretary of the Polish Journalists' Association. Stereotyped thinking interferes with people of the older generation, while young journalists lack professionalism. This is why the training of journalists and the development of international contacts in journalism will help consolidate democracy, she said.

The journalists' meeting continues.

United States & Canada

U.S. Radio Broadcasts Promote 'Cold War Spirit'

LD0303133290 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] New York (United Nations) March 3 TASS—A group of senior officials of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, who attended the recently concluded Soviet-American meeting in Washington on information exchanges, have held a briefing at the United Nations headquarters for journalists accredited at the U.N.

Touching upon the activities of a number of radio stations that operate under the control of U.S. authorities, Soviet representatives pointed out in particular that the activities of Radio Liberty (RL), which is subsidised by the U.S. Government, obviously stirs up inter-ethnic conflicts.

This particularly manifested itself during the coverage of events in Transcaucasia when Radio Liberty beamed overtly provocative broadcasts following the introduction of the state of emergency in Azerbaijan.

A Radio Liberty correspondent, who was present at the briefing, through his questions tried to cast doubt on the legitimacy of such description of the RL broadcasts. Besides, he referred to the fact that Radio Free Europe (RFE) had received permission to open its bureaux in a number of East European countries.

Speakers at the briefing said the character of the RL-RFE broadcasts by no means promotes a change of the Soviet side's point of view on the activities of both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

The latter, in its broadcasts beamed at East European countries, obviously tries to stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments in order to undermine relations between the Soviet Union and its allies for the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The texts of a number of RL-RFE broadcasts, which patently show that they are carried out in the same cold war spirit as before, were handed over to the American side, said A.A. Lebedev, deputy head of the ideological department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Commentary Examines News Broadcasting Styles

LD1002234190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2054 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Comment by television announcer Vladimir Pozner in the studio on CNN and "Vremya" newscast video reports on events of the day as shown on the "Echo of the Day" newscast on 10 February; from the "Echo of the Day" newscast]

[Text] That is how the staff of CNN—Cable News Network, as this organization is called in the United States—news service saw today's events. You will, of course, have noticed that Gosteleradio, State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and CNN far from coincided on everything. Some topics did coincide, but more did not, not only in not being included but also because they were in a different order and, perhaps more importantly because they were commentated upon in a completely different way.

Perhaps some of you expect me to give value judgments now and to say that in some instances this was better than in others, but I'm not going to do that. Anton Pavlovich Chekhov in his day once noted that it is not possible to prove that Pushkin was better than Zlatobratskiy [Russian populist author]. And it is indeed impossible; it is not an exact science. Time alone can judge—if you like—but when it comes to television programs and not only ours but all of them, throughout the world, in 25 years they will all sink into oblivion and no one will remember them at all. No, it is not a question here of value judgments but of understanding certain, in my view, important truths. The first is that when we watch a news program we are always watching someone's selection. Second, that the program is determined by a whole range of factors among which, is, of course, professional skill but also political outlook, personal tastes and, of course, short-term concern. That's what it's like. Third, one needs, obviously, to bear in mind that every station, Gosteleradio too and CNN which we have watched and all the rest, present the news as an absolute truth: This is what happened today; whereas in fact and this is the fourth truth, a lot of different things took place and we have been shown what it was deemed necessary to show. There is nothing terrible and nothing to be condemned in this. In the end, every television station is dependent, be it on the government, a private owner, or a company. And, as is well known, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Of course, a more intelligent person would say: There's the music, but you can play variations or even improvise. A less flexible and more stupid person would say: Oh no! Just play according to these scores, my scores! But neither of them would say: You can play a totally different piece for my money. It doesn't happen like that. I repeat, it is natural that each television organization makes its own selection.

Let's suppose, and I repeat, let's suppose that all these television stations really are striving for the truth and that that is their main priority, that they don't respond to phone calls, wherever they're from, or to pressure: You're my friend, but the truth is more precious. I repeat, let's suppose that is what it is like. However, even in that event, we are dealing with a subjective selection. I'm not talking about the situation in which the selection is tendentious or we are given not an echo of the day but a badly deformed echo and, that—let's be blunt—has happened. We have supposed, nonethless, that there's none of this and that there is a desire to provide an accurate reflection. I repeat that this desire is, inevitably, subjective. For this reason, as I see it, for us to have a really sound echo, there must be more than one source, not just one television service and, in addition to the USSR Gosteleradio, there should be another television service, not of the state, but very different and not just one or two, but lots of them. And we could compile some kind of whole; after listening to various echoes of the day, something we would have arrived at by comparing the various echoes. I think this would be useful for each of us and for the whole of our society. I also think that it would be extremely pleasant and useful too, if the "Echo of the Day" came to the end of a given day rather than at the start of the next. And that's all.

I wish you all a pleasant Sunday.

REUTER Cites Bush on Call to Gorbachev

PM0203173790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE report: "Nicaragua and East Europe Discussed. News Agencies on Phone Conversation Between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush"]

[Text] "President George Bush has telephoned Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and the two leaders talked for approximately 30 minutes on events in Nicaragua and East Europe." Neither UPI, which carried these lines, nor other world agencies were able to give any other details in their first reports on the content of the conversation. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, UPI reports from Washington, announced the phone conversation in a brief statement which did not give any details. President Bush, who talked with the Soviet leader immediately before setting off on a five-day tour of the United States, also refused to answer any questions on this score from journalists as he was leaving the White House. Admittedly, a REUTER report, noting this detail, holds out the hope that Bush would be more forthcoming at a news conference in California planned for the end of this week.

To judge by the agency reports those correspondents who were aboard the presidential plane were luckier. From Bush's statements during the flight from Washington to New York they could get an idea, if not of the details of the conversation, at least of how the President assessed its tenor, what importance he attached to it, and, at the same time, why he was being so tight-lipped about the details. "It was a good and very constructive talk. It is important that confidentiality be preserved on such things, if we want to have discussions just as frankly as we have had," Bush said, supporting the idea of holding similar consultations in the future as well: "We agreed that such talks are very useful. I believe we should make this sort of thing a more frequent practice..." He told journalists he was satisfied with the way in which "Moscow accepted the results of Sunday's elections in Nicaragua." Bush also said that he had confirmed to Gorbachev his intention to move forward on arms control issues in line with the agenda put forward by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during their recent talks in Moscow. Both sides, REUTER commented, are hoping to conclude an agreement on conventional arms and a treaty on strategic nuclear arms reduction this year.

Second Round of USSR-U.S. Trade Talks Opens

LD0103204690 Moscow TASS in English 2033 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] London March 1 TASS—The second round of Soviet-American talks on a new Soviet-U.S. trade agreement began in London.

The sides are considering the expansion of mutually advantageous economic cooperation.

The Soviet delegation is led by Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Yuriy Chumakov, the American—by Julius Katz, deputy of the U.S. representative at trade talks.

The first round of Soviet-American trade talks was held in Washington in February.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Rally Demands Emergency Party Congress

LD0403085790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0804 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 4 Mar (TASS)—A rally and demonstration attended by thousands were held in Ulaanbaatar today. The organizers wre the Mongolian Democratic Union, the Socio-Democratic Movement, the New Progressive Union, and the Union of Mongolian Students. The rally made public a joint statement addressed to the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic and to the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The document demands the convening in March of an emergency congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which should revamp the Central Committee and separate the functions performed by party and state bodies. The document also proposes creating during March a provisional People's Hural with all public forces taking part with equal rights, with the aim of adopting a national constitution and law on elections and on holding democratic elections.

The participants in the rally then marched toward the government building, where their representatives handed over the joint statement to Bat-ochiryn Luvsantseren, member of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural and chairman of the Central Council of Mongolian Trade Unions.

Mongolia's Batmonh Pleased With Withdrawal Talks

LD0203143590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0850 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] J. Batmonh, general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic, has received the Soviet delegation which took part in the Soviet-Mongolian talks on the timescale and sequence of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia.

J. Batmonh expressed satisfaction with the successful conclusion of the talks. The forthcoming final withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Mongolian territory, he said, is a clear manifestation of the determination of the governments of Mongolia and the Soviet Union to work together to strengthen the atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding in the region in a spirit of the new political thinking. Mongolian-Soviet cooperation in the defense sphere will continue to be developed and strengthened in the future.

Present at the meeting were T. Gombosuren, Mongolian minister of foreign affairs; Lieutenant General D. Molomjamts, Mongolian minister of defense; and V.I. Sitnikov, USSR ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic.

Protocol Signed on Troop Withdrawal

PM0503103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Troops Will Be Withdrawn"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 2 Mar—The Soviet-Mongolian talks on the timing and procedure for the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia ended here today. They were held in an atmosphere of friendship and full mutual understanding. A working protocol was signed.

By agreement between the USSR Government and the Mongolian Government a full Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolian territory will be carried out during 1991-1992. The main combat strength of the Soviet troops in 1991, and the military units ensuring the removal of materiel will be withdrawn in 1992.

Agreements were also signed on the transfer to the Mongolian side without payment of the airfields and military camps vacated after the withdrawal of a considerable proportion of the Soviet troops during 1989-1990.

More on Troop Withdrawal Protocol

LD0503175490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] One of the important signs of our time is the agreement with a number of states of Eastern Europe on the time limits and procedures for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territory. This strengthens mutual trust and serves as proof of our peace-loving foreign policy. And in Asia, too, in the city of Ulaanbaatar, talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia have ended. Our correspondent there, T. Lordkipanidze, reports:

[Lordkipanidze] Representatives of the two countries have signed protocols which say that next year the fighting strength of the troops will return to the homeland, and in 1992, the units guaranteeing the withdrawal of material resources. [Video shows representatives of both sides at table signing documents, with military men and civilians shown in the background. The documents are signed and exchanged. Video switches to shot of mongolian military representative being interviewed]

Shagalyn Jadambas, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Mongoligan People's Republic [MPR] [deputy minister of defense], said Soviet soldiers served in Mongolia at the request of our government. That was evoked, first of all, by the tension on the country's southern border. Such a need no longer arises in a time when the policy of detente and peace is a reality, and when the atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding between neighboring countries is strengthening. Soviet troops are leaving, but the cooperation or our armies on a new basis will continue to develop and strengthen.

How do people in Mongolia asess the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops? [video shows shots of people in the streets; shot of individial interviewed in street—identified from caption as D. Ninj, member of the Presidium of the Coordination Council of the Mongolian Democratic Union]

[Ninj in vernacular, fading to Russian translation] As a citizen of the MPR, I welcome the decision. As a representative of the Mongolian Democratic Union, I consider it has been adopted in very good time. Soviet units came to Mongolia not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, but as guarantors of the stability of our borders, of people's peaceful labor. Now the soldiers are leaving, but the houses in which they lived and the schools in which their children studied, the clubs, hospitals and stadiums, are being left for the Mongolian people.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Gerasimov Queried in Manila

HK0303050690 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network in English 1430 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Interview with Gennadiy Gerasimov, USSR Government spokesman on the "Velez This Week" program, hosted by Jose Mari Velez—recorded, date not given]

[Text] [Velez] Mr. Gerasimov, thank you very much for this opportunity to have you on "Velez This Week". You are a man who, of course, can excite many people with your statements, with your knowledge of the events, and your intimacy with the personalities involved in all of these sweeping reforms and developments going on in Soviet Russia and in Europe.

Now, let me start on something that is close to our hearts—the American bases in the Philippines—and then we will get on to other developments with Moscow and other areas.

You are of course aware of...

[Gerasimov] Let us start with the bases, with the bases.

[Velez] The bases of our insecurities, as somebody said it. You are, of course, aware of some perceptible strain that seems to be developing in Philippine-U.S. relations, in particular relations to these bases, which are due for renegotiations, or in any case will expire in 1991. And somewhere along the way, you have been putting in the matter of withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay of frontline or combat troops, and eventually, withdrawal from the region, which would remove what has been at least publicly stated, a rather big reason that the Americans have cited through the years for their continued stay here. Are you doing this deliberately or is this part of another program of making it more difficult for the Americans today?

[Gerasimov] We are not doing it deliberately to affect the bases in your country. No. It is our overall policy of cutting our forces to size according to our new policy—which is to have balance of interests, instead of balance of forces. But this basic question is your question and of course, Americans must now find another reason because of our withdrawal, another reason for the existence of these bases.

Professor Galbraith, who is participating in this One Asia Assembly, talked about bureaucracy having its own truth—and if I may add, it's own logic. And as an example, he cited the Pentagon. They have their own logic. If they have a base, they must keep it there. This is their own logic. But they don't pay enough attention to the circumstances and don't have the patience either.

[Velez] Let me...[changes thought] You mentioned that the Americans must invent another reason for a continued stay, at least, in their present course.

[Gerasimov] You see, invent, not find, because they cannot find. So they must invent.

[Velez] Are you saying that there are no reasons? Before you answer the question, let me cite to you a letter that the American defense secretary who was recently here, who I think you did not meet...Your paths...

[Gerasimov] It was just a coincidence, just as by coincidence we have the same red tie.

[Velez] He did say that, in a letter to President Aquino, I think, to Mrs. Aquino, that they have seen no reason or no cutback in your defense forces or historical, political relationship that would change their perceptions of the need for the continued balance of power in Asia. In other words, you are not really, truly cutting back substantially.

[Gerasimov] He cannot prove the points because we are cutting our forces overall—armed forces by half a million, and 200,000 of our forces, we are cutting out in Asia. Also, we are putting out of commission 50-plus ships of our Pacific navy, which is, of course, small as compared to the America's Pacific fleet.

I had an argument on this point with the commander in chief of the American Pacific fleet in Honolulu, Hawaii, two years ago.

[Velez] Admiral Hardisty.

[Gerasimov] Two years ago. He is retired now, I guess. Two years ago. And he argued that they must keep that big Navy because of the Soviet Navy. But when we came down to the statistics, the figures, it was as comparing small fish to a big fish.

[Velez] Well, the argument goes further that a reduction in number may not mean that much if you introduce improved technologies. In other words, where the arms, the ships, the planes are better, faster, more efficient, more destructive and so on. So you can reduce forces...

[Gerasimov] In a way, yes, but we are not doing that either. No. Anyway, all these can be checked very easily by national technical means.

[Velez] That is the question I wanted to ask. Are these formally verifiable reductions?

[Gerasimov] Of course, they are verifiable. Especially the ships, they are there. You can look at them from above. Recently, there was a conference in Ottawa, Canada, on open skies. This was an American idea, open skies, and we want to improve on this. We accepted this idea. We want to improve this by open land and open oceans.

[Velez] Alright. In the face of this assertion from you on reduction of your presence, military presence in this region, what do you think the Americans will invent as a reason for the continued stay of the bases?

[Gerasimov] I don't want to do their work for them.

[Velez] [laughs] Don't you want to speculate?

[Gerasimov] Maybe they will cite that Asia is pregnant with regional conflicts. Maybe this.

[Velez] The world is full of certain conflicts. But Mr. Cheney did talk about some reductions, some forces in Asia. I guess this question of numbers will probably have to be debated between the two of you when you formally enter some kind of negotiations.

[Gerasimov] And this is the sign of the times. You see, in Europe, we are reducing our forces. We accepted the American suggestion, President Bush's suggestion, to cut our forces in central Europe to the level of 195,000 troops. It's a very big reduction. And we have negotiations with the United States on a 50 percent reduction of nuclear armed forces. And we came very near to the agreement with the United States on banning chemical weapons. So this is the trend of the times. So, if Europe is disarming, or is on the road to disarmament, then why must the Pacific be an exception?

[Velez] Well, let me ask you, Mr. Gerasimov: With this reduction or when you finally put this all into play, would you still constitute any kind of threat to the Philippines? Assuming you had in fact, in the past you constituted some kind of threat? As cited by the Americans.

[Gerasimov] Well, we never constituted any threat to you and the argument was that we are proclaiming our intentions and that intentions may change and tomorrow, we would want to conquer the Philippines, for instance. Which is nonsense. We are talking now about capability. And mind you, we don't have any capability now. Which is the best proof. When we talk about intentions, we can argue that we can change them overnight. But we don't have the capability. And why should we?

[Velez] We will just take a short break and be right back. [commercial break]

[Velez] As we have gone through intentions, let me go to another issue, and that is the matter of President Gorbachev's continued presence, existence and leadership, as the man who is on the forefront, the man who initiated, the leader who is practically indispensable. And in the words of some analysts, who precisely because he probably does not have any present alternatives to himself, that is his strength and his own weakness. In short, with all of these revolving around President Gorbachev, and with all of these reforms and even intentions and so on, what would happen if, for some unforeseen reason, Mr. Gorbachev is not on the scene?

[Gerasimov] Well, I don't want to speculate on this but I can say that he was the initiator of the process. He started it and he continues it, but this does not mean that he invented it. This is a process—actually our country was pregnant with this, this perestroyka. It is long overdue, actually. And so he was the first to see it as a political leader and to take a new course. God forbid that if something happens... There are other people, because the road is already open in a certain direction.

[Velez] You are referring to this as an inevitable march, that it is inevitable to Russia.

[Gerasimov] It is inevitable because it is the tide of the times. You look at other countries. They also follow our road and you look at our parliament and they discuss new laws which will change our society.

[Velez] You have come up with an extraordinary document in the Central Committee, the agenda, the proposed new agenda for the Soviet Union and this agenda has been approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet...

[Gerasimov] No, I guess you are talking about the platform.

[Velez] Platform?

[Gerasimov] Party platform. It was approved, the draft of this platform was approved at the plenum of the party. And now it is being discussed, in the press, in public, and then it will be approved as such, or as amended, or rejected—there are three possibilities—at the party congress at the end of June, beginning of July.

[Velez] And between now and then?

[Gerasimov] So we are still waiting for...discussing. Discussion... [clears throat]

[Velez] To what extent are the Soviet people able to participate in such discussions?

[Gerasimov] I mentioned already. They have freedom of the press now, free press, so they can write letters, write articles. They can discuss it at party meetings. What are these party meetings for—just to discuss what to do next. So it is discussed everywhere. It is controversial. It is not just everybody saying what a wonderful platform it is. No, there is a lot of criticism. So the end result will be, I guess, the best that we can get.

[Velez] Before going into some of the details of this startling document, which—I use the word advisedly of course—but in the sense that it does depart somewhat or significantly from Marxist theory and communist orthodoxy, where it introduces various freedoms, rights, where it abolishes the dictatorship of the proletariat, where it recognizes individual freedom, and property, individual ownership of factories and the means of production and so on and so forth. What do you think is going to be the fate of this document?

[Gerasimov] Well, it is interesting. We are also discussing this property question. We are discussing it in parliament. We have a draft law. It is also a furious discussion. Some people are saying what you are saying—that we are departing from Marxism. And other people are arguing that we are returning to Marxism and departing from dogmatism, from dogma which was left behind when we moved forward. And we must forget all this dogmatism and look at the realities of life to adapt to the new realities.

[Velez] How do you envision the shape will be, let us say, a year from now?

[Gerasimov] I hope that the parliament—we call it the Supreme Soviet, also the Congress of People's Deputies—we have two levels of parliament—will adopt the laws. And people are beginning to criticize the parliament—it is too slow. With these new radical laws including this law on the press, the freedom of the press, law on property and other laws, and to make our society live according to the law. And they will be put into effect. And there will be big changes in the economic structure. And also the power, the seat of power will be shifted from the party Politburo, the Central Committee to the parliament of the soviets. Originally, our revolution had the slogan: All power to the soviets. And the soviets means these local, elected bodies, legislative bodies, local and to the highest level. So you can interpret perestroyka as a return to the original slogan of the revolution. And our Communist Party will be one of the parties. Of course, every party wants to be the leading party, the party in power, and it is understandable that our Communist Party wants to stay in power, and in my view, it will stay in power as according to your projection, 1 year from now. But it must prove that it is good to be there, in free competition with other organizations, and possibly, parties, because they can be established now.

[Velez] One of the propositions in fact made was that when you gave up the legal or constitutional monopoly of power of the Communist Party—in other words, you have now gone into a kind of pluralism, political pluralism, in your society. And you are in fact talking about a Western-type presidential system where the president will be elected directly by the people.

[Gerasimov] This is one of the suggestions. It is not yet approved. The people argue. Some people argue for it, some people argue against it.

[Velez] Now, Mr. Gerasimov, in this type of reform which is very substantial, which is radical...

[Gerasimov] We call it a revolution.

[Velez] A revolution. Of course, some people are saying that your reforms should be more evolutionary, but you have waited long enough. You got lost somewhere along the way since 1917.

[Gerasimov] Well, some people criticize us for being too slow.

[Velez] And others think you are too fast. Depends on whether these are conservatives or the liberals or so on.

Please don't leave. We will be right back with Mr. Gerasimov. [commercial break]

There is a concern that has been expressed by a number of people, observers of the Soviet Union, that in view of your present extreme difficulties on the economic scene, would there be time for all these political reforms to catch up and establish themselves before you do encounter some greater problems from your people?

[Gerasimov] We have now difficulties, I agree, in our economic life. They are explained in this fashion: We are dismantling the old structure and erecting a new one and haven't yet dismantled the old structure to the end and haven't erected the new structure completely. So, a transition period. All these ills of transition are there and people grumble. And explanations are not enough for them to stop grumbling, so we must do something in the economic field.

[Velez] But do you think you have the time to solve these problems?

[Gerasimov] Of course, we have. President Gorbachev put it once in this way, that our people have a great tolerance. They can wait.

[Velez] Sounds like our people.

[Gerasimov] But he added, they cannot wait forever. So he knows the problem.

[Velez] You are describing my people there, too. But one thing probably, looking at our people is that, one experience that you do have is you initiate great revolutionary reforms, and you institute an open society....

[Gerasimov] Anytime, anytime you have changes, they provoke great expectations, that tomorrow there will just a land of milk and honey or money for that matter. It is not that simple. You must put additional efforts to change an old society and to create a new society. So we have all these difficulties. You look around, we have difficulties.

[Velez] Well, I know that you have said of course that this is really a humane socialism. But I think Professor Galbraith, in his address to the One Asia Assembly, in effect put this quite succinctly by saying that these terms really don't mean all that much. When you talk about capitalism and socialism, they don't fall into neat little squares. When you look at the capitalist countries which have adopted the welfare state concept, they are virtually socialist.

[Gerasimov] I agree completely. Actually, I have agreed with this view for many years. Galbraith is the author of the convergence theory which may have influenced his speech here, which said that capitalism is changing, socialism is changing and there are less differences between these two systems. This theory was heavily criticized in my country. There was a generation of sociologists who were writing books criticizing this theory and, in this way, their being better providers for their families because they were well-paid for that. And now I think that we must stop these dogmatic discussions on which is which. Because, really, capitalism has changed, and as Galbraith put it, adapted to the changes in the world. Socialism has not adapted. We have certain and very big achievements. We are a nuclear power, after all. And we have a lot of other things we can boast about. But we did not adapt to certain changes. So now is not a period of transition from one system to another. It is a period of adaptation to reality. And President Gorbachev said that we must give socialism a second breath. So, in this way, we are in the process of finding this second breath.

[Velez] Mr. Gerasimov, let me just push the question a little further. On the matter of adaptation by the Soviet Union, or the lack of it, which has brought about this situation of the need for perestroyka, not just structural or political reforms but ideologically oriented reforms. We mentioned Professor Galbraith and he did mention that the failure to adapt appears to have been in the area of the consumer goods. In other words, you did create an industrial base—iron, rail, everything. But in the matter of soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste and so on—I am not trying to be facetious but all of these goods, neckties and so on, there seem to have been a very serious flaw in that. Do you agree with that observation?

[Gerasimov] It is a situation that we were brought into by our bureaucracy. Our administrative caretaker-command system. In theory, we had a planned society which means that somebody above over there in Moscow knows how many bars of soap we are going to use per year, or how many pairs of shoes you are going to throw out in a year? And then everything must be so perfect. But this is theory. In practice, we cannot really command our big economy and you have this very serious situation. Very serious when soap disappears, then it reappears. Also we have problems with our money these days. We have too much money chasing too few goods. The inflation is high. And people also have panic-buying. So they buy anything in sight, which means that we have empty shelves. They are afraid of money reform. The government says: No, we are not going to do any money reform. But they are still a little bit afraid, so they do not want to save money. They want to spend money. So this is also one of the examples of our transition period.

[Velez] In the vision of President Gorbachev on economic reforms, what will be the role or to what extent are you willing to concede to market forces or market-oriented economy, as distinguished from centralized planning? Which incidentally was included in the criticism by Galbraith.

[Gerasimov] Well, we are now departing from this overplanned economy and going into a market economy. Our enterprises are independent now, in a way. They are independent in theory, but in practice, they are state-ordered. These state orders must cover part of their production capacity. In practice, pretty soon, the state order equals 100 percent of their capacity. So in theory, they are independent and go to the market. But in practice, they are still in the same old system. So this is one of the ills that I have mentioned of the transition period. But overall, in a year, two or three, we are going to have independent enterprises competing for the attention of the consumers.

[Velez] This is really going to be some kind of mixed economy. Socialist-capitalist mixed economy because they do engage in central planning, but from the capitalist point of view.

[Gerasimov] It will be mixed economy in the sense that the enterprises, your state-owned, will be on their own, but the mechanisms, how they are going to look, will be different. You see, one of the ideas that Professor Galbraith and others are advancing is that ownership is not important anymore. Management is important. In many ways, [words indistinct] But we don't want—you see the problem for us is—we don't want our perestroyka to create a class of rich people who don't do anything but simply live on their unearned income. This we don't want to happen.

[Velez] But if it does happen, you are not going to...

[Gerasimov] You work, you can participate in the profits of your enterprise. That is okay. If you have a factory and it is a cooperative factory, you have your profits but you work there. So we don't want to have this bourgeois class again that is doing nothing but enjoying life.

[Velez] You are not going to prohibit the eventual rise of the middle class, are you?

[Gerasimov] No, I don't think so.

[Velez] We will continue with this discussion after these commercials. [commercial break]

[Velez] Let me shift to another topic, Mr Gerasimov—the ethnic problem that appears to be quite serious. I was reading Ambassador Sokolov's article on this, and he mentions that he ...

[Gerasimov interrupting] Then you know all the answers.

[Velez] Well, I am going to ask you because I don't think I understood well. Well, one of the reasons for all of these problems you have is the forcible use of compulsory labor through the years of building the state. And this has exacerbated the matter of ethnic problems where you probably would get people from some of the ethnic regions and mix them all up for labor purposes.

[Gerasimov] No, this was not labor purposes. This belongs to the crimes of Stalin as we call them now. He moved people around, nations around. Forced them to move especially during the war. For instance, one of the biggest removals was the removal of our Germans. We have a lot of Germans, several million of them living in the border regions, living for two centuries. And because we were fighting Germans, he was afraid that they would be traitors, collaborators, what not, so he moved them to Central Asia. The same happened to the nation of Crimean Tartars that lived in the Crimea, the peninsula at the Black Sea. On the pretext that Crimean Tartars collaborated with the Germans—which is possible. Some Russians also collaborated. He just took the whole nation and moved them to Central Asia. And now we have the result of this policy. Because the Germans want to return to the land but people who live there on the land don't want the newcomers. The same is true of the Crimean. So these are problems we want to solve in an acceptable fashion, acceptable for everybody.

[Velez] Well, isn't there also an undercurrent, a desire for freedom with, for instance, the case of Lithuania. Because you occupied it, I think in 1940, there is this very strong movement now—in fact, there is already a proclamation of independence from Moscow. Now part of your new democratic orientation...are you going to grant this?

[Gerasimov] This development, I think, took us by surprise. We didn't expect this kind of thing. But the people now have freedom of expression, freedom of desire, and if they desire to leave, we have an article in the Constitution. So a republic, a union republic—we have 15 union republics—can leave if it desires to go. But it doesn't mean that the central government encourages this kind of separatist movement. I don't know of any government which likes separatists. As a correspondent, as a younger man, I covered a civil war in Nigeria, which was about separatist—Biafra. Abraham Lincoln is remembered in the United States mainly as the man who saved the union. They also had a civil war. So there are many separatist movements in many places in many countries. Maybe some right here, too. And of course, it is not encouraged. But because we have this article and because we want to be a really free society, we now are drafting a law which will be about the mechanism of withdrawing from the union if this or that republic wants to leave the union. I compared it once to a divorce. If you want to divorce, you must meet the claims. From one side to the other and vice versa. So this draft law is now being discussed or being submitted to our Parliament. We don't want Lithuania to go, and President Gorbachev went to Lithuania. I was there also on this trip and he tried to persuade the people that we will have a new society and a new federation. The name of our country is the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. But in practice, it was a unitary state and Moscow decided a lot of things, not everything but a lot of things which the republics did not like. But we are now giving them all the independence they want in practice.

[Velez] But as part of the...

[Gerasimov] Still they will be part of the Union. Defense, for instance. Defense will be in Moscow. Questions of defense, the big questions of foreign policy. But otherwise, they will be on their own. We call it economic independence. Also they will be given...They even now are beginning to print in the Baltic republics their own currencies which is not good. And these republics are economically integrated with the Soviet Union. They depend on us. We depend on them. They cannot stand on their own feet economically because the goods they produce are not competitive in the Western markets. And the oil and gas they are getting, they are getting at subsidized prices. If they go into the world market with this price structure, they will be ruined tomorrow.

[Velez] The observation is that you are going so close to the American capitalist system, we are going to have a lot difficulty distinguishing between the two. What with all the other political reforms, the economic reforms, now you are even going to have a United States?

[Gerasimov] There is one big difference. The United States is like a country in the sense that their states are geographical entities. Fortunately or unfortunately, our republics are not only geographical entities, but also national entities. For Georgia, the majority of the people are Georgians. In Armenia, the majority are Armenians. And they have their own cultures, their own national aspirations. Now there is rivalry between Texas and New York, for instance, but it is just small fry compared to nationalist movements.

[Velez] When you describe the situation in Lithuania, you refer to the law and your approach and so on. Is that going to be true, more or less, of how you will approach the problems of the different republics—Latvia, Estonia...?

[Gerasimov] The law will be the same for every republic. It is not just a special law for Lithuania. But the Gorbachev policy is to persuade the republics to stay. He argues that you have not yet tried the real new federation and the real freedom. When you taste this freedom within the union, you will drop the idea to go from the union, to go out.

[Velez] If I understand this correctly, it does appear that you are taking out the military option. In other words, there will be no military suppression. You are going the persuasion route with respect with this problem that you are having in the different republics.

[Gerasimov] Yes, that is right. Only the legal means. Legal means and persuasion.

[Velez] Tell us about Azerbaijan. This is the country that millions of Filipinos have never heard of before, but because of the recent problems that you had there, we have them in the news every day, every night. Everybody is talking about Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. Are you still militarily present in that...

[Gerasimov] In the capital.

[Velez] In the capital. But for the moment...

[Gerasimov] But life is normal. The presence is there. It is normal today. But it is a long story. I don't know if we have time for this. This is an ancient quarrel between Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Very ancient. And some little eruptions. Nobody expected this kind of eruption. And during this quarrel about one region which belongs to the Azerbaijan republic but is claimed by Armenian republic—the name is Nagorno-Karabakh. It all started there. But then Armenians began to persecute Azeris who live in their republic. And vice versa. Azeris began to persecute Armenians who live in their republic. Baku, for instance, the capital, was always an international city. And now, we have two migrations. Refugees. We never had refugees. Now we have these refugees from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and vice versa. Almost half a million. And they created additional problems in Baku—housing, jobs—and they get angry and they begin to kill Armenians who still live in Baku. There is a big Armenian community in Baku. They started to kill people. Moscow, the government, had no choice but to move in with the troops to establish order. Now, they are stopped, but another situation—and the Azeris are angry against the army now, against Moscow, against the government. So it is very complex situation.

[Velez] From somewhere in Central Asia, [words indistinct]

[Gerasimov] But we are jumping from the Baltics to the Caucasus.

[Velez] That's right.

[Gerasimov] Let us jump to the Far East.

[Velez] Let's go to Eastern Europe.

[Gerasimov] Okay. Let's jump there.

[Velez] I'm sure you have been asked this many, many times, but I will ask you on television. There is an almost accepted truth that the two Germanys will eventually reunite. Of course, this was held by many people, even before all these developments. And at some point or another, the Germans will reunite just like the Koreans will reunite and many other people. With all these developments, the breaking of the Berlin Wall, it does appear that they are going to reunite and that means tremendous, tremendous economic power right there, and possibly military power.

[Gerasimov] I may add that nobody likes a united Germany, only they are not saying so. Not France, not Britain, not the United States—nobody likes the appearance of the German might in terms of competition in the world market. But they promise to support these ideas although they are supporting them half-heartedly, in my view. But of course, this is the question. We have a big Germany. The question is: Are we going to have a Germany in Europe or a German Europe?

[Velez] We will just pause for a while and will be right back with our very distinguished guest. [commercial break]

[Velez] Do you subscribe to the inevitability of the reuniting of the two Germanys, and if so, over what period do you think it is going to happen?

[Gerasimov] It looks like we were surprised by the speed of the movement toward this end, but it looks like they will be reunited. And we are concerned, being the victim of German aggression in World War II. It's our psychological concerns. You may argue and the Germans argue that they are not going to repeat this mistake again. But psychologically, somewhere in the back of our minds, we are concerned about German intentions. It is a psychological phenomenon which has political implications, too. And also, this reunited Germany is changing the whole structure of balance of forces in Europe. And so, we agree with other countries on a good formula of how to reconcile this German reunification with the concerns of the neighbors. The formula is two plus four, which means that the two German states decide what they are going to do with consultation of the four powers, Great Powers, victors of World War II, which means the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain. And also, of course, we must take into account the broader picture of two alliances that are in Europe—NATO and the Warsaw Pact. How to reconcile this...the phrase which was first used by Chancellor Kohl and which we are using now—to synchronize two tracks. There are two tracks: One track, German reunification; the second track, European process, all-European process. The building of an all-European home, if you wish. And how to synchronize these two tracks.

[Velez] On your own, the Soviet Union, what are you doing to answer the serious concerns which you mentioned?

[Gerasimov] We did a lot. We had our discussions. We had German visitors in Moscow. We had Modrow and others from the GDR in Moscow discussing this. We had Kohl, Genscher in Moscow discussing this. We are talking to both German states and talking in a constructive way. Also, we have this formula and one more point which I must emphasize is another concern: The postwar order must stay. The borders must stay where they are. Actually, this is legally established or approved by Helsinki Final Act. And also, we heard from both Germanys their words that they are not going to change it. But not from Chancellor Kohl, not yet. When we asked Chancellor Kohl if he can guarantee that there will be no revision of borders, he says: Don't worry. There will be no revision. But this is a question not for me to decide. This is a question that will be decided by united Germany. So he refers the final answer to the united Germany which creates our concerns.

[Velez] What is your main concern about redefining the borders?

[Gerasimov] Yes, first of all, part of Poland, and not a small one, is the part which belonged to the Reich, to the Germany. Second, we have Kaliningrad District which is called Eastern Prussia, which is now part of Russia. And I guess there are certain things with Czechoslovakia along the border. So Poland is very much concerned, that is why Poland asked to be included into this formula, two plus four, to look like two plus four plus one. And we understand the Polish desires.

[Velez] With all of these fundamental, revolutionary, extraordinary changes which would happen in Eastern Europe and continue to happen, all of these in the Soviet Union, can you give us your impression of the impact in the world, even in Asia. The significance and so on.

[Gerasimov] All of these changes are positive changes, changes for the better. We now have military confrontations in Europe being defused. We have negotiations in

Vienna on reductions—and maybe now I can say radical—reductions in conventional arms and armaments and armed forces. We have Soviet-American negotiations on cutting by half our nuclear, strategic nuclear weapons. Another example of the changing situation which comes to my mind is that just one year ago, maybe less, one of the controversial subjects discussed in Europe was to modernize tactical nuclear weapons or not to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. Mrs. Thatcher, prime minister of Britain, was saying: We must modernize our missile range because of the Soviet Union. Now, this subject is completely irrelevant. It is dropped. Nobody discusses it because events surpassed this particular problem. So, changes in Europe are for the better. And of course they must influence new interests, no matter what. No matter what you say or no matter what resistance you are going to put, they will influence Asia...also for the better.

Even Secretary of Defense Mr. Cheney is going to cut here and there small bits of his forces. This is also a fact. Japan. Japan—they don't have a defense ministry but they have this department of national defense and they now are achieving one percent of their budget going to military matters. And they are also going to have difficulty explaining why they should keep it up and why not stop and maybe give it a review. So, it is all benevolent influence everywhere.

[Velez] Do you see the events and the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union affecting, to a large degree, what will happen in China, which is of course a great concern to everybody, especially for us here in Asia? Will there be any expectation that similar seeds ...? Of course, we know Tiananmen Square.

[Gerasimov] I don't know. China had several years of very impressive economic development. I don't know. I was there, too. I was with President Gorbachev... was there. We were very happy with the visit because we normalized our relations. I remembered Deng Xiaoping discussed our past and our past quarrels and then he said: This is the last time I mention the subject. Let's forget about it. Forget about the past. Let's go to the future together. Something like this. Not the exact words but the message was like this. To normalization.

So, we normalized our relations. We have border trade increasing. We are pulling down our fortification in the Soviet Union's border. They are pulling down their fortification on their side of the border. We have regular meetings for demarcation of the border so there will be no more border quarrels. So, it is good times. As to the domestic development of China, I am afraid to predict what is going to be there next.

[Velez] With the end of the cold war and with all these series of changes, do you think the world can sleep and breathe a little better with the thought that at least, the idea of a worldwide conflict has probably been considerably reduced with all of these changes?

[Gerasimov] I don't have the last issue of BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. This American publication has a doomsday clock on the cover and it shows five minutes to midnight. Maybe now, it shows 15 minutes to midnight. Maybe it is back. Maybe even 20 minutes to midnight because, of course, everybody agrees the world is better now and the threat of nuclear confrontation has receded. Nobody now believes the Soviet Union is preparing a nuclear attack on anyone. And I hope that the United States is also not preparing. It is not their intention. Because even if you want now, you see, a very simple idea that, at last, got the acceptance of many political leaders and this idea is that if you start a nuclear war, you will be the victim.

[Velez] So let me end our conversation by going back again to where you started. Which is really the Philippines. Let me find out from you what your thoughts are, President Gorbachev's thoughts on the future of U.S.-USSR-Philippines relations...

[Gerasimov] Is it a triangle? I don't think it is triangle. We have good relations with your country. We have visitors.

[Velez] No, I mean the U.S.

[Gerasimov] You said: U.S.-USSR.

[Velez] I kind of ...I should have said Russia, Soviet Union, and the Philippines. I did not mean to include the U.S. there.

[Gerasimov] Was it a slip of the tongue or was it a Freudian mistake?

[Velez] Freudian mistake probably because they are all over the place. [laughs]

[Gerasimov] [laughs] Well, I am not a specialist here. I am just a visitor. This is my second visit to the Philippines. This first time, it was for UNCTAD—United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—and I like the place, of course. And you see, Manila in Russian means, if you translate it, to be seduced. So, if I say in Russian, manila menya manila, the translation is: I was seduced by Manila.

And I hope that our relations, which are good—we have good exchange of visitors, of foreign ministers, and I guess, our cultural ties are on the rise with economic ties. But of course, I understand the potential is there. We must develop the potential of good [word indistinct] and the potential of economic cooperation which exists between our countries. So, I think we have a lot of things to do.

[Velez] Do you think it is possible to continue to develop this with the continued presence of American bases in the Philippines or does that prove to be a kind of hindrance, obstacle to our own better relationship, an expanded relationship?

[Gerasimov] Oh, I don't know. It depends on how much this question of bases influences your foreign policy. If there is this linkage, that is bad. If it is another question, simply bilateral question, then we can ignore it. That is for you to see.

[Velez] Mr. Gerasimov, let me give you a minute or so and have you say whatever you might wish to address the people. And your thoughts after attending the One Asia Assembly.

[Gerasimov] Well, as a conclusion, I may say that it was very interesting to participate in this One Asia Assembly. I met a lot of people and what struck me most is that they were extremely friendly. Extremely friendly, and I like it here.

[Velez] We seduced you.

[Gerasimov] That is correct.

[Velez] Thank you very much.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev, Najibullah Exchange Anniversary Tidings

LD0503094590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0828 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 March, (TASS)—In connection with the anniversary on 15 February of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] Central Committee, has sent Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a message which notes that the new political thinking in international relations as applied to the Afghan problem made possible in the signing of the Geneva accords and opened up the way for advancing the policy of national reconciliation aimed at ending the fraternicidal war between Afghans.

The message stresses the determination of the government of the Republic of Afghanistan to achieve the settlement of the inter-Afghan differences by political means and to ensure the status of Afghanistan as a free, neutral and demilitarized state which would correspond to the world's interests and stability and cooperation in the region and the world as a whole.

In his message in reply Mikhail Gorbachev says that with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and around it there arose a new situation and new possibilities for solving its national problems. A good basis for advancing along the path of political settlement in Afghanistan are the constructive proposals and initiatives, taking into account the interests of all Afghans, put forward by President Najibullah. It is precisely in this way that the Soviet Union interprets the peace plan which President Najibullah proposed at the ninth conference of the heads of states and governments of non-aligned countries, importantly added to by his recently expressed explanations of certain specific questions.

Mikhail Gorbachev, confirming the immutability of the Soviet line of solidarity and support for the Republic of Afghanistan, wished the friendly Afghan people peace and prosperity.

Commentary Reviews Soviet-Iranian Relations

NC2602150490 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Esteemed listeners. The international mass media continues to focus on the expansion of Iranian-U.S. relations because these relations exert a direct influence on the political situation in the Persian Gulf and the Near and Middle East region.

For quite some time, a large number of experts on Iranian-U.S. relations have observed the predilection in Tehran to hurl fresh invectives against the Arch Satan, especially when there is an escalation of political tension in Iran. Out of habit, this initiates a fresh chapter of tension in the relations between the two countries.

At the beginning of February a new wave of anti-American sentiment was initiated in Iran, reaching its pinnacle on the days celebrating the 11th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. However, now that these sentiments have succeeded in consolidating the Islamic system in Iran once again, they seem to be on the wane.

As events during the past few days indicate, it is in this calm period that talks between Iran and the United States are reinvigorated. One of the prime causes for the impediments in the resolving of differences between Iran and the United States is the financial claims by both sides on (?pending) assets. As we are aware, a special court has been set up in The Hague for addressing these claims. [passage omitted]

However, financial differences are not the only reason for the conflict between the two countries. The most sensitive unresolved issue is the hostages abducted by the extremist groups in Lebanon. Some months ago, Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani said at a news conference in Tehran that if he perceives any manifestation of good will from Washington, he intends to extend his assistance in the release of American hostages. No tangible change in the hostage issue was observed in the aftermath of this comment.

Opponents of an improvement in bilateral relations are numerous in both the countries' capitals, and both have adequate grounds for suspicion one another. For example, the U.S. Senate recently deemed it legitimate that the special U.S. service could abduct any individual in any country if the court in that country considered him guilty. [passage omitted]

Despite the above, most observers do not consider the possibility of positive progress in improved Iranian -U.S. relations too farfetched. Eliciting occasional attention is Washington's reiteration that forging normal relations with Iran will benefit the United States in the long run. The Pentagon's decision to withdraw the last three of its minesweepers from the Persian Gulf is evidence of this claim. This will bring the total number of U.S naval forces in the Persian Gulf to the level it was before the escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict. [passage omitted]

It appears that the new elements incorporated in U.S. policy on the Persian Gulf region will evoke a positive response from Tehran. Meanwhile, Washington would do well to study intensively the recent statement by 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani that Iran favors the mitigation of international tension and is opposed to Islamic adventurism. The Iranian president similarly stated that his country is ready to initiate a new era of national reconstruction and invites all foreign countries to cooperate with Iran in this regard.

It is not improbable to consider that this statement includes the United States as well. However, it is clear that normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations will be possible only with Washington's acceptance and respect of the values that Iran holds in esteem. In any case, it is a prolonged and difficult course.

Supreme Soviet Appoints Ambassador to Morocco

LD2502152490 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium appointed Yuriy Rybakov Soviet ambassador to Morocco today, sending former Ambassador Malik Fazylov into retirement.

Professor Yuriy Rybakov was born in 1930. He netered the diplomatic service in 1953, after graduating from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He has a doctorate in judiciary.

From 1953 to 1955, Rybakov was a staff member at the Soviet mission to Austria, from 1956 to 1962—worked in the Soviet Embassy in East Germany. From 1963 to 1970 he served as third, second and first secretary at the Soviet foreign Ministry's department for negodtiations and legal affairs.

From 1970 to 1972, Rybakov worked as counselor at the Soviet United Natidons mission in New York, and from 1973 to 1978 was department head at the U.N. Secretariat office for legal affairs in New York.

From 1979 tdo 1988, Rybakov was head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's department for negotiations and legal affairs. In 1988, he was appointed head of the ministry's department for international and legal affairs.

Rybakov's diplomatic rank is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

Kuwaiti Envoy Interviewed on National Day

LD2502210990 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Dear listeners, 'Abd al-Muhsin Yusif al-Duwayj, the ambassador of the State of Kuwait in the Soviet Union, joins our program today with an interview with the Arabic service of Radio Moscow on the occasion of his country's national day. Esteemed Kuwaiti Ambassador 'Abd al-Muhsin Yusif al-Duwayj is now before the microphone:

[Al-Duwayj] Kuwait is marking the 29th anniversary of its national day. In mid-March we, Kuwait and the Soviet Union, will be marking the 27th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Observers looking at this history—27 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries—will find that these relations are developing year by year. They are more than developing, there is now a basis of understanding and a strong basis for consultation between the two states. We in Kuwait, of course, have believed in these relations since the beginning, and for our part have endeavored to develop them to their current level. There now is cooperation in the cultural, economic, and military fields. With the current policies of perestroyka and glasnost in the Soviet Union, we now are entering into investment and banking cooperation. Thanks be to God; we now have reached an advanced stage in our relations. Within the next few months, perhaps next spring, Kuwait and the Soviet Union will sign an agreement on the protection of investment between the two countries, and an agreement on the abolition of duel taxation. I have not forgotten in this respect that Kuwait will be the first Arab state to sign, or which will sign, such an agreement with the Soviet Union.

From the political dimension, there are no contradictions between us and the Soviet Union in foreign policy or in Soviet and Kuwaiti objectives. We have common objectives, and our relations with the USSR have not experienced any upheaval. On the contrary, we see them developing every year and we notice that, whenever crises escalate in the world, there is consultation and dialogue between the Kuwaiti and Soviet leaderships. [passage omitted]

East Europe

Shevardnadze, GDR's Boehme View German Issue

LD0203211790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1845 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 March (TASS)—Taking into account the internal political situation taking shape in the GDR right before the elections to the People's Chamber, Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Central Committee Politburo, USSR foreign affairs minister, and Ibrahim Boehme, the chairman of the GDR Social

Democratic Party, discussed the German issue today. It was noted that only if the construction of their unity is managed, controlled, and planned in time, can the Germans count on understanding from their neighbors and from the entire international community. Eduard Shevardnadze also stressed that any attempts to ignore the external aspects of rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG and their movement toward unification are bankrupt and will never receive the support of the Soviet Union and other European states.

GDR SPD Officials Assess Talks

LD0203151990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1410 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The Soviet side has given an insight into its view about German unification and, in so doing, has expressed concern about this process' fast pace. Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the GDR Social Democratic Party [SPD], stated this in Moscow on Friday after his meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR Foreign Minister.

During the talks all matters which had been discussed at former meetings with Soviet politicians were touched upon. Also at these earlier talks, they had not remained silent on the concerns in Moscow about this process' pace. One has to remember how the peoples of the USSR and Eastern Europe could react to statements, above all from FRG politicians, which again and again bring into play Article 23 of the FRG Constitution, although they know perfectly well that this affects all European peoples' vital interests. In general he noted agreement during his talks in Moscow on security policy issues. There were differences on the assessment of economic questions arising from the unification process, which are not regarded by the Soviet side as so acute.

Speaking to journalists at the end of his USSR visit, Boehme stressed that his party does not want a Germanization of the European process, but a Europeanization of the German unification process. What is crucial is union with decency and dignity. This means that people should not be put under time pressure and that deadlines should not be dragged into the debate, such as again was the case—if he was correctly informed—in Helmut Kohl's latest speech in the GDR. This is irresponsible and puts not only the people of the GDR and the FRG, but also the peoples of Europe under time pressure.

It is also irresponsible for various politicians speaking in the media to talk about their models of a united Germany's membership in NATO. He feels that these things show a lack of seriousness and violate the respect and dignity of people who should have equal rights in shaping a European confederation.

It has become clearer that the construction of the common European home needs stable foundations, the GDR SPD's security and disarmament expert, Minister Walter Romberg, said summarizing the experiences of his Moscow visit. The movements in Central Europe, between the two German states, and even in the Soviet Union are taking place at a pace and along paths which require this. It is time to think a lot more intensively about "a European house-building cooperative." At the same time, the Europeanization of the German problem has to proceed more quickly and the linkage between this problem's internal and external aspects have to be taken seriously. This became particularly clear to him in Moscow.

The Soviet Union's thoughts about its model for future security structures and a united Germany are still at the early stages, Romberg went on to say. As regards the NATO side, and this of course includes the Federal Republic, it unfortunately has to be stated that the readiness to change its way of thinking right up to new military structures is at best at the beginning of the early stage. Very comprehensive and far-reaching changes are necessary here. During the talks with Shevardnadze everyone's readiness and need to arrive at structures which consolidate security and stability in central Europe has been clear.

Touching on his talks with Gorbachev advisor Marshal Akhromeyev, Romberg stressed the readiness to take on board fresh starting points. They talked mainly about restructuring military security in central Europe. The Soviet side's interest in finding new solutions here was clear.

Minister Shevardnadze pointed out that all attempts to ignore the external aspects of the rapprochement between the GDR and FRG and the movement toward unification are untenable and will never be supported by the Soviet Union and the other European states. In the talk it was stressed that the Germans could only count on the understanding of their neighbours and the whole of the international community if there is a gradual and well-ordered establishment of unity.

GDR's Maleuda Visits, Meets With Lukyanov

LD0203205490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1928 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN)—Supreme Soviet representatives have declared their undiminished interest in close cooperation with GDR parliamentarians even after the People's Chamber elections. This was announced today by People's Chamber President Dr. Guenther Maleuda after his talks with the first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Anatoliy Lukyanov, and the chairman of the Union Soviet, Yevgeniy Primakov.

Maleuda arrived in Moscow this morning on a three-day visit.

Maleuda's remarks made it clear the exchange of experiences on parliamentary activity received broad attention.

The participation of new parties—serious work was currently underway on a law on parties in the soviet union—for example, made new demands. "We must learn to work together with friends and those with different views," Lukyanov had stated. The latter announced that a parliamentary delegation will visit the GDR early next week. The delegation wants to meet the new forces in the GDR.

The Soviet side expressed concern about efforts in the FRG to annex the GDR, said Guenther Maleuda, adding that further topics of discussion are the domestic policy development of the GDR and the process of unification between the two German states. The two countries' parliamentarians stated that unification should be completed gradually and subject to control. There has also been agreement that the unification was above all the affair of the Germans themselves. It must, however, be integrated in the European framework. The security interests of all sides must be taken into consideration. Western ideas about NATO membership of a unified Germany are unacceptable. [passage omitted]

Further on Talks With Lukyanov

LD0203222490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Today a meeting between Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet first deputy chairman and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and Maleuda, president of the GDR People's Chamber, who is in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Surpeme Soviet, has taken place. Expounding the Soviet position on the issue of the unification of the GDR and FRG, Comrade Lukyanov stressed that this process should not be accompanied by phenomena giving rise to the concern of other European states regarding security or disturb the military-political balance of forces.

This is our approach as well, stated Maleuda, who noted the importance of the accords reached in Ottawa by the foreign ministers of the four powers, the GDR and the FRG on the mechanism of discussion of the external aspects of the construction of German unification, including the issue of the security of the neighboring countries.

On the same day, Primakov, the chairman of the USSR Soviet of the Union and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, met Maleuda.

TASS Reports GDR Premier's Upcoming Visit

LD0203141490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin, 3 Mar [date as received] (TASS)—As ADN reported here today, Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, will visit Moscow on Monday and have talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. H. Modrow will head a government delegation, which will also include ministers representing various parties and political associations in the Government of National Responsibility. Apart from the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, the GDR delegation will have talks with Nikolay Ryzhkov, the head of the Soviet Government, and other Soviet representatives.

FRG Parties Hit Kohl Stance on Polish Border

LD0403133790 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 4 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Stepovik]

[Text] Bonn March 4 TASS—The intention of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to link the question of recognition of Poland's western borders with its renunciation of reparations has given rise to a stormy reaction in the political circles of the FRG.

The decision has been criticised not only by representatives of opposition parties but also by partners for the coalition as well as by some CDU [Christian Democratic Union] figures.

The Free Democrats [FDP] are against linking the question of recognition of Poland's borders with its renunciation of reparations, said Hilde Hamm-Bruecher, FDP expert on foreign policy issues. We shall not allow the government to yield to pressure from right-wing radical forces during decision-making, she emphasised.

The chancellor's decision was strongly criticised by Olaf Feldmann, FDP expert on defence matters.

The stand of Helmut Kohl, he said, is having a negative effect on the reunification process and arouses misgivings in neighbouring countries. Poland's border may not serve as a bargaining chip. The Free Democrats have never questioned and will never question it, he said.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), in an interview with LUEBECKER NACHRICHTEN newspaper, announced his intention to urgently discuss the issue with the federal chancellor.

A meeting of partners for the CDU-CSU [Christian Social Union] and FDP coalition is also to be held next week for this purpose.

The Greens Party believes that the lack of a clear-cut policy and the chancellor's hesitations only enhance distrust of the FRG on the part of Poland and other neighbours.

Attempts to attach strings to the recognition of the borders are discrediting the government in the eyes of the public and undermining its prestige, said Ralf Fuchs, Bundestag deputy from the Greens Party.

Heiner Geissler, CDU deputy chairman, urged Kohl to give up attaching strings and to make a clear-cut pronouncement about the western borders of Poland.

Text of USSR-CSSR Troop Withdrawal Accord

AU0103153290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 28 Feb 90 p 14

[CTK report: "Text of the Agreement on Troop Withdrawal"]

[Text] Moscow—On 26 February an agreement was signed between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The document, which was signed by Jiri Dienstbier and Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign ministers of the two countries, contains the following:

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
taking into consideration the statement issued by the Czechoslovak Government on 3 December 1989, and the statement issued by the Soviet Government on 4 December 1989, including their legal aspects,
motivated by an attempt to develop traditional friendship and cooperation between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics while thoroughly adhering to the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs,
confirming their firm resolve to comprehensively assist in the strengthening of peace, stability, and security in Europe and throughout the world,
and expressing their desire to adhere to the undertakings resulting from the Warsaw Pact Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 14 May 1955,
have agreed to the following:

Article 1
1. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will take place in stages; the first stage will be completed by 31 May 1990, the second stage by 31 December 1990, and the third stage by 30 June 1991.
2. During the first stage, the withdrawal of a substantial part of the Soviet troops will be completed in harmony with the jointly drafted timetable.

Article 2
The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will provide the Soviet side with the necessary cooperation during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Article 3
During the period prior to the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the principles in existence when this agreement was reached—including property, financial, and other issues—with regard to appropriate changes in conditions for the mutual settling of accounts and mutual payments, will apply to these troops.

Article 4
The sides will appoint commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops who will resolve practical issues resulting from the implementation of the appropriate stipulations of this agreement.

Article 5
Property and financial issues occurring in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be considered by the commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and will be resolved by agreements between the appropriate ministries of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 6
Property and financial issues associated with Soviet troops in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, not revised prior to the period of their complete withdrawal, will be dealt with by a special agreement between the sides, by an agreement that will be reached no later than two years from the date that this agreement becomes valid.

Article 7
This agreement is valid from the date it is signed.

Troops Continue Leaving CSSR on Schedule

LD0303113190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1815 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Prague 2 Mar (TASS)—As of today, seven echelons with military hardware and servicemen from the Soviet Army have already been dispatched from Czechoslovakia. This is exactly in line with the agreed timetable for the troops withdrawal, said Major General (Viliam Poltikovic) head of the CSSR Government office for issues relating to the Soviet troops withdrawal, in an interview with CTK.

He noted that all the expense incurred in transferring the military hardwre, men, and materiel is being borne by the Soviet side.

CSSR Press Coverage of Troop Withdrawals Hit

90UI0398A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by special correspondent S. Pomerantsev: "Are Wounds Healed With Salt?"]

[Text] Prague—I will confess right away that these lines were not easy to write. After all, it is a question of an article in a Czechoslovak newspaper with whose editorial office SELSKAYA ZHIZN is linked by cooperation of many years' standing. But not mentioning this publication would have meant a dereliction of duty.

I have turned to the newspaper page time and again. It is wholly given over to one problem—the impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia. The general idea is expressed in the motto prefacing the selection of interviews, comments and readers' letters: "We Don't Want the Soviet Army Here".

My colleagues might say: this is the mood in society. And they would be right. But this was the mood both one month and six months ago. Yet much water has flowed along both the Vltava and the River Moskva. There has already been a Soviet Government statement unequivocally calling the decision to commit the armies of five socialist states to Czechoslovakia in 1968 mistaken, and the position of the Soviet leadership at that time, interference in the internal affairs of a friendly country. The decision, belated, perhaps, but inevitable, on the impending withdrawal from Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces has already been adopted in principle, and the question, by no means secondary, of course, amounts to the timeframe of the implementation of this decision. Two rounds of negotiations have already been held, and military and engineering problems of the withdrawal were discussed. As is known, the limited capacity of the already overburdened railroad pertains to the most complex of these problems. In addition, the subject was raised a matter of days prior to the visit to the Soviet Union by CSSR President V. Havel, in the course of which all the "i's" are to be dotted and the "t's" crossed. What aim, one wonders, was the newspaper pursuing in inflaming new passions?

A few days earlier ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY carried the account of a press conference given by the country's president, at which he told of a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev and his reaction to it. Vaclav Havel, who knows well the price of both human injustice and genuine humanism, confirmed that it is a question not only of tens of thousands of servicemen and their families but also of a large quantity of equipment, which cannot be hauled away overnight. "The whole withdrawal is connected also with internal political problems in the Soviet Union," the president added.

However, ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY argues more simply. Difficulties with the subsequent location of the servicemen and their families? "I know that they do not want to leave here, but let them go and build their own accommodations," is the advice of a reader whose letter was selected for publication. And this is the opinion of the editorial office itself: the Soviet side is opposed to using, for the troop withdrawal, an air bridge "which was so successfully organized at the time the troops of the five Warsaw Pact states came here in 1968," because, you see, the Soviet troop trains are not subject to customs inspection....

The press is not avoiding serious matters in our countries today—we can only rejoice at this. There has already been open discussion of that which ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY has brought up once again—the difficulties created by the Soviet troops' presence in Czechoslovakia. These include the additional burden on the home market, housing, the roads and the environment. No one denies that serious moral damage has been done, and not only to Czechs and Slovaks but to Soviet people also, incidentally. But are wounds healed by sprinkling salt on them?

And can a harm that has been done be rectified by causing new harm? Younger generations will judge these events not only by the actions of the politicians who adopted the unjust decision in 1968 but also by the way in which its consequences were removed. This includes the tens of thousands of soldiers who have come, through none of their own doing, to be on CSSR territory and the thousands of young men who are the children of our servicemen and their Czechoslovak coevals. After all, they will have to live alongside one another and maintain the good-neighbor relations of our countries.

New Name, Coat of Arms for CSSR Proposed

PM2202145390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Government Decision"]

[Text] Bratislava, 15 Feb—Republic of Czecho-Slovakia—this new name for the CSSR was proposed by the Slovak Government at a session here on Wednesday. It provisionally approved a new state coat of arms, as well as republic coat of arms, flag, and anthem.

In the Slovak Government's opinion, the state coat of arms, reflecting the idea of equality, should comprise two equal parts. On one side, the Czech lion wearing a crown; on the other, the ancient Slovak emblem—a cross atop three hills.

The Slovak Government resolutely rejected the peremptory demand by the leadership of central television and radio for a considerable reduction of the numnber of staff in the institutions' Slovak branches, stressing that its exclusive right to make decisions on matters of media management on the territory of the republic should be fixed in legislation.

Parliamentary Session Ends After Tax Debate

LD0103181890 Budapest MTI in English 0900 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 1 (MTI)—The third working day of the Hungarian parliamentary session ended in Budapest on Thursday.

In the prolonged debate on the interest tax in the second half of the day, Budapest MP Frigyes Tallossy cancelled his motion about revoking the law concerning the abolishment of taxes payable on state home-building loans. At the same time, he also renounced his MP mandate.

In this way, the interest tax law remains effective, while parliament approved the motion that on determining exemptions from paying the interest tax and the increased rents, per capita incomes do not include the family allowance, the child-care allowance and other social benefits.

Hungary's Horn, Karpati on NATO, Pact Links

PM2502144590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov report: "Hungarian Ministers' Statements"]

[Text] The following report has been carried in all central newspapers in the Hungarian Republic: "On 20 February this year, at a session of the Hungarian Political Science Society on the subject 'is a New History of Europe Beginning?' G. Horn, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party Presidium and Hungarian foreign minister, declared in his speech: 'We need closer ties with NATO. Moreover, I do not rule out the possibility that Hungary will become a member of that bloc's political organization.'" Appearing on television the same day, G. Horn pointed out that Hungary's membership of NATO's military organization is not ruled out either.

He went on to report that he considers closer cooperation between Hungary and various NATO organizations, the political one above all, possible in the "near future" as an interim step toward creating a system of collective security in Europe.

The newspaper NEPSZABADSAG carried an interview with Hungarian Defense Minister F. Karpati in connection with Horn's statement. F. Karpati made the following reply to the correspondent's question as to whether there had been any changes in the government's policy on the alliance: "I too learned this news only this evening from the television broadcast. I think I will still have time to familiarize myself with this concept in greater detail.

"At the present time I can say in reply to your question that the Hungarian Government is unequivocally fulfilling its obligations as an ally within the Warsaw Pact framework. At the same time, as the government headed by M. Nemeth has already declared, we seek to ensure that the factors which led to the bloc's creation will be eliminated in the all-European process of reducing arms and the level of confrontation."

According to an MTI report, F. Somodi, secretary of state at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, has declared that two working groups are currently holding talks on the technical aspect of the Soviet troop withdrawal, on the terms for transporting troops and military freight, and also on the final version of the text of the agreement. Financial requirements and the value of the installations built by Soviet military units also have to be determined accurately during the talks.

CPSU's Girenko Meets With MSZMP Visitors

PM2302152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] K. Docze and J. Vasas, secretaries of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee, were in Moscow and had consultations in CPSU Central Committee departments.

The Hungarian comrades met with A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 21 February. During the conversation they exchanged information and opinions on the main avenues of the two parties' work.

Gusev Meets With Hungarian Industry Minister

LD2502041590 Moscow International Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] In Moscow, Vladimir Gusev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union received Ferenc Horvath, Hungarian minister for industry, and discussed with him questions concerning cooperation in the exploration of the Tengiz oilfields and the development of trade and economic links between the two countries in the current year.

At the meeting, Sandor Gyorke, Hungarian ambassador to Moscow, was also present.

Taxis Offer To Carry Soviets Free to Border

LD2202123990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Knowing the present level of taxi charges you will be amazed at the grand gesture of self-sacrifice when you listen to the report of (Klara Babitsky).

[Begin Babitsky recording] we reported on a number of occasions that the leaders of the Szekesfehervar urban council and the parties functioning in the county seat have voiced their dissapointment over the fact that the Soviet units temporarily stationed here are not being reduced in their town by as much as a single man or a single weapon, even though plans have already been made for using the sites and buildings. Now the Szekesfehervar tourist taxi drivers have made an offer on this matter. Its essence is that, having learned from the press that one of the obstacles of the withdrawal is that there are insufficient means of transport, these drivers offer to convey completely free of charge the Soviet civilian personnel staying in Szekesfehervar, together with their chattels, as far as Zahony [on the Hungarian-Soviet border]. As they write in an open letter published in the local press: In this way we want to express our friendly, helpful intentions toward the Soviet people. Already many people in Szekesfehervar have joined the tourist taxi drivers' offer since 21 February. As far as I know, the Soviet side has so far not reacted to the offer. [end recording]

Polish 'Concern' Over German Unification Voiced

PM2302111190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE report: "Poles Concerned"]

[Text] The U.S. State Department has virtually rejected the aspiration which T. Mazowiecki, the Polish head of government, expressed in London to participate in talks concerning Germany's unification in accordance with the formula two plus four (the two German states plus the four victorious powers).

While recognizing the legitimate right of Poland, as well as Germany's other neighbors, to have its national interests taken into account, at the same time State Department spokesman R. Boucher emphasized that "four is four" and their special rights and responsibility stem from wartime and postwar accords.

The dramatically accelerated process of German unification and the stubborn reluctance of the FRG (unlike the GDR) to finally recognize the Oder-Neisse border are arousing understandable concern in Poland. And this concern is coloring the debate which has developed in Warsaw over the presence of Soviet troops on the country's territory. Whereas L. Walesa declares that he "will do everything possible to ensure that the Soviet Army leaves the country as soon as possible," A. Karkoszka, for example, an eminent expert on disarmament issues and a member of the Palme Commission, advocates a gradual—over at least three years—withdrawal of the troops, whose numbers he estimates in the pages of the newspaper TRYBUNA at approximately 40,000 men. In Karkoszka's opinion, it is not in the Poles' interests to accelerate the Soviet troop withdrawal under conditions when the question of recognition of Poland's western border is not entirely clear and when NATO membership for a future united Germany cannot be ruled out.

Polish National Defense Minister F. Siwicki has declared that on the question of the Soviet troop withdrawal the Poles should be guided, above all, by national interests connected with ensuring the country's security and with guarantees of the inviolability of its borders.

As is known from the Soviet Government's recently published statement, it is ready to discuss this question if the Polish Government expresses a corresponding desire.

Diplomatic activity in Europe over the German problem is not diminishing. GDR Head of Government H. Modrow has arrived in Warsaw. At talks in Paris FRG Chancellor H. Kohl and French President F. Mitterrand advocated convening a special EC conference devoted to the problems of Germany's unification.

Siwicki Speaks on Withdrawing Troops From Poland

PM2102124390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report under the rubric "In the Countries of Eastern Europe": "Cautious Approach Needed"]

[Text] Warsaw, 16 Feb—Our state's interests require a serious approach to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory, Polish National Defense Minister Army General F. Siwicki pointed out. He issued PAP with a statement in connection with the USSR leadership's expressed readiness for talks on this problem.

The statement says that progress at the disarmament talks will also enable the numerical strength of Soviet troops to be reduced in the future. On the other hand, the processes taking place in Poland's neighbor states may change the existing alignment of forces. That is why, Army General F. Siwicki pointed out, we must approach the question of the Soviet troops' withdrawal from our republic's territory in a cautious, unemotional fashion, guided by the interests of our country's security and guaranteeing the inviolability of its borders.

Michnik on Anti-Polish, Anti-Gorbachev Attacks

PM2302181090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 7, 18 Feb 90 p 7

[Polish Sejm Deputy Adam Michnik article: "As a Pole Sees it"]

[Text] As I see it, the last plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee crossed a border—from a philosophy of dictatorship to a philosophy of democratic order. The essence of the former is the idea that the Party should have the leading role, while the essence of the latter is that all citizens have an equal say in the public life of a country.

I think three things are very essential—that Article 6 of the Constitution, which gives the Party the leading role, be rejected; second, that the CPSU give up its monopoly on power; and third, a multiparty system be allowed. In this way the most important doctrines of Stalin's totalitarian system are being destroyed. The question of a democrtic perestroika remains open as before—how should it be performed, when and by what methods? But still a turning point has occurred. Something of very great importance has taken place for all who love freedom.

No less important is that at long last we can see the way of thinking of the opponents of democratic perestroika. V. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, declared openly, that the present Politburo, led by Gorbachev, should be replaced, because it doesn't have enough authority to deal with the country's destiny. Why? Because someone must be held responsible for the events in Eastern

Europe. "Our buffer zone has been destroyed," complained Anufriyev. "But already today they make territorial, and material claims, destroy consulates, desecrate the graves of our soldiers and things we hold sacred, and humiliate our great country. And we again send there hundreds of millions of roubles, robbing our own people. We hospitably receive Mazowieckis and other Swedes." How simple and clear is such an image of the world! As compared with comrade Anufriyev, Stalin was a past master of dialectics and understanding of complicated historical processes.

This absurdity isn't worth arguing against. Desecrating graves is always vandalism—whether they're graves of Soviet soldiers in Poland, or graves of Polish soldiers in the USSR. Here we agree completely. But such a mixture of semitruths and frank lies testifies exclusively to ignorance and ill will. As I was taught at home, one shouldn't boast of one's ignorance. To reduce the processes going on in Eastern Europe to anti-Soviet excesses means to demonstrate one's incompetence. To us, in relation to sovereign European states, the concept of a "buffer zone" means to express one's imperial psychology. As a deputy to the Sejm, I'd like to declare that I respect the national dignity of Russians and other USSR nations, but, at the same time, I demand that respect be expressed for the national dignity of Poles. We'll never allow anyone to call our country a "Buffer zone" of any other state.

One other thing—when the surname of the prime Minister of my country is written in the plural, that reminds me of Stalin's trials and testifies to a rare case of vulgarity.

I'll say quite openly—I highly value the recent policy of the USSR government in relation to Poland. I'm far from interfering in the USSR's internal affairs. If now I'm writing about the speech by V. Brovikov, USSR Ambassador to the Polish Republic, then I do not do so to protect Gorbachev, whose policy the Ambassador attacked outright. I'll only note here that if tolerance in relation to dissidents was called here "irresponsibility and impotence in cutting down anti-state activities", then a question inevitably arises—what, in such a case, are Mr. Ambassador's alternatives? We know each other well, and I ask you openly and in public—what are you trying to achieve? What, besides patience, do you offer Gorbachev—trials and camps? Is that what you miss? What else do you offer people besides a nostalgia for the former times of fear? Do you really believe that by thinking as you do, you can be a good ambassador of your country in Poland? I assure you—the Poles will not accept such a langauage.

How nice it is that the majority of participants in the plenary meeting spoke another language.

Paper Cites Walesa Call for 'Dictatorship'

PM2202131990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Walesa—for a Dictatorship?"]

[Text] "Solidarity" leader L. Walesa has told a correspondent of the Swedish evening newspaper EXPRESSEN that Poland needs a dictatorship.

Pluralism and freedom, according to him, do not befit the situation today. It demands a strong government. What we need today is a strong dictatorship or a strong regime which will be able to make people work, Walesa said.

In the interview, which the Polish press cites prominently, he complained that people swear and hiss at him when it comes to the question of the need for reforms.

In connection with the bewilderment of the Polish public elicited by Walesa's statements in the interview in the Swedish newspaper EXPRESSEN the POLISH PRESS AGENCY yesterday disseminated a statement by the "Solidarity" leader's press spokesman. It denies the authenticity of all the fragments of the Walesa interview cited by the press.

Romanian Defense Minister Grants Interview

PM2102162990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the rubric "In the Countries of Eastern Europe": "Interview With V. Stanculescu"]

[Text] Bucharest, 20 Feb—ADEVARUL has published an interview with Romania's new defense minister, Colonel General Viktor Atanasie Stanculescu. It says in part:

I received officer's rank 30 December 1949, the third military man in our family, following in the footsteps of my grandfather and father. After my appointment to the post of minister I was congratulated by all subunits of the Romanian Army. They expressed agreement with this decision taken by the country's new leadership.

I share the views of officers and enlisted men who have protested about certain shortcomings of Army life. A whole set of problems have accumulated as a result of protracted indifference to such questions as servicemen's elementary living conditions, uniforms, and food.

To the question of whether there are still many Communists in senior Army posts, Col. Gen. V. Stanculescu replied that since the Romanian Army is the army of a country which has embarked on a new path of development and wants to be a European state, the principles of political pluralism must be taken into consideration when resolving cadre problems.

Broaching the question of putting the state security service, the "Securitate," under the control of the

Defense Ministry, Col. Gen. V. Stanculescu said that the situation needs to be studied. Honest people must be retained and those who have compromised themselves must be separated. This is a long but necessary process. Long does not mean too long, because the "Securitate" no longer exists. But there are people who could be used if they were not mixed up in crimes. The Army has organizationally disbanded state security organs and will never again permit the appearance of the kind of monster that would damage the country.

Amid the changes in the society's social life the Army must integrate as best as possible into the political structure as a stabilizing element. It must enjoy the people's trust. The agreement secured with representatives of the country's political parties over my appointment to the post of national defense minister proves that the Army will not be manipulated by various forces and will not be involved in political games.

In conditions where Romania has embarked on economic revival the Army must not create additional financial difficulties for the country.

New Romanian Ambassador to USSR Interviewed

PM2302182090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 7, 18 Feb 90 p 11

[Undated Sergey Volovets interview with Romanian Ambassador Vasile Sandru: "Romania's Rehabilitation of Diplomacy"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Romania's new Ambassador to the USSR Vasile Sandru granted his first interview in Moscow to 'MN':

[Volovets] A personal question: what was your occupation before 1990? Were did you learn to speak Russian so beautifully?

[Sandru] I studied; at the Moscow Power Institute. I graduated in February 1953, then worked as an engineer in Bucharest and, later, as a Party official, but was soon forced to return to the economic sector. I've been a diplomat since 1958. I headed the department of socialist countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was Deputy Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Spain. In 1986, I was transferred from my post in Spain to a job at the united power system and then retired in 1987 at 60.

[Volovets] Ion Iliescu, Chairman of the National Salvation Front, is also a graduate of the Moscow Power Institute isn't he?

[Sandru] That's right. We have known each other since our time in Moscow. He studied in the Institute'ls Hydropower Department, and I in the Thermal Power Department.

[Volovets] Did you leave your diplomatic career of your own accord or were you asked to leave?

[Sandru] Under Ceausescu, the rule was that the top officials never explained to their subordinates. People were simply told that as a matter of personnel rotation, the administration had decided to do this and that. You see, if a person is given a reason why, then he may produce a counter argument.

[Volovets] Don't you see a certain change in the role of the socialist countries' embassies in general? It seems as if now these embassies represent the Party and the administration more than they do their nations?

[Sandru] During my career, I have met with lots of extremely skilled and; talented Soviet diplomats. In the case of Romania, we are dealing with paradox. At first, its embassies, especially in socialist countries, were indeed like the Party representations: most of our ambassadors were full or candidate members of the Communist Party Central Committee. Later, when Romanian embassies abroad began to serve as places of banishment for important people out of favour with the ruling clan, it was decided that romanians posted abroad could not be members of the Central Committee. Persons out of favour remained abroad without a voice in Party matters.

Ambassadors were belittled: they were even excluded from talks during Party visits and sometimes state visits.

[Volovets] How do you view the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance?

[Sandru] In discussing their future, it would be incorrect to put the most emphasis on economic and military cooperation. If CMEA and the system of economic integration cater to the real interests of the East European nations and the USSR, then CMEA will have good prospects. The same applies to military-political cooperation. Ideology mustn't have any role in that sphere. What is important are the interests of the state and the nation. WTO and CMEA will remain only so long as they serve the interests of its members.

[Volovets] Are you planning any changes in your Embassy?

[Sandru] Indeed, something needs to be changed here. The embassy staff consists of well trained professionals who have been in their present job for a long time. They greatly contributed to the development of Romanian-Soviet relations. I hope that, within the natural framework of diplomatic personnel rotation, we'll have younger appointees who will upgrade the Embassy's activity to correspond to the importance assigned by Romania's new leadership to the development of relations with the USSR.

I'm well aware of the difficulty of the task. Ceausescu refused to recognize diplomacy as a profession. He believed that anyone could be a diplomat. That, naturally enough, downgraded Romanian diplomacy. During the last two decades, about 75 per cent of the professional diplomats were dismissed from their Foreign Ministry jobs.

Now new staffers are being trained for the Foreign Ministry: the diplomatic profession has been rehabilitated and diplomatic profession has been rehabilitated and diplomats will now be chosen on a competitive basis.

[Volovets] "MOSCOW NEWS" wishes you success.

IZVESTIYA Describes Anti-Iliescu Riot

PM2202122590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Volodkin dispatch: "Confrontation on Victory Square"]

[Text] Bucharest—The latest demonstration involving many thousands of people on Victory Square showed Romania's political instability more eloquently than ever before. It quickly grew into an attack on the government residence, recalling rather an attempted coup d'etat than a peaceful demonstration by the opposition...

Splinters of window panes tinkled down under a shower of stones and blows from bars. Dozens of young people took the government residence literally by storm, attacking deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican Voiculescu, who came out to meet them, with their fists. "Down with Iliescu!" someone painted in bold red letters on the wall of the residence directly above the heads of the soldiers who observed the pogrom indifferently. "Iliescu is with the communists!" shouted a short man, brandishing as proof a volume of Lenin with a torn cover found in the residence.

Victory Square was a dismal and worrying sight last Sunday. Worrying because anticommunism and Russophobia, increased because of the lack of democratic culture, have been exploited by certain forces on the threshold of free elections. Many people are particularly alarmed by the fact that "the army and the people" are increasingly in the foreground of this large-scale political show. The impression you get is that someone is trying to make them clash in a bloody fight so that they can then rise to the heights of power. Alas, at the moment it is impossible to say, and it would be stupid to guess, who is behind the scenes.

I believe that the army leadership, through fear of provocation, did not decide to take active action against the thugs straight away. Toward dusk trucks full of soldiers started arriving at the government residence. A convoy of armored troop carriers and fire trucks with water jet equipment arrived. Triple ranks of soldiers and paratroopers gradually started to firmly block all access to the residence. However, even such a substantial barrier did not stop the mob, which carried on demanding the resignation of I. Iliescu, chairman of the National Salvation Front Council. Later on in the evening stones were again thrown at the windows, hitting the soldiers. On seeing their passiveness, the unruly mob tried to storm the building once again but, meeting with resistance, started shouting "Murderers! Murderers!" It must be noted that the soldiers did not shoot at all, not even warning shots. I do not think that anything threatened the lives of the hooligans detained inside the building either. Nevertheless, provocative rumors about reprisals against them spread like wildfire around the square.

It is difficult to say how matters would have ended if the troops had not moved into the crowd at around 2300 in the evening, pushing it back from the walls of the residence by force. Straight away engines roared and armored troop carriers moved into the free space. A quarter of an hour later the soldiers were still there, with a lawn behind them that had been trodden by thousands of feet, scraps of books that had been thrown out of windows, heaps of broken glass on the steps of the government residence, and another attempt in the history of Romania to displace the country's leadership by far from parliamentary methods.

Miners' Pro-Iliescu Rally Ends in Violence

PM2202162590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch: "Miners Go to Bucharest"]

[Text] Bucharest—Around 6,000 miners from Valea Jiului, one of Romania's coalfields, have come to Bucharest to support I. Iliescu, chairman of the interim National Consensus Council, through their presence in front of the government building in Victory Square.

They appeared on the street leading from the Northern Station to the government building in their illuminated miners' helmets over their coaldust-covered faces. The people of Bucharest who had gathered in Victory Square greeted the first column of miners in triumph. Having learned about Sunday's pogrom, immediately after the shift ended the miners traveled several hundred kilometers to defend the Romanian interim council from young hooligans. "The Miners Are With Iliescu!" was written on many of the placards they were carrying. However, the miners had come to the capital not only as defenders of the government, but also as people who want to know the whole truth about the events of last Sunday and the instigators of the pogrom who were aiming to remove the interim council headed by I. Iliescu.

...Five soldiers were hospitalized and around 50 were slightly hurt. That was the cost of the attempted coup d'etat. During the investigation it has been confirmed that many of the pogrom participants were receiving up to 500 lei for taking part in the illegal actions. Even some of the soldiers were offered money by persons unknown to merely fire a single shot at the demonstrators. It is not hard to imagine the bloodbath which would have resulted from the demonstration that ended with the ransacking of government offices if its organizers had managed to provoke shooting.

The newspaper LIBERTATIA has named Romanian "liberals" with foreign connections as being among the organizers of the demonstration. As I. Iliescu noted in conversation with the miners who had come to Bucharest, the trail of coup preparations leads to emigre thugs [boyeviki] associated with the fascist party of legionnaires which existed in Romania in the thirties. According to the scenario, the destabilization of the already shaky political situation in the country would have resulted in the establishment of a right-wing military-nationalist government, I. Iliescu told the miners.

Representatives of the newly emerged bourgeois "historical" parties in Romania which took part in the meeting also attempted to talk with the miners. However, in my view, there was no dialogue. The workers literally "slammed" the speakers who tried to explain to them just what democracy is. The thousands of miners still in the square whistled and shouted down their delegates.

It should be noted that during the talks with the miners I. Iliescu also touched on a question which is currently disturbing many people in Romania. Namely, the fate of Ceausescu's notorious Securitate state security service. Reaffirming that from the first days of the December revolution it had been made subordinate to the Army, I. Iliescu nonetheless noted the need to purge the state security ranks of people who had compromised themselves in serving the dictator. Going on to say that the Romanian Government faces no threat, he proposed that the miners leave the capital and return to their workplaces. "We will call on your help if the need arises," I. Iliescu stated.

Meanwhile, events in the square gradually got out of the control of the leaders of the miners' groups. They were making their way to the station when, hearing their comrades chanting "We're not leaving! We're not leaving," some of the miners returned to Victory Square.

"People of Bucharest! Today we have come with empty arms, tomorrow we will come with weapons and beat up all idlers!" a miner shouted at the assembled citizens. Sensing their power, some miners started searching passers-by, suspecting that provocateurs and terrorists might be among them. This excess of suspicion virtually led to an outbreak of mob law, when more than 50 miners rushed after somebody. If the police and assault troops had not arrived it could all have ended in tragedy. Fights flared up in a few other places. The police and miners carrying a placard stating "We are not vandals!" who ran up found it hard to break up the fighting. Nearer nightfall thousands of miners, forming a front and chanting "Townspeople go home," forced out of the square the Bucharest residents who had gone there in order to welcome the... arrival of the miners.

"We are too 'clean' for them," one man said ironically, "but now they are strong..."

The miners themselves failed to notice how their triumphant entry into Bucharest ended in elementary violence and failed to increase either their popularity in the capital or that of the person to whose support they had hurried. It seems that it will still be some time before the Romanian capital ceases to be a zone of instability.

PRAVDA Assesses Bucharest Demonstrations

PM2302124190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Vedrashko dispatch under the rubric "In the Wake of Events": "Miners Out in the Square"]

[Text] Bucharest, 21 Feb—Romanians are never at a loss for a joke. If the worst comes to the worst, they open one of the latest newspapers. Today's ADEVARUL frontpages a cartoon showing a man asking: "How do you plan to spend Sunday, pals?" The answer is: "We will go and change the government."

Every joke contains its share of the truth...

A solid line of helmeted servicemen with automatic weapons, a ring of armored personnel carriers—this is how the seat of Romania's provisional government is now protected. Let me briefly recall the preceding events. The 18 February rally of thousands of people in the square, most of whom were observers rather than participants, evolved into a violent attack on the government institution.

This is how the event was described by Silviu Brucan, member of the leadership of the National Salvation Front [NSF], which is the country's most influential political party at present, who telephoned your correspondent on Monday. Organized, trained, and generously financed "assault teams" forced their way inside the building for the purpose of capturing it and forcing the government to resign. These formations first went into action on 28 January, when similar actions were attempted. At that time the leadership of the National Peasants Party [NPP] presented the NSF with an ultimatum: Give up power. Two representatives from each political party were invited for talks at the seat of government. But the NPP insisted that nine people from its ranks should attend. "When we asked why nine instead of two, the NPP general secretary replied: Because it was we who organized this entire action in the square," Brucan narrated.

The aforementioned quotation testifies to serious differences between the NSF and the NPP. Furthermore, it clearly indicates who is blamed by the Front for actions which destabilize the situation.

Following the 18 February events the government decided to take measures to prevent the arrival in the capital of thousands of working people from the provinces who had expressed their intention "to uphold their government." The same was done also in Bucharest.

Nonetheless, on Monday Victory Square again turned into a seething cauldron. Slogans in defense of the government were chanted. Thousands of miners got close to the building's walls and demanded order in the country. Their delegates were given a hearing at an emergency sitting of the Provisional Council of National Accord. In my view, the most impressive moment occurred when the minister of defense and the minister of internal affairs were presented with a demand to promise that outrages will not recur in the future. Otherwise, a miner said, we will be forced to apply our specific miners' tools of labor to restore calm in the capital. Both ministers gave assurances that they will spare no energy to protect the legitimate government.

The local press is actively commenting the events of the last few days. Whereas the actions by "assault teams" are unambivalently appraised as incompatible with democracy, the high-speed countermaneuver by the miners did not produce such a unanimous appraisal. The newspaper ROMANIA LIBERA, for example, writes that the miners, in their desire to protect democracy, overlooked the fact that the violators of order had already been arrested, and that they should have waited for the investigation and trial of the culprits. But I do not think that there is any point in doubting the working class' right to participate in social life and express its opinion on what is happening in the country.

The newspaper ADEVARUL, in its turn, notes: "It would not be bad if parliamentarians were to work like miners." The newspaper's hint is quite transparent: It is suggested that members of the Provisional Council of National Accord should run the country more efficiently.

Cooperation Protocol Signed With Romania

LD1602152190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1747 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest, 15 Feb (TASS)—A protocol on the results of the session of the Romanian-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission on economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation was signed here today. A wide range of problems linked with insuring that Romania's production capacities in metallurgy, chemicals, and the cellulose and paper industry, are kept occupied was discussed during three days of talks conducted by the co-chairmen of the commission: P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and V. Stanculescu, Romania's minister of the national economy.

An understanding was reached on deliveries from the USSR of the material, technical, and power resources essential for the production of output to be supplied to the Soviet Union on a mutually advantageous basis.

The sides agreed that the appropriate organizations of the two countries will carry out work on the reconstruction and re-equipping of enterprises previously built in Romania with the assistance of the USSR.

Also discussed were the prospects for developing reciprocal economic and trade links. On the basis of the decisions of the 45th sitting of the CEMA Council, an understanding was reached on restructuring the mechanism of cooperation on the basis of going over to world market prices and to settlements in freely convertible currency.

Those taking part in the talks discussed possibilities for the establishment of direct links and setting up joint production facilities, and examined specific ways of deepening cooperation of advantage to both sides.

P.I. Mostovoy also was received today by I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional National Unity Council, and by P. Roman, prime minister of Romania. The Romanian leaders thanked the Soviet Union for its support for the Romanian revolution and for the considerable material assistance given to the country during recent months.

Those taking part in the conversations noted with satisfaction that despite the complex nature of the period currently being lived through, cooperation between the two countries continues to develop. They expressed the conviction that this will continue to promote the stregthening of friendship between the peoples of Romania and the USSR in the future.

Ye.M. Tyazhelnikov, ambassador of the USSR in Romania, took part in the meeting.

REUTER Interview With Albania's Plaka Cited

PM2602132590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Abbreviated reprint of REUTER interview with Sokrat Plaka, Albanian deputy foreign minister: "Interview With Albanian"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; date of interview not specified]

[Text] A REUTER correspondent has reported from Tirana (we publish his abridged report—Editorial Office):

Albania, which has emerged from decades of Stalinist isolation, is examining the possibilities of cooperating with the European Community and taking part in talks on international security, Sokrat Plaka, Albanian deputy foreign minister, has said. At the same time Plaka pointed out that Albania, which is not involved in any military and political alliances, is not embarking on the reforms which are under way in East Europe. The communist system will be retained.

In response to the question of possible future involvement in the European Community, Plaka said: "We do not rule out this possibility. We are seriously studying it."

Albania has stated that it will continue to defend socialism while undertaking some limited reforms in its economy, which is the least developed in Europe. However, it obviously sees the changes in Europe as a historic opportunity to escape from the confines of its rigid policy of relying on its own forces, which was imposed ruing the rule of the late leader Enver Hoxha, who died in 1985. Hoxha considered this small Balkan country with its population of 3 million people extremely vulnerable to foreign interference. This fear is probably easing now.

"We are conscious of the change of equilibrium in Europe. We still do not know the nature of the new equilibrium," Plaka said. "However, the relaxation of tension in Europe is a positive factor." He said that Albania manifests an open approach to its role in Europe since the military blocs in which the two superpowers dominate have not yet been disbanded.

Plaka voiced the proposal for Albania—the only European country not involved in the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—to possibly take part in future talks. "We welcome the European peoples' efforts to strengthen security and cooperation," he said. "We deem some of the decisions adopted in Helsinki, such as the inviolability of borders, to be important. However, we did not take part in the conference because of its bloc character."

"We do not reject the idea of a European summit meeting, a Helsinki-2. We will study it," he said. "We have already contributed to European security by eschewing the existence of foreign military bases in our country. The superpowers' bases in Europe pose a threat to European countries' independence."

Plaka, whose statements reflect Albania's current foreign policy, said that his country will possibly even abandon its former policy of ignoring the superpowers and establish diplomatic relations with Washington and Moscow.

Tirana has hitherto rejected on several occasions the idea of restoring relations with Moscow, which were severed after the ideological conflict of 1961, and establishing diplomatic relations with Washington, which it accused of trying to oust the local communist leadership after World War II.

In response to a question about future relations, Plaka said the following: "We are not indifferent to these two countries' position toward Albania. We will establish relations with any state which responds with friendship to our proposal of friendship."

Albania May Soften Stance on Superpowers

PM2102102190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Friendship in Return for Friendship"]

[Text] London, 19 Feb—Albania may abandon its former practice of ignoring the superpowers and establish diplomatic relations with Moscow and Washington, Sokrat Plaka, deputy foreign minister of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, declared in an interview with a REUTERS correspondent. We will establish relations with any state which responds with friendship to our offer of friendship, he added.

Albania is now studying the possibilities of cooperation with the European communities and of participation in talks on international security.

At the same time, the agency points out, Albania regards the changes in Europe as a historic opportunity to rid itself of the limitations of its rigid policy of reliance on its own resources, which was imposed during the rule of the late leader, Enver Hoxha.

Commentary on 'Winds of Change' in Albania

LD2202163290 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Aleksandr Shakhin commentary]

[Excerpts] Speaking in a recent interview with Reuters, deputy foreign minister of Albania, Sokrat Plaka, has called for an international dialogue, and said that he does not rule out the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations with Moscow and Washington. Here is a commentary contributed by Aleksandr Shakhin:

It looks like the powerful winds of change in Eastern Europe have reached, as a light breeze, that small country in the Balkans. Such a conclusion can be drawn not so much from the interview of the Albanian diplomat, as from more objective facts. The signs of change can be seen best in the economy. Albania is developing commercial contacts with countries of the West and Eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

There are also signs of change in social life, an area the former leader Enver Hoxha protected so thoroughly from foreign influence. True, a monument to Stalin still stands in the center of Tirana, yet the Stalinist model itself is changing—factories are getting broader rights; there are less commands from the center; labor staffs can now choose their own leaders; and several candidates are nominated at elections of party and government bodies.

There are also indications of progress in foreign policy. Albania has joined discussions of the Balkan problem. Together with Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia it is working energetically to strengthen confidence and promote cooperation in the region. Judging by what the ranking diplomat Sokrat Plaka says, more moves are to be made. The country, with a 3 million population, is looking for its own place in Europe. It is exploring the possibility of cooperation with the European Community, and taking part in talks on international security. The only country not represented at the Helsinki conference of 1975 will probably attend the coming forum, Helsinki Two. As for the prospects of establishing diplomatic relations here too, there are signs of a new thinking.

It is stated that Albania will establish relations with any state that will reply with friendship to its offer of friendship, and that is certainly an encouraging statement.

Union of Democratic Forces Holds Rally in Sofia

LD2602092290 Moscow TASS in English 0842 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Mishakin]

[Text] Sofia February 26 TASS—The Union of Democratic Forces of Bulgaria has started its election campaign by holding a meeting here on Sunday, attended by about 200,000 people. The meeting's resolution gives a general idea of the opposition's programme. It calls for a "second Bulgarian Republic, a new statehood and a new Constitution".

One of the union's leaders, P. Simeonov, said the opposition wanted no more experiments in the country. It wants only freedom and private property, a market economy and a multi-party system.

The resolution also notes that Bulgaria must pursue a peaceful policy. Priority attention must be given to relations with West European states, while the country's traditional relations with East European nations and the Soviet Union must be continued and developed, but on an equitable basis.

The Balkans need urgent foreign policy initiatives, the document stresses. The Union of Democratic Forces favours an early Balkan summit meeting. Such a meeting could be of great importance for promoting mutual trust on the peninsula. It notes that the economic programmes of opposition parties would be published shortly.

The speakers criticised the Bulgarian Communist Party and chanted anti-communist slogans. There was an incident after the meeting that violated public law and order.

Speaking on Bulgarian television, representatives of Sofia City Council, the Prosecutor's Office and the Sofia Internal Affairs Department said that a group of meeting participants later pushed aside the guard of honour at Georgy Dimitrov's mausoleum and climed upon it. They called on the crowd to destroy the mausoleum and desecrate the embalmed body of the founder of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The Internal Ministry troops stopped the crowd with the help of one of the meeting organisers, celibate priest H. Sybev.

The Prosecutor's Office ordered the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs to investigate the incident.

West Europe

Council Of Europe Holds Meeting in Moscow

Shevardnadze Meets Officials

LD0303120990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1923 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (TASS)—We are broadcasting the text of the official report on the meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and representatives of the Council of Europe:

On 2 March, Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign affairs minister, met representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Council of Europe: Joao di Deus Pineiro, the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, and Catherine Lalumiere, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, who have arrived in the USSR on a working visit. In the course of the conversation they held on questions concerning relations between the USSR and the Council of Europe, a great positive impetus was noted, which these relations received as a result of the visit to Strasbourg by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Commitee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, his speech at the Parliamentary Assembly, and of his meeting with the Bureau of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The sides were unanimous in their assessment of this visit as an event of large-scale European importance.

There was a businesslike and explicit conversation on the further development of mutually advantageous ties between the USSR and the Council of Europe. It was agreed to continue with the contacts, and with the establishment of cooperation, above all in such spheres as law, including human rights, culture, education, ecology, information, and health care, including by means of the Soviet Union joining a number of Council of Europe conventions and participating in its specialized institutions. An official invitation was issued to the Soviet side to participate in European conventions. The importance of political dialogue was singled out as a catalyst for the development of the whole gamut of relations between the USSR and the Council of Europe.

It was noted that implementation of the agreement in principle to open a USSR general consulate in Strasbourg should facilitate the development of overall ties between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe.

Great attention was paid to the situation on the European continent from the point of view of making use of the practical experience accumulated in the Council of Europe and its possibilities for becoming one of the supporting structures of the "common European home," above all in the matter of creating a European legal juridical body.

During a thorough exchange of views on the development of the all-European process, the growing role of that process as a most important factor of stability in Europe was underlined. The Soviet side stated the need to synchronize the changes taking place on the continent, including those in relations between the two Germanies, with the CSCE process, and said that the emergence of any elements which would destabilize the situation in Europe is impermissible. In connection with this, the common view was expressed of the importance of calling a summit meeting in 1990 of the countries of Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Within the context of a discussion of European problems, the participants in the meeting agreed that a number of permanently operating functions of the Council of Europe could in time be dovetailed with the Helsinki process and take on an all-European character.

After assessment of the results of the conversation, it was noted that the current favorable situation in Europe and the affirmation of the philosophy of cooperation between the East and West of the continent dictate the need for a constant increase in the potential for interaction between the USSR and the Council of Europe, and places on the agenda the question of conferring upon their relations a new and qualitatively higher level.

Eduard Shevardnadze also held a separate conversation with Joao de Deus Pinheiro, during which matters of bilateral Soviet- Portuguese relations and the prospects for their development were discussed in a concrete and business-like manner. It was noted with satisfaction that the political dialogue between the USSR and Portugal is organically a part of the international community's movement toward higher quality mutual relations and cooperation in the interests of peace and progress.

On the same day, a dinner was given in the guests' honor.

Leaders Brief Press 2 Mar

LD0303135490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1730 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (TASS)—"After our talks in Moscow we feel optimistic about the development of relations between the Council of Europe and the USSR," Deus Pinheiro, chairman of the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe and Portuguese foreign minister, stated here today.

Speaking at a news conference which was also attended by Catherine Lalumiere, general secretary of that organization, he reported that during the talks with USSR Foriegn Minister Eduard Shevardnadze there had been discussion of concrete plans for expanding cooperation between the Council of Europe and the USSR.

The Soviet side has been handed a letter from the committee of ministers containing an invitation to join in a number of European conventions. During the conversation, Deus Pinheiro noted, it was stressed that "juridical and humanitarian questions should be the priority ones in defining the future of the European Continent."

Deus Pinheiro said that the question of cooperation with the USSR will be touched on at the forthcoming conference in Lisbon on 23-24 March at the level of foreign ministers of the member countries of the Council of Europe.

Catherine Lalumiere, general secretary of the Council of Europe, reported on the contents of the list, which has been handed to Eduard Shevardnadze, of conventions the Soviet Union has expressed a desire to join. These are, she said, the European conventions on information with regard to foreign law, on protecting archeological heritage, on violence in sports (mainly concerning soccer matches), on drugs and toxic addictions [toksikomaniya], on nature and fauna protection, on protecting animals in transit between countries, and on norms and standards for producing medicines.

On the problem of German unification, Deus Pinheiro said this process must take place "simultaneously with the building of new European institutions and structures."

Officials Leave Moscow

LD0303121190 Moscow TASS in English 0940 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—The delegation from the Council of Europe, which paid a working visit to the Soviet Union, today left Moscow.

The delegation included Joao de Deus Pinheiro, chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Portuguese foreign minister, and Catherine Lalumiere, secretary-general of the Council of Europe.

At the airport they were seen off by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and other officials.

Soviet-Swiss Conference Opens in Geneva 1 Mar

Security, Disarmament Discussed

LD0103212590 Moscow TASS in English 2100 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Geneva March 1 TASS—The Soviet-Swiss conference on East-West relations which opened in Geneva today, is discussing stronger European security and mutual confidence as well as the military and political situation in Europe and prospects for disarmament.

Conference participants gave special attention to the reunification of the two Germanies.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the staff of the Warsaw Treaty Forces, and Kaspar Villiger, head of the Federal Defence Department, stressed common interest in channeling this process to ensure security and stability in Europe.

The conference will continue its deliberations tomorrow.

Conferences Addresses German Issue

LD0203205890 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Geneva March 2 TASS—A two-day Soviet-Swiss conference on relations between the East and the West has closed here.

The conference discussed a wide range of issues to consolidate security and mutual trust in Europe and prospects for the construction of a common European home and economic cooperation between East and West European countries.

The German issue provoked special attention. Both Soviet and Swiss participants are sure that it must be solved within the framework of the common European process and with obligatory preservation of the post-war borders and security of all European countries.

They noted the important role of the neutral countries, including Switzerland, in the expansion and strengthening of multi-faceted relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

The conference was attended by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces Army General Vladimir Lobov, head of the Swiss Federal Military Department Caspar Villiger and Soviet and Swiss scientists.

Pact's Lobov Meets Swiss Military Officials

LD0103111490 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Berne March 1 TASS—Visiting chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces Army General Vladimir Lobov met head of the Swiss Federal Military Department Caspar Villiger and chief of the General Headquarters of the Swiss Armed Forces General Heinz Haesler today.

The sides discussed German reunification and its role in the common European process, as well as the creation of new structures of European security.

They noted the need to politicise the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO and develop mutual contacts in order to ensure stability and security in Europe.

Adamishin Receives Visiting Swiss Official

PM2802105590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 23 February USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.L. Adamishin received G. Dyukre [name as transliterated], chief of the political secretariat of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, who is visiting the USSR within the framework of bilateral consultations between the two countries' foreign policy departments.

Compensation Due for Occupied Swiss Property

LD0403100790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] ASSOCIATED PRESS has a report on the Soviet-Swiss talks held in Bern. Our country has agreed to pay Switzerland approximately $3.9 million in compensation for the property of Swiss citizens and companies in areas that were incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II. The property concerned is in what used to be eastern Poland, Prussia, the Baltic republics, and Bessarabia. Switzerland raised the issue of compensation as far back as 1946 immediately after the restoration of diplomatic relations with our country. It was 1972 before the talks actually began, and only now has the problem been resolved.

Latin America & Caribbean

Chamorro Hopes for Continued Aid From USSR

LD0303104290 Moscow TASS in English 1013 GMT 3 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Dmitriyev, Igor Pshenichnikov, and Aleksandr Trushin]

[Text] Managua March 3 TASS—The situation in Nicaragua remains calm. Sporadic unrest in Managua and other cities of the country, following the promulgation of the results of February 25 general elections, did not receive further development.

Radio stations controlled by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF) ceased calling on the population not to recognise the electoral triumph of the oppositional National Alliance and to urge President Daniel Ortega not to transfer power to a new government.

Talks between SNLF and National Alliance on a transfer of power to the opposition alliance continued on Friday.

During the talks, which began on February 28, the sides are seeking to reach a compromise, Danilo Lacayo, adviser to the Nicaraguan president-elect, told TASS.

He said the National Alliance expects that a changeover, scheduled for April 25, will take place in peaceful conditions.

A new Nicaraguan government will encounter serious economic difficulties which the SNLF tried to overcome.

The political council of the National Alliance decided to send a special delegation to the United States to seek economic aid from the Bush administration to the new Government of Nicaragua.

Delegation leader Francisco Majorga said here that the National Alliance expected to get 600 million dollars a year from the United States for the solution of the republic's economic problems.

Nicaraguan President-elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro told TASS: "I want relations between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua to be fine and remain as they were before.

"I hope that the Soviet Union's humanitarian aid to Nicaragua will be continued because the republic needs it precisely now for economic rehabilitation.

"The new government of Nicaragua will widely popularise Soviet aid," she said.

The president-elect praised perestroyka in the Soviet Union. "I know that Mr. Gorbachev thinks the way I do. He also wishies prosperity for his native land and for other countries of the world," he said.

Messages Assure Cooperation With Nicaragua

LD0203184790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1708 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (TASS)—The 25 February Nicaraguan elections have become an important stage in the country's life and a major step on the path toward a just settlement of the Central American crisis. The elections were held in complete accordance with the obligations assumed at the El Salvador meeting of Central American Presidents.

The main particular which made the Nicaraguan elections an extraordinary event in world practice was the presence of numerous international observers. They witnessed the Nicaraguan people's free choice, the national liberation front's responsibility for the country's fate, and the sincerity of its intentions to develop and deepen the process of democratizing Nicaraguan society.

A telegram sent on 1 March by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to Daniel Ortega Saavedra, president of the Nicaraguan republic, stressed that the Nicaraguan elections were possible primarily thanks to the selfless activity of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, which completely devoted itself to defending the Nicaraguan people's independence and sovereignty, and achieving national consensus, democracy, and political pluralism in the country.

The message noted that, in the conditions of an unceasing economic blockade and in the complex political situation within and without Nicargua, the Sandinista leadership ensured that the election campaign and the elections themselves were carried out in an atmosphere of genuine democracy and free expression. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium expressed confidence that the traditionally friendly relations which have been established between the Soviet and Nicaraguan peoples will continue to develop on the basis of mutually advantageous cooperation, for the sake of peace and progress.

On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium a telegram was also sent to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in connection with her victory in the the Nicaraguan presidential elctions. The message expressed the hope that the friendly relations which have built up between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua, based on the principles of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, will be further developed within the framework of mutually advantageous cooperation for the good of both countries' peoples, in the interests of strengthening peace and universal security, democratization, and humanization of international relations.

USSR Sends Messages to Ortega, Chamorro

PM0503102790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Messages Sent"]

[Text] On 1 March the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sent a telegram to President Daniel Ortega Saavedra of the Republic of Nicaragua in connection with the general election held in that country 25 February, which attracted the attention of the whole world public.

The telegram states that the elections held in Nicaragua were made possible, above all, thanks to the selfless activity of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front], which devoted itself entirely to serving the Nicaraguan people, upholding their independence and sovereignty, and achieving national harmony, democracy, and political pluralism in the country. Held in full accordance with the pledges adopted at the meeting of Central American presidents in El Salvador, they marked a crucial stage in the life of the country and an important step on the way to a just settlement of the crisis in Central America.

As the message points out, under conditions of the continuing economic blockade and the complex political situation in and around Nicaragua the Sandinist leadership displayed firm will and flexibility, ensuring the normal holding of the election campaign and the elections themselves in an atmosphere of genuine democratism and free expression of will. The main feature that made the elections in Nicaragua an unusual event in world practice was the presence there of numerous international observers, who witnessed the Nicaraguan people's free choice, the FSLN leadership's very great responsibility for the country's destiny, and the sincerity of its intentions to develop and deepen the process of the democratization of Nicaraguan society in the interests of resolving the exceptionally important and complex tasks facing the country.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium expressed confidence that the traditional friendly relations established between the Soviet and Nicaraguan peoples will continue to develop on the basis of mutually advantageous cooperation in the name of peace and progress. A telegram of congratulations was also sent on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in connection with her victory in the Nicaraguan presidential election.

The message expresses the hope that the friendly relations which have taken shape between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua and are founded on the principles of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs will be further developed within the framework of mutually advantageous cooperation for the good of our countries' peoples, in the interests of strengthening peace and world security and democratizing and humanizing international relations.

Process of Transfer of Power in Nicagarua Viewed

PM0503102990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "Nicaragua: War Over?"]

[Text] According to reports from the Nicaraguan side, the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] and the election-winning National Opposition Union [UNO] are holding consultations in Managua on the question of transferring power to the country's new government.

These consultations, which began in the presence of international observers (they will remain in Nicaragua until 25 April, the day the V. Chamorro government will be inaugurated) will work out a formula for the transitional period and define the Sandinistas' future role in running the country. National Assembly Secretary R. Solis told journalists at a Managua press conference that the UNO will not be able to achieve any changes in the republic's constitution or implement its planned reforms without the consent of deputies from the FSLN, who hold 38 seats in the Nicaraguan Parliament. At the same time, certain forces in the UNO Political Council, which is an alliance of diverse parties, oppose any Sandinista participation in the future Nicaraguan Government.

According to information from AP, the United States has authorized its ambassador in Honduras to inform the leaders of the Nicaraguan Contras of the current U.S. position on Nicaragua, and to point out to them the need to maintain restraint in the transitional period. It is reported from Tegucigalpa that Honduran President R. Callejas has stated that the Nicaraguan Contras on that country's territory should leave the country "as quickly as possible." "I cannot expedite events in Nicaragua," he noted, "but the insurgents should not remain on our territory."

Nicaraguan President D. Ortega, REUTERS reports, has ordered the Sandinista Army to unilaterally cease fire and refrain from any hostilities. "The war is over in Nicaragua," U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker believes. In his opinion the United States should refrain from any action or advice likely to damage the fragile stability in Nicaragua or lead to an exacerbation of relations between the sides involved in the conflict. The U.S. press is noting the "decisive support" given by the Soviet Union to the electoral process in Nicaragua. "The USSR played a constructive role in getting the Sandinista government to hold these elections," THE WASHINGTON POST stated, quoting an unnamed ranking U.S. State Department official.

Cuban Preparations for U.S. Invasion Cited

PM0203135590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 p 3

[Maiden dispatch by "our new correspondent" Aleksey Novikov: "'People Who Are Ready To Die.' That is How Fidel Castro Speaks of His Compatriots. What Lies Behind These Words?"; first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Aleksey Vladimirovich Novikov was born in Moscow in 1958. After graduating in 1981 from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Journalism Faculty he worked as a probationer and correspondent on KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and then as the newspaper's observer.

Havana—February. Heat. The shining leaves of the palm trees floating against the background of a white-blue sky seem artificial—surely a living plant cannot really stand day after day in such scorching heat without dying or even turning yellow! Even my buttons, it seems, will now melt and drip down my shirt in a thick plastic stream. But that is because I am unused to it. February in Cuba is not the hottest month. So Ramon Alfonso Soto, who is host to me and my colleague from Moscow radio, is obviously not suffering greatly from the heat. It has merely brought out the perspiration on his brow. But perhaps that is from impatience. For a whole minute he has been tugging at the door catch but the obstinate iron bolt is completely intractable. Noticing that we are exchanging skeptical looks from time to time, Ramon gives a scarcely perceptible smirk:

"Don't worry, when bombs fall all round this thing will be pulled out in an instant."

Finally the intractable mechanism gives in, the door opens, and, having climbed a dozen steps, we are in paradise. There is nothing here except concrete floor and walls, it is true, but it is cool here. Indeed, these premises are not intended for a comfortable sojourn, we are in a bomb shelter. And now Ramon Soto has appeared before us not in his usual shape—as director of a hydraulic goods factory in Cienfuegos City—but as a commander in chief on a regional scale. After all, in the event of war it is he who will lead the factory's defense.

"Two hours after the alarm the majority of the factory's workers will have joined the territorial militia troops and 75 people will remain here—the so-called defense and production brigades which will not only defend the enterprise but also work at it. Now alongside our main output we are also producing a certain quantity of weapons—light hand-held mortars and so forth. But when hostilities start the factory will switch entirely to arms production."

Actually, it is time to explain. Do not think that a state of siege has already been introduced in Cuba or that the roar of enemy bombers can be heard behind the clouds. There is none of that, but the country does indeed quite seriously expect an American armed invasion and is therefore in a state of full combat readiness. People here call it a "nationwide war." We have grown accustomed to associating these words with blazing cities and villages, attacks, and guerrilla ambushes. For the Cubans "nationwide war" is a reality of daily civilian life.

What do I have in mind? Primarily the so-called people's territorial militia troops (MTT) which exist in addition to and alongside the regular army and unite hundreds of thousands of people.

"The national revolutionary militia (that was what the territorial militia used to be called—A.N.) was organized soon after the revolution," I was told by Lieutenant Colonel Ruben Cabrera, chief of staff of the Cienfuegos MTT. "But subsequently it lost its importance since with the aid of the USSR and the other socialist countries we succeeded in creating a powerful regular army. But in connection with the change in the situation in the early eighties it became clear that, however much we developed our armed forces, our country's economy would not allow us to create an army capable of resisting the U.S. army. It was then that Fidel had the idea of a 'nationwide war' as a result of which there appeared the territorial militia troops."

"After all," Cabrera continues, "although we have always received Soviet aid and count on it in the future, despite your great difficulties, we nonetheless realize that in the event of an armed U.S. invasion we will not be able to ask you for direct intervention and will have to rely only on our own forces. We proceed from the premise that if the Americans succeed in defeating part of our main forces and partly occupying the island we will have to create a 'wasps' nest' for the aggressor so that he cannot feel secure for a single minute. The Americans will pay such a high price that they will have to renounce the intention to seize our country. Even if the worst happens for us, if we do not receive the slightest aid—not a single cartridge, not a single gramme of wheat—we intend not only to organize a fitting rebuff but also to beat the U.S. interventionists. I personally believe that this is possible and even inevitable. Because we have the main thing—the absolute, total unity of our entire people united around the party—and because we have a very convinced, courageous, and able leader who never deviates from the chosen path. You may be sure that there will be no wavering, no concessions to imperialism, still less capitulation, on the part of our leader and our party. How long this war will last we do not know—two years, four, or 10. In any case we shall fight until victory and then begin to build socialism again—in accordance with the precepts of Marxism-Leninism and Fidelism [fedelizm]."

I am no expert in the field of military problems and I cannot therefore assess competently whether in the event of aggression Cuba is capable of withstanding the strike of the Pentagon machine. But I can attest that they are preparing for this more than seriously.

I have before me a handbook for a territorial militia fighter (they are called "milicianos" here). Its first lines read: "The territorial militia troops consisting of workers, peasants, students, housewives, pensioners, Cuban men and women who have responded to the appeal of our commander in chief when U.S. imperialism is building up its aggressive preparations against our country."

Who can be a territorial militia member? Any Cuban who is not an invalid, who is in his right mind and has a good memory and can hold a weapon. Profession, skin color, or sex are of absolutely no importance. There are battalions consisting entirely of women and there are territorial militia subunits uniting boys of 14 and 15. In the event of aggression they too will fight. Although recruitment to the MTT is on a voluntary basis, its membership encompasses the overwhelming majority of the population. Thus, in the Cienfuegos municipality where we talked with Lieutenant Colonel Cabrera, 90 percent of the able-bodied population, right up to 60-year-old men and 55-year-old women, are territorial militia members.

"We have the most varied weapons," Ruben Cabrera says. "Although, of course, some have already become obsolete. They include carbines and PPSh submachine guns... We have 'T-34,' 'T-54,' and 'T-55' tanks, we have self-propelled guns, mortars, and cannon. We also have U.S. weapons, including the most sophisticated. Where does it come from? That is a secret."

"Incidentally, " the lieutenant colonel does not conceal his pride, "our armored battalions are trained far better than the regular army units. After all, the latter contain mainly novices who have never seen an enemy, who do not know what fighting is. But I have 100 percent soldiers who have fulfilled their international duty: Many of them took part in the hard fighting in the deserts of Ethiopia and in our offensive toward the southern borders of Angola and many fought in Cuito Cuanavale.

"In peacetime all weapons, including tanks and artillery, are hidden under ground, but in the event of an alarm MTT subunits will be mobilized and armed within 6-8 hours. Thus, if necessary, virtually the entire country can be put under arms in a few hours."

The organization of the territorial militia troops mainly copies the structure of the regular army. The main military unit of the MTT is the regiment (1,400-1,600 people) which includes artillery, armored, sapper, and reconnaissance subunits. They are commanded by retired offices, graduates of special schools, and those internationalist soldiers who gained combat experience outside Cuba.

As for military training, there are several forms. First, each novice, before becoming a territorial militia member, must devote 20 hours to studying the basics of military matters—antitank tactics, the art of camouflage, shooting... Second, all "milicianos" without exception must regularly give one Sunday a month to military exercises. This is called "Defense Day" and everyone takes part—great and small. Third, every five years each territorial militia member takes part in 10-day rallies which take place "on a theater of combat operations" and are something like maneuvers.

Actually, the training of a Cuban to defend his motherland begins by no means with his drafting into the army and not during territorial militia exercises. The idea that "defense of the motherland and socialism is an honor and supreme duty" is instilled in every person here from the start of his independent life (thus, for instance, in Cienfuegos I saw a kindergarten-creche called "soldier of the revolution"). This principle is enshrined in law and not only in the Constitution but also in the "Code of Childhood and Youth," which contains a list of Cubans' rights and duties up to age 30.

It must be said that the Cuban people's combat morale is maintained not only by regular military exercises and the study of "heroic and combat traditions" but also by a number of propagandist means. One of them, and an extraordinarily widespread one, consists of posters. There are a great many of them here—drawn by hand or most often beautifully printed.

One more curious detail. Recently a report from the capital's mattress factory was shown on Cuban television. Its workers decided to try to work under artificially created extreme conditions, as though the country were totally blockaded and had no sources of energy. The electricity was turned off at the factory. For a whole day it worked without light, using manual labor: The wadding used to stuff the mattresses was beaten by hand, the mattresses were sewn by hand, and the freight was carried away by hand. To all appearances this measure was viewed here as a new initiative.

What has generated this activation of military and defense preparations in Cuba? Obviously it is directly linked with the changes in the international distribution of forces caused by the transformations in the USSR and East Europe. As is well known, the Cuban leadership has a negative attitude toward these transformations. And it makes no secret of the fact. Thus, back in early December last year F. Castro stated that a process of socialist transformations cannot be implemented "when they slander socialism, destroy its values, undermine the party's authority, demoralize the vanguard by refusing it a leading role, reduce public discipline to nothing, and sow chaos and anarchy everywhere. That is how counterrevolutionary activity can be conducted..." It is therefore not surprising, according to F. Castro, that all these changes are meeting with "the delighted support of the head of the most powerful, aggressive, and greedy empire mankind has ever known." Today, when "the socialist camp no longer exists politically," Washington feels that its hands have been untied and, in the Cuban leadership's opinion, its aggressiveness is increasing many times over.

Let us add to this that in the socialist countries and even in the USSR voices are being heard increasingly frequently demanding a review of the present economic relations with Cuba, that CEMA intends to switch to world market prices and accounting in hard currency (in short supply here) and it becomes clear that the country naturally feels particularly uncomfortable. Especially as Cuba is only separated from its long-standing enemy—the United States—by a narrow strip of water of 150 km (and no one here doubts that the United States will descend on Cuba at the very first opportunity).

And if we take into account all these factors, we can understand F. Castro's words to the effect that the present moment is "one of the most dubious, uncertain, and problematic... in all the years the revolution has existed" and that the country is now living "in a period of uncertainty and doubt, in a period of serious threats. Today we are threatened as never before." "A new period, a new stage is beginning. Times of great trials for our people may come." The responsibility which rests on the Cubans today is all the greater because, F. Castro says, "Cuba has become the frontline bastion not only for Latin America but also for the entire 'Third World' and has become a stronghold for the revolutionary, progressive, and just ideas of the whole world."

The country's leadership is firmly convinced of the correctness of the path chosen 30 years ago and does not intend to waive its principles. No one will crush the Cuban revolution, the guarantee of this is that "we have an entire people ready to die in the struggle," Fidel Castro states...

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Joint Sitting Begins 5 Mar

LD0503072490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Today, the USSR Supreme Soviet session will continue work. During these minutes a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities is beginning. The deputies are intending to return again to discussion of the draft law on ownership. As is known, after the first reading in the Supreme Soviet, this draft law was published for discussion by the people. Many remarks and proposals were expressed by deputies during its second reading. Thus, the concluding discussion of the draft law and the adoption of a decision is ahead.

To Discuss Ownership

LD0503074990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Half an hour ago the USSR Supreme Soviet session resumed work. The sitting was opened under the chairmanship of Comrade Lukyanov. The registration of deputies carried out has shown that there is not a sufficient number of members of the Supreme Soviet necessary for the adoption of decisions. It has been decided to begin discussion of the draft law on ownership, which will be looked at paragraph by paragraph. Decisions will be adopted after other deputies, who have obviously not yet returned from their constituencies where they have been taking part in the elections, join the sitting. Now Deputy Kalmykov is making a report on the elaborated draft law from the Committee for Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and the Committee for Economic Reform.

Lukyanov on Absence of Quorum at Supreme Soviet

LD0503104790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0900 GMT on 5 March carries a two-minute report by correspondent Olga Vasilenko from the Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin. Vasilenko reports that there was no quorom this morning for the debate on the draft law on property.

According to Vasilenko, Kalmykov spoke on the concept of property and ownership: it has been decided not to use the phrase private property [chastnaya sobstvennost], but this morning's debates indicated diametrically opposing views of deputies on the subject.

Vasilenko reports that "at the end of the morning session, Lukyanov [in the chair] returned to the problem of the quorom. He said that 173 of the 271 deputies of the Soviet of the Union were present, and only seven deputies had valid reasons for absence; 174 of the 271 deputies of the Soviet of Nationalities were present. Perhaps, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov said, this should be published in the press so that people could see which deputies fail to come to join us. But it is nevertheless necessary to take all measures to ensure that there is a quorom today, so that this draft law can be put to the vote."

Gorbachev Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Session

LD0303170590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] We have just received a report that a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has taken place today in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In accordance with the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet Presidium has examined proposals, remarks, and elaborations in the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and the commissions of its chambers on the draft law on the institution of the post of president of the USSR and the introduction of corresponding amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution, which will be presented for study by an extraordinary congress of USSR people's deputies.

Kudryavtsev, leader of a working group, USSR people's deputy and vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, gave a report on this issue to the session. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium approved the draft law. It will be published in the press.

Other issues, concerned with preparation of an extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the formation of a corresponding commission, were examined at the sitting.

The session heard a report from, Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and there was discussion of a draft decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the situation in the Azerbaijani and Armenian SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republics] and measures to normalize the situation in the region. It was decided to submit the draft for consideration at the next available session of the Supreme Soviet. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ruled that the central electoral commission for the elections of people's deputies of the Armenian SSR had acted outside its authority in connection with the creation on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani SSR of constituencies for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, insofar as these actions run counter to Article 76 of the USSR Constitution, according to which a union republic exercises state power on its territory alone. The session discussed certain other matters related to state life.

Commission Chairman Tarazevich on Presidency Bill

LD0303150290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1715 GMT 2 Mar 90

["Supreme Soviet Diary" program with G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the Commision for Nationalities Policy and

Relations Between Nationalities, and correspondent V. Stepanyuk, in studio—live or recorded]

[Text] [Stepanyuk] What is to be the status of the president of our country? How must our Constitution be changed to deal with this major innovation? This made for trenchant debate at the Commission of Nationalities Policy and Relations Between Nationalities. Most of the deputies are in favor of the swift establishment of presidential rule. Naturally, the deputies feel an enourmous responsibility for the quality of the analysis of this bill, for memories are still fresh of the time in our difficult history when unlimited power became the foundation of lawlessness. Incidentally, considerations such as this provide the grounds for many of the counter arguments against a presidency. On the other hand, strong presidential power is needed to weaken the power of the bureaucratic apparatus.

[Tarazevich] Life and experience have shown that, unfortunately, not always is there unity in the actions of the legislature and the executive—the council of ministers. Therefore, to unite the legislative and the executive and our judicial authority, whose basis we have already defined by legislation, we need a president and presidential power. We need something that will unite all the structures of power in our country.

As the role of the party declines, as its functions pass to the legislative and executive authorities—to the soviets, of course, which the party unites today—these functions should likewise pass to the president. Therefore, the power vacuum we are experiencing today exists both because there is no uniting force and because, unfortunately, in several ways our executive authority operates uncertainly. All of this should be fulfilled by the president and those bodies functioning under the president. There has been discussion at the sitting of the commission—it has not yet completely finished—on the role of a federal council under the president and on the participation in the work of this council by the top officials from the union republics.

We do not believe the draft of the law yet adequately sets out the relationship or the balance between the president and the Supreme Soviet. We have already discussed, let's say, the scenario in the bill which related to what would happen if the chambers cannot reach agreement on such and such a question and intervention by the president cannot bring about agreement—then the president could turn to the congress to reelect the Supreme Soviet. In what cases?

Our commission believes that as new pieces of legislation relating to the national state system and interethnic relations are dealt with, certain situations will arise in the Supreme Soviet when the Soviet of the Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union are, of course, not in agreement, when there is disagreement between those two chambers. If these disagreements surface very frequently, then in the first place the president will find himself engaged solely in setting the disagreements. In other words, an awful lot of his time will be taken up with this problem. In the second place, a situation could arise whereby it is necessary to convene the congress several times a year, say, to resolve the question of reelecting a new Supreme Soviet.

In other words, the question of the relationship between the president and the Supreme Soviet has not been completely resolved in the bill. We are trying to have some creative input into this bill. In summary, there is still a long way to go before our discussion is completed.

Youth Affairs Committee Official on Presidency

LD0303145590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1715 GMT 2 Mar 90

[From the "Supreme Soviet Diary" program, with correspondent I. Minayev; identified by caption]

[Text] [Minayev] Several proposals were voiced at the sitting of the Commission for the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage. It has been decided to incorporate these in the commission's conclusions on the bill on the presidency. Here is one of them: Should the differences of opinion between the president and the parliament prove intractable, then the Supreme Soviet should have the right to convene an extraordinary congress of people's deputies to resolve the problem.

The members of the Youth Affairs Committee also prepared in earnest for the discussion. [video shows a deputy reading some proposals linked to the wording of the document]

[Begin recording] [V.M. Minin; identified by caption as deputy chairman of the Youth Affairs Committee] We are really quite unhappy with the document itself.

[Minayev] The [presidency] bill, you mean?

[Minin] Yes, the bill. Unfortunately, at the moment we cannot say categorically: That's no good, because it needs quite a lot of extra work. We (?also have several) criticisms of the mechanism that is proposed. Of course, the bill must be refined, and we will try to ensure that it is discussed one more time during the session. That will probably enable greater consensus to be reached when deciding on this law, and will probably make the work at the congress itself significantly easier when the document is discussed. Because during the discussion at the first and second congress there were clearly some quite harsh opposing viewpoints. That is the first thing.

Second, we believe that when such an important law is to be adopted, it is definitely necessary to talk not just about presidential power, but about the opportunities open to parliament, too. As far as the opportunities which I have just mentioned are concerned, the way they stand at the moment they are, I believe, inadequate. They should definitely be strengthened. That is, the committees' and commissions' work to create legislation does little to convey the independence of the committees and commissions. In other words, neither financially nor [pauses]...well let's say with regard to the working machinery —the apparat—surrounding the committees, they are also in quite a weak position. In short, parliament itself is not providing the counterbalance about which we need to talk. To the president. There must be a strong parliament. In our opinion, at present it is not strong enough. Indeed, it is very weak. The president would have to consider this at once.

Third, I believe, of course, that we must consider immediately a Council for National Security. As things stand, the president would be responsible for everything. Both the quality of a decision and its timeliness will depend on the information that is provided and on who provides the information essential to the decision.

[Minayev] If we return to the specific features of your Committee for Youth Affairs, then what link is there with the bill? And in this sense, is the bill, as it is presented, to the liking of your committee?

[Minin] The bill as presented is not to our liking. This is our second sitting, and we have had quite a lot of comments and suggestions. People are very concerned over the lack of the strong and rigorous checks and balances that are needed in this law to keep in check the possibility of the reemergence of a cult. That is perhaps the main danger of all the dangers that we have found in our discussion of the bill. Probably everything else is of secondary importance.

[Minayev] Hence the idea of creating a strong parliament that could keep things in balance?

[Minin] Quite right. I should like to explain why I think this: Because, if there were no such checks and balances, then the possibility of the continued development of our political and other trends—and it is in them that the young people, above all, see their future participation—of alternative trends, if one may put it that way, will be reduced to a minimum, and I do not believe anything good would come of that. The opportunities must be created for people to profess opposing points of view. [end recording]

Political & Social

Gorbachev Votes, Meets Reporters 4 March

PM0403215190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unatttibuted report on interview with M.S. Gorbachev in Moscow 4 March conducted by unidentified persons: "M.S. Gorbachev: These Elections Will Bring Forth New, Fresh Forces"; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] One of the buildings of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics houses Electoral Precinct No. 11/311 of the capital's Oktyabrskiy Rayon. M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, voted here. A large group of Muscovites gathered at the electoral precinct and Soviet and foreign journalists were present. Immediately after voting M.S. Gorbachev answered numerous questions, including giving an interview for Central Television.

Question: Behind each candidate deputy is a position, a platform, views, and convictions. Sometimes these positions do not coincide. For what, for what kind of position, have you cast your vote just now?

M.S. Gorbachev: In my view, this question is the most important. For me there is no other path—only the path of perestroyka on which we have embarked together. I think that the stream of people who adhere to this great cause is growing. It is already an entire movement. The movement for perestroyka, for change, for the renewal of all forms of life of our society. We have acknoweledged that we value everything good that was done by preceding generations. But we can also see much that did not materialize. Moreover, much that did happen was burdensome or erroneous. We must rely firmly on the positive things that were achieved by our grandfathers and our fathers. We must go forward, doing our work and making our own contribution to the country's development. I think that to be participating today in perestroyka is a a cause for great happiness. In my opinion this gives man a lift. Then you know what you're living for. After all a person comes into this world not in order to consume, but for something greater. And perestroyka gives everyone a chance for participating in history.

These elections are very important and they will most likely bring forth new forces, fresh forces, perestroyka forces into the arena of political and state activity. It must be taken into account that it is now a question of republican, and local soviets, the soviets with the broadest base. It will be precisely these people's deputies who are directly in touch with real life, who are closely involved with the life of people and in touch with their worries. Society is waiting. I would say: In society there is a tremendous impatience for change.

I think that the soviets will now gather strength. New people will come along shaped in the new atmosphere. This will also be combined with the fact that we shall still be adopting good laws for the soviets; they are already about to emerge. As a result of the new laws which have been and which are being adopted, the soviets will become altogether different.

As for a position, I feel closer to people who comprehend our policy in depth, with mind and heart, people who are very responsible. I do not recognize positions whereby people try to prove to us that nothing needs changing and that everything is allegedly fine. No. I believe that perestroyka is life itself. If we had not started it ourselves, it would have appeared in our enormous multiform country in such forms that would have been extremely grave for society. Even now—just look what unexpected processes are arising! Everything needs to be understood, comprehended, and sustained. It seems to me that this kind of realization is now maturing in society. Equally, I do not accept positions of proceeding at breakneck speed. The time is too crucial for that. It is possible to accelerate everything, but everything must be done intelligently.

Question: Mikhail Sergeyevich, do you believe that these elections can strengthen the position of candidate people's deputies who are party members, or will they, on the contrary, weaken them?

M.S. Gorbachev: You know, I take a calm view of things. First, we must not set the party and nonparty people in opposition to each other. We must rule that out. In general how can one set the party in opposition? It is possible to speak about some party workers of various ranks who might not suit or whose time has simply gone by, people want to see other leaders, that's fine. But the party is itself a part of the people! It is not the worst part of the people, I can affirm. I can affirm this if only because I have been connected with the party since 1952. Incidentally, I was admitted to the party here, in Moscow, in Leninskiy Rayon. For me the party is something sacred. Everything must be done to ensure that it acquires a second wind, finds its place in the country which is undergoing renewal, in the atmosphere which is undergoing renewal. And this process is underway already.

That is the first thing I wanted to say: We must not set things in opposition to each other. It is a good thing that people are entering, joining the party even though some people have left it; this, too, is, for sure, an objective process. Some people are leaving, but many are also joining it. New people are joining and precisely at this present turbulent time they are throwing in their lot with the party.

It is the party--the party itself rather than just individual persons, individual communists—the party that addresses our society and the people from an open position. It is outlined in the draft platform. I think that it is a progressive platform. But you see, it is still not finalized, this is an ongoing process, it is only a document for discussion. The congress is yet to come, and I think that it will enrich the platform, and we will thus obtain a document which will be fully in line with the needs and challenges of this crucial time period. This is indeed a most crucial period. A great deal will depend on how we understand one another, on how we act right now—not in the years but in the months to come, because time really is tight now [vremya uplotnilos do predela]. And a great deal as regards the long-term prospects. The very process of perestroyka will depend on it.

I have no doubt that perestroyka will materialize. This is because life itself has dictated the changes. The really important point is this—how will it develop in the future? It could take painful paths and painful forms, through confrontation. On the other hand, it could occur through accord, through unification of forces. This is what I am committed to. It is necessary to trim away [otsech] the extreme positions and unite. Because this is our common cause. Should we once again enlist just one-half of society and put it on one side of the barricade, with the other half on the other side? Then say: Start fighting? No, we have already been through all this. I think that perestroyka's interests are ultimately in line with the interests of everyone, even though at present they are also having an adverse effect on everyone's interests, and this is a painful process.

Ultimately, we all need perestroyka. This is the actual basis for unity. The time now is such that we simply must, we have to listen to and understand one another. I think that rallies are becoming a thing of the past, what we need is a lot of intelligent and competent work. We have already laid a sound legal foundation for it. Further steps will have to be taken along Supreme Soviet and government lines to consolidate the new perestroyka processes and to back up the new forms of life. It will, however, be difficult to march on, to advance. We are, after all, children of our own time. We are not extraterrestrials, nor have we landed on some desert island. We have lived this life for years and decades, we have accumulated our own experience—each and every one of us and the country as a whole. Now we have jointly admitted that this life must be changed, it must be changed for the better, primarily in order to ensure that the atmosphere prevailing in the country will make people feel good. This is the main point.

Question: Is there not some contradiction here—you say that things must change for the better, and right away go on to say that it will be difficult, even more difficult than at present....

M.S. Gorbachev: Simply because everything depends on us! Unless we change, nothing else will change. Man is the key element. Perestroyka was conceived and is being implemented for man's sake. But it will materialize only if man himself changes. This is the connection. This applies to all. To academicians, to you journalists. I cannot say that all your affairs are in an ideal state. Now take the party—it has become the object of special examination by our entire society. This is no bad thing. It is no bad thing that such attention is given to the party, that people look to see how it acts, what plans it puts forward, what sort of people head the party organizations today. All this indicates that people associate perestroyka's success with the party's activity. I am on these people's side. I share their opinion.

Question: Can a non-journalist ask a question?

M.S. Gorbachev: Of course.

Question: What is your forecast of the specific economic results for Muscovites? Bearing in mind everything that is being done in our country today.

M.S. Gorbachev: This question could be asked by a representative of any other city, too. Because Moscow reflects the overall situation in the country, even though there are differences. In some respects, Moscow is better off compared with others. But in other respects, other regions are better off—and Muscovites must also know this—compared with Moscow. We must do a lot this year to achieve a breakthrough in the socioeconomic situation. This is what is most crucial. It is to be expected that there will be easy, as well as difficult steps in this direction. It may even come to the point of having to take certain unpopular steps. But I must bring this conversation to an end and be on my way. I think that we will talk about this further.

Question: Mikhail Sergeyevich, a five-year period of perestroyka lies ahead. How do you personally appraise these five years?

M.S. Gorbachev: I think that, since they have not yet passed, it is a bit too early to appraise them. (Laughter) Generally speaking, however, the following is the most substantial point. These years will have seen, along general lines, the materialization of that which will lead our country to a new path, a new movement, new forms of life. We will no longer live the way we used to. We will never turn back. The answers to all questions—and there are plenty of them, both questions and problems, in our life today—so then, both the answers, and the solutions must be sought without turning back, but by resolutely marching forward.

Further Remarks

LD0403200190 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 4 TASS—Election to republican and local soviets (local government assemblies) held in the country will become a turning point in the development of perestroyka, Mikhail Gorbachev believes.

The Soviet leader took part in the elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation, the city and district soviets. Elections were held today in two more republics—the Ukraine and Belorussia.

Gorbachev gave a kind of a press conference right at the polling station after casting ballot papers.

One of its topics was the institution of the executive presidency in the USSR. Gorbachev said that if he was put forward, he would not avoid it. "At the time we are living through I cannot give up my mission. But it is for the people to decide," he pointed out. Gorbachev added that the institution of the executive presidency would permit to balance democratic and decentralisation processes, to consolidate them with the help of a balancing mechanism. As for the post of the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and all that is connected with the party, the 28th party congress will tackle these problems, he said.

Answering the question whether he agreed with the democratic platform for the 28th congress put forward by a group of Soviet Communists at the All-Union Conference of Party Clubs and Organisations, Gorbachev said that there is much in common in that platform and the one put forward by the party Central Committee, but there are some differences. "Let us take party factions, for example," he continued. "We put it down in the platform of the party Central Committe that we should review the very principle of democratic centralism. We are laying emphasis, as we should, on restructuring the party on the principles of democracy. This is the most important thing." The difference is in the following: We remain on positions of the leninist vanguard party, while the democratic platform deals with the party of a parliamentary type, Gorbachev said.

Gorbachev said that he did not see any special reason for the split of the party. If some groups come up with ambitious claims, this does not mean a split, he said. "On the contrary, the feeling of consolidation, of cohesion is strengthening in the party," he stressed. Gorbachev expressed confidence that communists would be widely represented in the new Soviets. "But I would not set Communists against non-party candidates. Their rapprochement, the rapprochement between the party and the people would be more reasonable."

Speaking about demonstrations held ahead of the elections, Gorbachev pointed out that he favoured the continuation of a dialogue and opposed confrontation.

When the situation in the Baltic republics was mentioned, Gorbachev said that the discussion was going on about ways of building relations inside the Soviet Union. "We all believe that the treaty basis should be reconsidered. However, the way this process is understood by each side can be a subject for the exchange of views, for discussion, which are now continuing." He said that during the past week he had met with nearly all representatives of the Baltic republics and had discussed this problem with them. "I think that solutions will be found that will give a new lease of life to our federation," the Soviet leader pointed out.

Gorbachev questioned the correctness of criticism of the Soviet foreign policy made at the latest plenary meeting of the party Central Committee. "I cannot agree with some statements. There were two speeches that show the lack of knowledge and short- sightedness of those who made them. I am sure that the new thinking gave a very important chance both to our country and the whole world. We came to realise that we belong to the same civilisation, to the same world, and not to different camps."

Answering a question of Aleksandr Stark, a Romanian radio and television correspondent who specially came to Moscow to interview Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, speaking on behalf of the Soviet people, expressed solidarity with the Romanian people. "Things do not go smoothly both for you and for us, but let nobody be disconcerted about it. I am sure that you have chosen the right course," he said.

The press conference was followed by Gorbachev's conversation with Muscovites. It dealt with the most burning problems, specifically, the role of the Communist Party on the present stage and ways to set things in order in the country.

People's Congress To Discuss Presidency 12 Mar

LD0503113990 Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 5 Mar 90

[By TASS news analyst Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—A special congress of the USSR People's Deputies is opening in the Kremlin on March 12 to pass a final decision on whether an executive presidency should be introduced in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Parliament voted for the creation of the presidential post last week.

Most deputies regard the creation of the presidential post as a condition for deepening the democratic process. According to a western analyst, Gorbachev managed to do the impossible over five years of his rule. "Balancing at the top of the pyramid, he managed to create a new parliamentary structure supported by the people, vest it with real powers and change the role of the Communist Party by turning it from general administrator into a truly political party ready to fight for seats in the new Soviet Parliament."

The presidential post will be a link between the legislative and executive bodies of state power, without which they cannot act in unison. The president will have sweeping powers, ranging from presidential veto to the right to dismiss government officials.

Prominent Soviet lawyer Fyodor Burlatskiy believes that another important feature of the presidential system is that it will help carry out a new nationalities policy based on a new union treaty. The key issues of the Soviet nationalities policy are to be resolved not by the Politburo but at a Council of Federation that will be set up under the president and will include the heads of all union republics.

The idea of concentrating such great powers in the hands of the president, implemented in many democratic countries, also has opponents in the Soviet Union. This is not surprising in a country that knows the price of power abuse.

However, chairman of the Council of the Union Yevgeniy Primakov said that a document to be submitted by the parliament to the Congress of People's Deputies envisages enough democratic measures to prevent this power abuse. They include the right of impeachment, completely new to the Soviet political system, and the right of parliament to insist on its decisions by repeatedly confirming it by majority vote, in case of disagreement with the president.

Draft Law Detailed

LD0503114390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0910 GMT 5 Mar 90

["Draft Law Published on Presidency in USSR"—TASS headline]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—A draft law to institute the post of president of the USSR and alter and supplement accordingly the USSR Constitution was published in today's newspapers. [passage omitted]

The president submits to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies reports on the state of the nation. He submits candidacies for the posts of head of government, chairman of the Committee of People's Control, Supreme Court, chief state arbiter, and procurator general. He can propose to parliament that they be freed from their duties.

The head of state submits to parliament the question of the resignation, or of accepting the resignation, of the government. By agreement with the head of government he dismisses and appoints members of the government, this being subsequently confirmed in parliament.

The president has the right to return a law to parliament with his objections to be debated and voted on again. If parliament confirms its decision by two-thirds of the votes in each of the chambers, the president signs the law or can appeal against it before the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

In the event of a military attack on the USSR, the president declares war and general or partial mobilization. In the interests of protecting the USSR and the security of its citizens he imposes military rule or a state of emergency in particular localities. He is obliged to discuss this question with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic concerned, and may in these cases introduce temporary presidential rule.

The president conducts negotiations, signs international treaties, accepts the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states, appoints and recalls the USSR's diplomatic representatives in foreign states and in international organizations, confers diplomatic ranks and special titles.

The head of state awards USSR orders and medals, confers honorary titles, and decides questions of granting citizenship of the USSR, of exit from it, of depriving persons of Soviet citizenship, of granting asylum, and of granting pardons.

The president heads the Soviet of the Federation of the USSR. This is a new body in the Soviet political system, of which higher officials of the union republics are ex officio members. The Soviet of the Federation elaborates measures to implement the principles of the national and state system of the USSR.

Another body new to the USSR is to be set up under the president. This is the Presidential Soviet [sovet], which elaborates measures to realize the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and provide for the country's security. The head of government is an ex officio member of the Soviet, its remaining members being appointed by the president.

In the event of a violation by the president of the Constitution or laws of the USSR, he can be removed from his post prematurely on the decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by not less than two-thirds of the votes of the deputies, taking into consideration the conclusions of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision.

Under the bill, the president is elected by the citizens of the USSR on the basis of a universal, equal, and direct franchise and secret ballot, for a term of five years. Any citizen of the USSR not younger than 35 years and not older than 65 years is eligible to be elected president. A candidate who has obtained more than half of the votes of the electors who have taken part in the voting, in the USSR as a whole and in the majority of the Union republics, is considered to have been elected.

Central Committee Schedules 11 March Rules Meeting

AU0203201290 Paris AFP in English 1940 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 2 (AFP)— The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee will meet on March 11, one day ahead of a session of the full Soviet parliament, to discuss proposed amendments to party rules, the Moscow Radio publication Interfax reported Friday.

Interfax said the Central Committee meeting would last more than one day, but could resume after its first day's work either during the Congress of People's Deputies session or after that two-day parliamentary meeting.

It added that a proposal to create the post of a strong executive presidency would only be discussed by a party plenum after the Congress made the necessary changes to the Soviet constitution.

The new party rules would be "shorter" than the current rules, Interfax said.

Yeltsin Warns Gorbachev May Not Finish Year

LD0203204190 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1948 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Mr Yeltsin tonight denounced Mr Gorbachev as a dictator and hinted that one day he might challenge him for the leadership. He also warned that Mr Gorbachev could be finished in a year. In one of his most outspoken interviews yet, he said on Channel 4 News that Mr Gorbachev was intolerant and lost his temper with Soviet deputies.

Mr Yeltsin, who is regarded in the Soviet Union as Mr Gorbachev's greatest threat, was asked if he regarded the president as a dictator. He replied: "Yes, he is intolerant. He loses his temper with deputies and calls them demagogues when they want to push ideas of their own.

"He loves power and cannot stand people who contradict him. He either fires them or avoids having anything to do with them." And then, with a smile, Mr Yeltsin pointed a finger at himself and said: "You are looking at a prime example."

Asked if he would ever consider challenging Mr Gorbachev for the leadership, Mr Yeltsin replied: "If the conditions are right there is a chance if I am not too old."

Zamyatin Views Gorbachev's Powers, Prospects

LD0403095290 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0914 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] New powers being adopted by President Gorbachev will not mean a return to totalitarian rule, the Soviet ambassador to Britain said today.

Leonid Zamyatin's comments follow claims by radical Moscow communist Boris Yeltsin and a warning form Social Democrat Party leader Dr David Owen that Mr Gorbachev is turning himself into a dictator.

The Soviet ambassador claimed the new presidential powers were necessary to speed up the reform process and would be based within the framework of parliament.

"That is not coming back to a system of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, this is a new presidential form," he said. "It maybe looks like the American system but with a Soviet taste."

In an interview with David Frost on TV-AM, Mr Zamyatin said Mr Gorbachev nursed an idea of a "common European home" before he came to power.

The issue was first raised with a Western leader when Mr Gorbachev met Mrs Thatcher at Chequers in December 1984. The new era in East-West relations could be traced back to that time.

"Mrs Thatcher told him—I don't think that I open any secret—that Reagan was a man with whom he could talk," said the ambassador.

"I wouldn't say that was a decisive opinion, but nevertheless it was the advice of a very experienced prime minister who had to deal with the President of the United States.

"And after these talks certainly both sides looked at Soviet-American relations with different eyes."

Mr Zamyatin said Mr Gorbachev was still popular in the Soviet Union, although the reform process was not moving as smoothly or quickly as hoped.

There was now real political opposition and old, inefficient economic ways were disappearing.

On the changing face of Europe, Mr Zamyatin stuck strictly to the official Soviet line calling for a slowdown of the process towards German reunification, with German neutrality afterwards.

The ultimate aim was a nuclear-free and preferably completely demilitarised Europe.

Writer Discusses Gorbachev Statement

LD2802141090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 6, 9-15 Feb 90 p 5

[Open letter addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev, written especially for GIMTASIS KRASTAS by Mikhail Chulakiy, secretary Leningrad Board, Russian Writers' Union, at the conclusion of the first round of the CC CPSU Plenum that discussed the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence question.]

[Text] M. Gorbachev's statement, presented at the hastily convened plenum of the CC (Central Committee) CPSU, attracts one by its openness. No matter which paragraph one glances at—open-hearted avowals abound.

For example: "Economic relations were formed over a period of centuries. Also, this market, was first, Russia's then the Soviet Union's—after all, these were results of a long-followed path." Wonderful! Since the USSR is truly —a direct heir of the Russian empire and union organizations are—an extension of the imperial ones. Great, that this has finally been stated so clearly. Apparently, after that many years, Western creditors will no longer remind the leader of our government to repay those czarist debts, that the newly-born Soviet Republic refused to honor, although they could do so. Since we are currently already picking the fruits of old Russia's market, it would be honest to also repay Russian debts. Every time period has its conjuncture, however: In 1917 it was more convenient to deny any type of Russian czarist inheritance, but now to the contrary—to assert it. (The only problem is to be found in the fact, the statement makes it unclear, how independent Lithuania was able to exist and how it was able to provide for itself, between 1918 and 1940, without being a part of either the imperial or union market).

Or, for example, "CPSU Statutes proclaim, no part of CPSU has the right to decide the question of its own independent existence, under its own program and laws, while at the same time, renouncing the CPSU position in general. That means, that the Lithuanian Communist Party was and continues to be an integral part of a united CPSU." Thus, the multitude of all those communist parties (CP)—Lithuanian CP, Ukrainian CP, Georgian CP etc., with their conferences and their Central Committees—amount to pure fiction and plain Soviet duplicity. In truth, they do no differ in the least from plain regional committees, since what type of parties can they be, if they are prohibited from having their own statutes and programs?

Here is the best part, however: "The current Party and government leadership is not going to allow the union to crumble. I make this declaration during the Central Committee Plenum. I am discussing this openly." Judging from the newspaper text, this passage was followed by the first applause—you see, Central Committee members were listening to their General Secretary's words with strained silence. How interesting: The current party and government leadership is not going to permit this! However, what should one do then with the constitutional right of freedom to self-determination until separation?" What if some republic were suddenly to seriously interpret the Constitution and decide to exercise its right? In other words, this right—also amounts to plain Soviet duplicity? It is interesting, that "the leadership will not permit," has emanated not only from the party, but worse yet, from the state leader's lips! The founded Constitutional Supervision Committee can start its work immediately and condemn the anti-constitutional utterances of the Supreme Soviet USSR Chairman.

As was acknowledged by M. Gorbachev, The Soviet Union remains an extension of the Russian Empire. The CPSU is above all, a disseminator of imperial spirit. The Politburo is comprised of—all Russians, with the exception of Comrades, Ivashko and Shevardnadze. This is how things are in our record multi-national state.

Thus far, only the local Communist Party question, but not that of state independence, has been decided. Moreover, what a sickly reaction right away!

Although in truth, it is totally understandable: Since the Communist Party is still state-connected here, and M. Gorbachev has done everything to prevent the recently concluded Supreme Soviet congress from breaking that knot, deleting Article 6 of the Constitution and liquidating the shameful partocratic regime. "Loyalty to communist ideals," and "defense of revolutionary achievements,"—these formulas darken the intellect to this day and prevent us from assessing the world objectively. We are all currently rejoicing at the fall of Ceausescu and are reading in the press about "dictatorship of the Ceausescu clan" and the dictator's crimes. However, where could we have read about these things...? we will not encounter one word in our press, about repressive communist regimes.

In other words, even the most progressive communists, like Gorbachev, only recognize the government of the communist parties, as the lawful government in lands of the socialist camp. All others—are politicians seeking government." True, they had to recognize the non communist government in Poland and they have to recognize—the non communist president of Czechoslovakia, by forgetting the "existent intricate system of international safety."—but that is not nobility, but rather a weakness, since not so very long ago, "Solidarity" and "Charter-77" were described here, in the same manner as Gorbachev now depicts Sajudis. Invitations by party activists of various caliber, "to return to the party the avant-garde role," are left for internal use. Those invitations are surprising in their simplicity. "To return"—

after all, this recognizes, that the avant-garde role belonged to the party earlier! When, however? What is the "earlier," in our history? There existed the successive regimes of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, whether bloody or liberal, but always dictatorial and based on force, thus, we have good reason for having only now, begun to "learn democracy" and "to found a law-based state." If the Party was, indeed in the avant-garde role of those regimes (currently, being lost, to the disappointment of partocrats), then it, namely the party is responsible for the unparalleled crimes of that time, for the genocide of the tens of millions and the destruction of a wealthy nation. The entire Party, rather than individual personalities, was defective. "A Party capable of leading the people's social development, which still in many areas yields to historical spontaneity, political emotion influences, that sometimes exceed the limits of attainable democratic norms." Who is discussing "historical spontaneities?" Are the genocide of Russian and Ukrainian people and the genocide of tens of nations, in truth—the conscious steps predetermined by " the all-conquering teaching?!" CPSU—RCP(b)—VCP(b) [as rendered in source] is indisputably the successor of the criminal organization's experience, criminal in the strict, Nurenberg connotation of this word. An organization, whose crimes reach up to the clouds since, alongside of Stalin, Hitler appears as an inept pupil. We are not saying, after all, that Hitler is not a criminal, but the national socialist party—is the avant-garde of the German people. On the other hand, I would think that among the average national socialist party members, there were some conscientious individuals who sincerely did believe in the truth of the new teaching. Weighed down by the burdens of crimes committed by the first communist generations, the CPSU itself should investigate its activities (and archives) and present its findings to the court of history, and present its wealth—to the people, who have been robbed and exploited by them. Moreover, may new non-communist parties, socialists and social democrats take the former CPSU place.

Woe is us, because the Russian CPSU leadership remains to preserve imperial vows. The Russian nation especially, will not be free, while the empire remains in existence—the Lithuanians are now freer than we are. They are spiritually freer!

'Top Priority' Debates Presidency Issue

LD0303164190 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Mar 90

["Top Priority" program, presented by Sergey Goryachev; not further identified; with "political analyst" Andrey Kortunov, and Moscow CBS bureau member (Jonathan Sanders]

[Text] [Goryachev] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to "Top Priority." I am Sergey Goryachev. The Supreme Soviet approved the creation of a full-scale presidential system in this country. The measure, when introduced, would make Mikhail Gorbachev head of state, similar to the U.S. President. But the state itself remains very different from the United States of America, and hence there is a lot of talk these days about what the presidential system really means in the Soviet Union. To share their views, here are today's panelists: To my left Andrey Kortunov, political analyst of the U.S. and Canadian Studies here in Moscow, and to my right (Jonathan Sanders), of CBS bureau here in Moscow. Well, the supporters of the presidential system in the Supreme Soviet kept saying that the president is needed to help move the country out of the crisis, while the opponents kept saying that given the history of the Soviet Union and the relative weakness of the new democratic institutions here, the president, if given so much power, would eventually become a dictator. You do not agree, Andrey, that is impossible? Go ahead, tell us why.

[Kortunov] Well, you know, I think that nothing is impossible in this country, and taking into account the historical background there is a real danger that the presidency will lead to some authoritarian tendencies in our political life. Even the experience of Western Europe shows that, you know, nothing can guarantee democracy forever. No system is perfect. But I guess that there are two basic lines of reason when we are speaking about presidency. One of them is, if I may quote, operational, and the other is strategic. On the operational level they claim that, you know, the Supreme Soviet at the moment is [word indistinct] (?the power), there are two levels, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, they cannot react quickly enough, we need some quick fix it. Therefore, we need Gorbachev as a president to give him additional power. But I don't think that it really makes the point, because it could give Gorbachev some additional power just by a decree of the Supreme Soviet or the congress, without....

[Goryachev, interrupting] Right. That was one of the arguments of those who opposed the....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Yeah, and I think that this argument is worth considering at least. The other argument is more strategic and is means, well it claims that only countries with long-established party, multiparty traditions can afford to have a parliamentary system of power, and since we do not have an established multiparty tradition like they have for example in the United Kingdom, therefore we need to have a presidency, like, you know, they still have presidency in France because they have too many parties and therefore it is very difficult to make their political (?pulses going). The experience of the Fourth Republic in France shows that it was not enough to make the country, you know, go effectively.

[Goryachev] All right. Jonathan, what do you think about the idea of the presidency? It seems to me that Mikhail Gorbachev did not anticipate presidency five years ago when he announced perstroyka.

[(Sanders)] No, I....

[Goryachev] So is it, is it, is it a well thought measure, to move toward democracy, or is it a desperate attempt to save the country from the crisis?

[(Sanders)] I think it's both. I certainly think that five years ago when Gorbachev came in as general secretary of the Communist Party he thought being general secretary of the CPSU was just a wonderful thing that was all he could ever desire. But as the country's been trying to change, as the country's been experiencing difficulties, especially in the peripheral areas where the authority of the Communist Party is deteriorating, as the economic difficulties have gotten worse, and as the party itself seems to be mired in a quagmire, he's been looking for other ways to do things. It probably is a good idea to change to some kind of more democratic system. Whether it's better to change to a presidential system or a system of prime ministry like Great Britain has, I think is a tough question. The question before us now is, was this the right time and was this done in the right way? I think many of the critics of Gorbachev's move this past week are not against the idea of a presidency per se, but they want to have a system of checks and balance in place before Gorbachev takes over. That probably is not a bad idea.

[Goryachev] Before someone takes over [words indistinct].

[(Sanders)] Before someone takes over. But even the most vociferous critics, be they people from the Baltic, be they Sergey Stankevich or Boris Yeltsin, they all say that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is going to be elected president. Just like George Washington, the first American President, swept into office without any real competition, Gorbachev's going to sweep into office to become the first real president of the Soviet Union.

[Goryachev] Along these lines it seems to me that Gorbachev is now different from what he was some five years ago. It seems to me that Gorbachev is changing. Do you agree, Andrey, with that, and if so then how, in what direction?

[Kortunov] Well, I think that all of us are changing and Gorbachev is no exception. I think that like all of us he underestimated the magnitude of the problems the country was facing and is facing, and I think that he shifted to the left gradually during these five years. He is more mature now as a politician, he is more educated in foreign policy, and at the same time I think the problem he is facing now is that the time is running out for him. You know, what would have been much easier five years ago is extremely difficult now, because I remember the situation just in, let us say 1986/87, I remember how enthusiastic people were....

[Goryachev, interrupting] People were full of hope.

[Kortunov] Yeah, and I think they really believe, now they are much more cynical, at least many of the people are much more cynical and much more suspicious of the power of the central leadership. This is, I think this is at least one of the reasons why all this national, you know, feelings, national sentiments replace our old ideas and old thinking about the effects of perestroyka.

[(Sanders)] Andrey, don't you think, too, that people are now so cynical that they have seen things get worse in their daily lives that they don't think anything can change until there's a change in the very structure of the government. Maybe one of the things they can say, well after all these years, after 300 years of Romanov rule, after 73 years of Soviet power, maybe some things can change in our structure and maybe for some people who are going to lead the country it may be just the first step toward a turning point where people think that things can change. Gorbachev only has a couple of years to make some changes that are going to hit people in their daily lives or else the cynicism will cement itself and things will continue to slide and get much worse.

[Kortunov] Well, I agree with you, perhaps it is the hope of people for the time being, but what, you know, (?somehow touched me personally) was that Gorbachev still tried to separate himself from the radical wing. I think, you know, some people at least know, I remember I spoke to some people after watching this famous sitting of the Supreme Soviet, and I think that some people were disappointed because they thought that the time for compromise, for reaching consensus is over, and he has to, to take the (?side).

[Goryachev] Do you think it is over?

[Kortunov] I think it is over, and, you know, you cannot have a revolution at consensus speed. You cannot have a revolution as a result of consensus, and, you know, I think that you have to sacrifice something. You have to take a side.

[Unidentified speaker] Right.

[Kortunov] I think, you know, part of the problem, the idea of presidency, is another idea, you know, to keep society together, just to, you know, to rise beyond the party line, beyond different ideologies and different national feelings.

[Goryachev] It is difficult, of course, to convince people in the West that Gorbachev has not enough power here in the Soviet Union and that this power should be reinforced.

[Kortunov] Well, you know, I think that the worst thing that can happen to Gorbachev is that he will be still here in Kremlin, issuing very good decrees and making good speeches but nobody will hear; that, you know, officially probably he'll have a lot of power but practically his power will be still limited. Even now, you know, for example, if the Baltic states dislike some of their legislation, they (?speedily)—they seem to claim that they are not going to abide.

[Goryachev] All right, what will the president be able to do, then, in that situation?

[(Sanders)] Well, I think the idea at least in emergency situation, is that the president could act much more expeditiously, that instead of having to get the Politburo together, let us say, he can order an emergency decree to put martial law in effect. For one, I'd rather have Gorbachev ordering an emergency decree than have a small group led by Ligachev....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Or someone else.

[(Sanders)] ...ordering something in Tbilisi.

[Goryachev] Andrey, the draft law on the presidency indicated that the president should be free from any group or party interests. This is another indication that Gorbachev could probably leave the post of the general secretary of the Communist Party. Do you think this can happen, because the party is lagging behind and Gorbachev cannot keep it up to date, up to the time, and he will leave it, especially in the light of the emerging multiparty system. Probably this is one of, another reasons why the presidency is needed. What do you think about that?

[Kortunov] Well, I think that the role of the Communist Party in the society is changing, of course.

[(Sanders)] And diminishing.

[Kortunov] Well, it is diminishing, but it is already [pauses]...also changing because after all, you know, for many, many years the party was really the center of the political mechanism. It was the force that was keeping the country together. Now, when the country rejects the leading role of the Party, I think some split within the party is practically inevitable, and therefore Gorbachev, trying to be above the party differences, tries also to be the leader of the party, not, of the country, not just a leader of one of political groupings within his country but the leader of the country itself. I think that the moment Gorbachev leaves the party, will be the moment of the party's split. Because you cannot have, you know, so many different people within one political organization any more.

[(Sanders)] Who is going to be a leader of the party then? Who can revive the Communist Party?

[Goryachev] That's a good question.

[Kortunov] Well, I think that it is evident that a fraction of the party will turn to social democratic values and I guess it will be very popular at least among the party intelligentsia and party intellectuals. I also think that there will be a pretty conservative wing and, if reforms go fast, if economic changes are (?new) in the country, then I think perhaps at a certain point the influence of the conservative wing will even rise to some extent because the situation of social equality...[changes thought] inequality will make people who lag behind the economic changes in society join this conservative wing of the party.

[Goryachev] What's your forecast, Jonathan?

[(Sanders)] Well, I think that there's a pretty accurate forecast and in fact I think it'll go even further. I think you're going to see a minority off the conservative wing who are going to say: We're Stalinists, we want to return to a strong leader, a strong voice. You're going to get much more interesting and much more difficult politics to manage. The problem is going to be nine years (?out). Gorbachev's going to be elected for four years, that's going to mean that he will already have been the Soviet leader for nine years. What's going to happen then? Who's going to take over? What politician has been able to succesfully stay in office as an active reformer for more than nine years? Franklin Roosevelt did it and then he died in office.

[Goryachev] Well, we'll see what's going to happen, and probably discuss it in our one of our next programs. Now we have some time left and I would like to raise one of the questions that you already touched upon, that is the relationship between Gorbachev and the radical wing. It is very interesting that Gorbachev noted at the Supreme Soviet session that the opposition was much more organized at that time and a lot of opposition leaders, all of them are members of the so-called interregional group of deputies, like Sergey Stankevich or Anatoliy Sobchak and others, they questioned the need to introduce presidency. Isn't that a paradox that a more radical leader rejects radical steps. How would you explain that?

[Kortunov] Well, you know, radicalism can have different dimensions, and I think that this radical wing is preoccupied with the rights of minorities, because even here in the First Congress of People's Deputies they....

[Goryachev, interrupting] That was last summer, I think.

[Kortunov] Yes, last summer they claimed that their rights, the rights of minority in the Supreme Soviet and at the congress, were somehow undermined, that their opinion was not taken care of and they certainly are scared that the national structure will make their political position simply irrelevant.

[(Sanders)] I think that that's right and I think there are two important things to bear in mind here. First of all I think that both Stankevich and Sobchak were not against the presidency. They were against the way it was being done. [brief indistinct interruption] Stankevich is a brilliant student of American politics and he said: Look, you have to have a system of checks and balances, constitutional guarantees. The Soviet Union has a history of dictatorship and totalitarianism, we have to do something to prevent this from happening. Sobchak, who pays attention to law, said juridically this is wrong to do it this way. We're rushing one part of a constitutional change ahead without the whole constitution. Let's do it in logical order and then have a presidency of a democratically formed country. The other thing that's fascinating is that Gorbachev did call them an opposition. All this time they've been talking about factions groupings and now, in the heat of the debate, it came out that these people are in opposition. A loyal opposition, a radical opposition, a social democrat or communist opposition, but it's an opposition.

[Kortunov] Yes, that's right.

[Goryachev] Now, quickly, to end this program, what do you think are the short-term and long-term consequences of the presidency in the Soviet Union, Andrey?

[Kortunov] Well, as I said already it will further undermine the role of the communist Party, and I think that it will help in the short run to, you know, to make [as heard] the troubleshooters in some regions of the country. I also think that it will lead to further radicalization of the opposition which will try and which is already trying to get its revenge during the elections to the republican legislatures. Speaking of their long-term consequences, I think that it will depend first of all on the economic abilities of the president and of his staff.

[Goryachev] All right.

[(Sanders)] In the short term I think this will give Gorbachev the opportunity and the possibility to act more decisively and more critically and so some of the nationality conflicts, some of the worker actions are going to be met with much stronger countermeasures. So I think the conflict is going to become focussed and I think that the conflict within the Communist Party is going to really show where the strength lies and I think the traditionalism of the party is going to die away. In the long term I think there's a fascinating consequence. For the first time since the founding of the Kiev princedom, since the founding of Muscovy, since the Romanov empire, since the Bolshevik revolution, in four years there may be—for the first time in Russian or Soviet history—an elected leader of this great empire and state, and that is going to be fascinating to watch. To watch people learn democracy or watch people not learn democracy.

[Goryachev] We hope they will learn.

[Kortunov] Yeah, but don't forget that the first Romanov was also elected.

[(Sanders)]. Elected by a small group of nobles.

[Goryachev] All right, thank you very much. That's it. "Top Priority" for today. Taking part were Andrey Kortunov from the U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute and (Jonathan Sanders) of CBS. I'm Sergey Goryachev. Thank you for listening.

Presidency Said To Strengthen Democracy

PM0203164990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article under the "Topical Theme" rubric by USSR People's Deputy A. Zhuravlev: "Strengthening Democracy"]

[Text] People's Deputies have voted for a presidency. An institution unprecedented in the country's history. Although this manner of individuals' accession to power has been fairly well studied by historians, philosophers, and sociologists. There is a common objective feature here: The idea of a presidency in one form or another has arisen and has been realized, as a rule, in complex, crucial periods of history, when the old power structures had weakened and were collapsing, leaving the way open to new forms. In such conditions there arose a need in society for a strong, consolidating authority capable of keeping the ship of state on course.

In that regard there should be no surprise or bewilderment at the fact that the idea of a presidency has assumed an unexpected urgency. Nor should one see in this, very tempting though it is, some sly intrigues generated by the "disorder" within the top echelon of our political-state structure. Yes, the situation in the country is less than pleasing.. Very many people, including quite influential strata, regard the development of democracy as an opportunity to steal a march, exact social revenge, or—one and the same thing—to acquire a political status commensurate with their economic power. For many reasons the present state structures are very often paralyzed or are too lax to maintain even a minimal social stability. It is undoubtedly in this situation that the idea of the "strong hand" occurs. Obviously, there are candidates for that role. However, this isn't the true purpose of the presidency in our conditions, even though many probably attach to it an exclusively "dictatorial" meaning.

The argument runs like this. Why introduce a presidency if all the acute problems can be resolved under the existing political hierarchy. After all, the present chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet has enough potential to enable him to make operational decisions tantamount to exercising the full range of presidential powers. If they are not enough—the USSR Supreme Soviet can be persuaded to increase them.

I agree. M.S. Gorbachev has such potential, too. But if you examine it, leaving aside the present moment, this is evidence not against but in favor of the idea of establishing a presidential form of rule. The stability of the state cannot be linked to the personality of one man. Nor can a constitutional president be confused, as a rule, with the extraconstitutional "savior of the Fatherland." If only because the latter may become the stooge of forces utterly alien to humanism, as has happened more than once in history.

A presidency is a reliable guarantee against that, the most important element of the civilization of power. I will clarify that point: In the context of the renewal of socialism this is a power which safeguards the interests of the majority of worker citizens on the one hand and, on the other, blocks attempts by certain social groups to impose the political priorities.

Therefore it was definitely not the urgency of the situation in the country which dictated the need to seriously study the possibility of presidential rule. This is a long-term prospect for the development of democracy. It will not be easy, of course. Hardly anyone would venture to describe in detail the future political and economic arrangement of society. One can only wonder what changes may result from the economic innovations: The economic independence of the republics and regions, the diversity of forms of ownership, the development of market relations, and so on.

But social stability is always the result of equilibrium, always the result of a competitiveness which rigorously monitors the quality of labor. Whether this is a question of economics, where labor determines the quality of goods. Or of politics, where it predetermines the competence and professionalism of major decisions. From this viewpoint, too, I will venture to say that the presidency may become a kind of competitor, testing the validity of certain decisions by the USSR Supreme Soviet. And vice versa. Judging by the relationship between the Congress and the president in the United States, this will lead to the elaboration of a suitable policy which takes into account both large-scale economic realities and the interests of specific social groups without detriment to society as a whole. In our conditions, however, one cannot ignore the clearly defined centrifugal tendencies in the economy and policy. That, of course, is largely justified. But only if the change in the point of balance does not upset the equilibrium between the center and the periphery. In other words, when giving economic and political independence to the regions, republics, and enterprises it is necessary to strengthen the federative principles that bind them, too. In the political sphere that function could be served by the institution of the presidency.

I have briefly outlined a few ideas on the presidency. The problems are quite complex. It is impossible in one newspaper article to analyze the whole gamut of practical questions connected with the presidency. I shall merely stress that the most important are the mechanisms for monitoring the activity of the president, his functions, and his place in the triad of legislative, judicial, and executive power and also in the political system of a renewed federation.

History shows that the institution of the presidency is as much an asset of civilization as the rule-of-law state. Let us remember that when pondering the future socioeconomic organization of our country.

Yakovlev Addresses Metro Workers 2 March

LD0203214890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Speech by A.N. Yakovlev at meeting with Metro construction workers in Moscow's Lenin Museum on 2 March—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We are all delighted—one would like to believe this—at the freedom, democracy, glasnost, and personal dignity that have finally come to our land, but there is alarm at the rampant irresponsibility, crime, impunity, exacerbated intolerance of one another, and the decline of discipline and moral principles: That is, conscientiousness, decency, and charity. All this becomes even more horrendous against a background of serious economic difficulties, when there are ever fewer goods in the stores and ever more chronic shortages, when unmanageable waves of money and vouchers for which nothing can be bought are sweeping the country. From this evidently come the questions: What are the authorities up to? Would it not be better, before it's to late, to take all forces in hand and bring order to a state that is tired of constant shortages and worsening conflicts? Or, tell us—that's what they say—at last, who is holding up restructuring? Is it the mafia, the shadow economy, trade, or the bureaucrats, the apparatchiks, or someone else? Perhaps the cooperative workers, the lease-holders or other economic innovations are the hindrance?

There is a third approach too, very different in content but very similar in spirit to the first two. It is the CPSU that's the problem, along with the outdated structure of the USSR, if not the union itself. Get out of it, and, they claim, manna will fall from heaven. It is a neighboring republic, or their own oblast committee that is the trouble, or Moscow that is in the way, the lack of strong power or on the contrary, the planned introduction of such a strong power. All that has to be done is to remove all these defects and impediments and everything will take shape all on its own.

What is it, in my opinion, that unites these ill-matched positions, approaches, and points of view? A lot, in my opinion. First of all, the search for a simple solution, the expectation of a miracle, or speculating on such expectations; naive faith in the possibility of frontal attacks; a superficial view of the nature of our difficulties and on the ways, means, and possibilities of overcoming them; an active, I would even say morbid, desire to have to find someone to blame and lump it all onto them. A psychology of bitterness, bordering at times upon hatred, has emerged, an astonishing moral levity from which some are prepared to slide into social confrontation, schism, and reprisals. All this is evident, as is, naturally, people's reaction to queues, bare counters, the rise in prices, the lack of security in life, not to mention such extreme instances as outbursts of violence or the forced resettlement of thousands of people.

The essence obviously lies in the system of economic relations itself, where poor economic management and extravagance are not only possible but indeed advantageous for whole industries and whole groups of people.

What then is to be done? True, it is necessary, of course, to take a powerful grip on the arm of every unconscientious person, but it would be the height of naivety to seriously count on coping with the problem in such a way. It is necessary to change and change radically the whole system of economic relations, which gives rise to absurdities, irrationality, and antisocial phenomena. Consquently what is needed is a normal regulated market, where the producer might sell his wares and purchase what he needs. Such a system is still to be created. But all this needs to be done in such a way that the social protection of the individual is enhanced and becomes still more efficient and effective. It is in this regard that there are very gave contradictions.

It seems to me that it is a matter here not just of demolishing unsuitable economic relations which is what the Supreme Soviet is at present engaged on in adopting the land law and the property law, and not only of executive discipline, although, of course, there is a place for this. In my view it is indeed a matter of the fact that in these conditions a black economy has been in existence for years and decades.

A further point is law and order. As I have already been saying, crime is on the increase. I am deeply convinced that this must be halted, and it seems to me that with the introduction of presidential power, if the Congress of People's Deputies agrees to it and elects a president, this will be the most paramount task for the new presidential power. I am personally an emphatic and longstanding supporter of this step.

This post will not, of course, automatically settle any complex issues. Nor will it in itself bring an increase in goods. That is clear. But every good owner works, or at least should work, for the longer term. Society is making a change of tremendous importance and the transition is a complex one. Surprises, temporarily unstable conditions, and manifestations by some people of shortsightedness, lack of foresight, or else deliberate irresponsibility are possible. For all intents and purposes you and I have already been experiencing all these things, have seen them, and are aware of them. In this respect there is a particular need for the existence of purposeful political will capable of leading perestroyka along a course of democracy through any zigzags of fate.

I personally believe that one of the failings... all the positive aspects of collective leadership notwithstanding, there is one very fundamental failing: The erosion of responsibility, erosion of responsibility. In other words, if I'm part of a collective I have no responsibility for anything in particular since collective decisions are taken, and on this, that and the other.

I think the creation of the post of president should solve this problem, too, because it's not just a matter of the top presidency—it will probably spread downwards somehow as well; that is, the creation for a specified term by democratic means of a category or cohort of people who will themselves for a certain period of time be accountable for their actions and bear responsibility for them, so that the people can ask them what they have done and how they have done it.

In any collective, of course, there must be an optimal combination of individual leadership, to make things progress successfully, and democratic control. That, in a nutshell, is how I imagine power in the future: Individual leadership under democratic control.

Terms Election 'Colossal Step'

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[All Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (TASS)—"Perestroyka has entered the decisive stage where new conditions of economic management and the new democratic situation should become irreversible," Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Poliburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee told workers of the Moscow Metro on Friday. The destinies of perestroyka, the party, and the country were discussed.

"The only guarantee of democracy and perestroyka is their continuation and development," the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee said.

In this connection he touched on the proposal to create the presidential post in the USSR, which was supported by the Supreme Soviet.

"I personally favor this step," Yakovlev said.

"Of course, it will not deal with any difficulties automatically and will not increase goods all by itself. This is clear. But any good owner works with an eye to the future. Society is taking an enormously significant turn. This transfer is complex, and here the presence of a purposeful political will, capable of carrying through perestroyka along the course of democracy through any of fate's zigzags, is particularly necessary."

Yakovlev noted that a complex mechanism should operate in shaping the system of power. It should stimulate to the utmost the activity of every segment of power and at the same time should prevent it from becoming a new monopoly on power."

"This is the same dialectic of life which requires a crane, for instance, to be provided with a counterweight. If we put an engine in a vehicle to get it moving fast then a steering system and brakes are also needed."

"Any collective, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said, needs the optimum combination of individual leadership to make things progress successfully, and democratic control, collective consultation on essential matters, and some kind of mechanism to resolve conflict situations and overcome contradictions are also needed. By creating the post of president we are in fact striving for such an optimum combination at the level of the country as a whole.

What are we then getting which is fundamentally new? Primarily we are gaining, for the first time in our history, the practice of a direct, multicandidate, and secret election of the highest person in the state for a fixed term of office. This is a colossal step in the development of our democracy. A step which just by itself is capable of seriously limiting any authoritarian aspirations.

We, furthermore, are bringing a clarity, which never before has been characteristic of us, to the processes of a changeover of power, the transfer of authority. By this token any possibility of the usurpation of power is cut off at the root. But this will ensure the unprecedented high authority of the post of the head of state for us as well. An authority which will not only be determined by the "uniqueness" of this post for all of the USSR, but will also begin to be built up from the democratic nature of its elections and operation, from the clarity, glasnost, and openness of competitive procedures, from its real and not symbolic rights, obligations and powers with which the future president must be endowed. This is why to me personally the opinions that the president will supposedly again become a personal dictator and will revive a regime of personal power seem to be the result of ignorance."

The secretary of the Soviet Communist Party believes that the "president of the USSR will become a symbol and a real force which can and must unite and consolidate the whole country." He did not preclude the possibility of the emergence of new parties.

"The consolidation of the principle of division of power will enable us to create all the supports for democracy which guarantee its stability and effectiveness," Yakovlev said.

Kashlev Urges Faster Adoption of Rights Laws

PM0203215190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

["Viewpoint" by Prof. Yu. Kashlev, USSR Foreign Ministry ambassador for special assignments: "Nothing More Urgent Than Human Rights"]

[Text] In the process which has begun in our country of creating a rule-of-law state and making the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system the key role is to be played by the adoption of a series of laws designed to ensure the social, economic, civil, political, and cultural rights of the Soviet person. The combination of just these categories of rights determines the fullness and depth of society's humaneness and democratism, and precisely they lie at the basis of the universal documents in this sphere, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international pacts, the Helsinki Final Act, and the 1989 Vienna accords.

For decades we doggedly maintained—both in our "internal" propaganda and at international forums—that social and economic rights of a mass, collective nature, i.e. those which affect millions of people at once, took absolute priority over other rights in the Soviet Union and were better safeguarded than in the West. The glasnost of recent years has exposed the falsity of such statements. What is more, it has turned out that we lag behind the majority of the world's developed countries in terms of many socioeconomic indicators.

As for individual rights, civil and political, they had already come to be regarded as "not our trump card," and we had almost gotten used to constant criticism of us for political prisoners, "refuseniks," mental patients, dissidents, etc.

Now, literally in the space of the last few years, the situation has changed substantially. Internal natural laws and the requirements of perestroyka have breathed life into such truly democratic phenomena as multicandidate elections, pluralism of positions at the Congresses of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, the openness of their work for millions of television viewers and readers, the activeness of sociopolitical movements, etc. A very important new step on this path was the adoption of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and its most fundamental tenet: That our ideal is humane, democratic socialism. Of course, we were late proclaiming this ideal, but, as the saying goes, better late than never....

Draft laws designed to have a decisive impact on the depth and scale of democratization in the most complex and laggard sphere of perestroyka—the socioeconomic sphere—and to ensure a genuine shift, not the former slogan-like shift, to facing up to the individual's socioeconomic needs and rights with a view to ensuring worthy living and working conditions are these days being examined at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. We all expect the people's deputies to do effective and bold work on the new laws.

But, at the same time, I will risk expressing one opinion.

A number of draft laws concerning citizens' individual political rights do not figure on the list of priority items on the agenda of the present USSR Supreme Soviet session. I mean, above all, such laws as laws on freedom of conscience and religious organization in the USSR, on citizens' public association, on the press and the other mass media, and on the procedure for leaving and entering the USSR. True, the last two have been given a first reading, but the matter has not been seen through to the end. Work is probably being done on all these drafts in Supreme Soviet organs. But does their absence from the official agenda not signify inertia in terms of the old underestimation of civil and political rights?

People might say: Is this the right time to tackle these categories of rights, when the Supreme Soviet is so loaded down with more urgent and important matters? I can give this reply: There is hardly anything more urgent today than the ensuring of human rights. This is confirmed by events both inside and outside our country.

We ourselves have recognized people's individual freedom as the chief asset of life and proclaimed a shift toward ensuring **the whole range** of a citizen's rights. But he does not live by bread alone and measures society's democracy and humanity not only by the general thrust of reforms but still more by the specific increase in his individual rights.

The four aforesaid laws (in all, of course, there are far more) affect the interests of many millions of Soviet people. There is no need to demonstrate this with regard to the laws on citizens' public association or on the press: In my view, they have just as much significance for democratization as, let us say, the law on ownership for economic perestroyka. The problem of freedom of conscience and religion also deeply affects tens of millions of believers. The events in the western Ukraine have shown the cost of delays over adopting urgent legislative acts, even under conditions of the radically improving position of the church in society over the years of perestroyka.

People sometimes voice doubts about the expediency of finally adopting the exit and entry law and refer to "unseemly" lines outside the Moscow embassies of the FRG, the United States, and other countries. But, first, the lack of a law has not reduced the number of people wishing to leave (they are mainly Soviet Germans, Armenians, and Jews—all with their own national and social problems). Second, it is incorrect to reduce this law just to emigration, because it is designed still more for those Soviet people—several million of them every year—who make temporary trips for professional, creative, or personal reasons and have no intention of leaving their motherland. The law is aimed at facilitating our contacts with peoples abroad—without which it is hard to speak of involvement with panhuman values.

The Soviet legislators themselves obviously proceeded from an awareness of the importance of all these laws for broad categories of Soviet people when they declared in the "Appeal to the Soviet People" in the summer of 1989: "The USSR Supreme Soviet guarantees that laws will be adopted during the present session and the fall session which will ensure... the protection of every citizen's rights and freedoms. These laws include a law on freedom of conscience, a law on the press and information, and others." Unfortunately, that promise was not fulfilled, and it is still not clear when it will be.

Another aspect is added to this—the international aspect. Our firm intention to bring our legislation and practice in the human rights sphere fully into line with international obligations (which, incidentally, were long ago adopted by us but, frankly, were not fulfilled for a long time) is an organic part of the new political thinking championed by the Soviet Union.

In his well-known UN speech in December 1988 M.S. Gorbachev said that the elaboration and imminent adoption in our country of precisely the aforesaid laws attested to the USSR's firm intention to travel the path of democratizing our society and humanizing international relations.

Just over a year ago, when the decisions of the all-European meeting were adopted in Vienna (the author of these lines happened to be the head of the Soviet delegation), we reaffirmed our pledge to bring our legislation fully into line with international law. It is clear today that this process is being dragged out.

It is not only a question of the laws themselves. Stretching out behind them is a whole chain of practical questions connected, for example, with freedom of movement for citizens not only between countries, but also within our country, with the pledge to publish in our country all laws and legally binding acts concerning human rights, with facilitating access to international information, etc. We have a lot to do in this sphere.

The next stages of the all-European conference on the human dimension of the CSCE, which are to be held in Copenhagen this year and in Moscow next year, are not far off. There is, of course, to be a serious discussion there of human rights and the fulfillment of the Vienna pledges. Taking into account the democratic changes in East European countries, will we not now be left as the sole target of criticism on these questions?

At this year's major event too—the upcoming all-European summit meeting—humanitarian problems must obviously be aired in such a way that nobody has any doubts about the irreversibility of our policy of further democratization. This policy, which provides for the continuation and deepening of the political and economic reform, the humanization of our society, and the building of a rule-of-law state, must also include the speediest adoption of specific laws on the Soviet person's civil and political rights.

Journalists Union Holds Plenary Session

Congress Planned for Jul-Aug

LD0103074190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1521 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—A routine congress of the USSR Union of Journalists will take place in July-August 1990. This decision was adopted today at the plenum of the directorate of this creative organization held here. At the congress, it is planned that specific measures on a radical change in the work and on the renewal of the Union of Journalists are to be discussed.

The majority of the participants in the plenum expressed the idea that the perestroyka of many aspects of the activity of journalists' organizations and of the union as a whole is necessary. Noting all the positive things accumulated by the organization, at the same time, they stressed that excessive centralization of the leadership, the need for improvement in the system of electing its leading bodies, and the limited nature of glasnost are hampering the successful activity of the Union of Journalists in today's conditions.

The plenum upheld the initiative of a number of journalists' organizations regarding the setting up of a Union of Journalists of the Russian Federation and adopted a resolution on the protection of journalists who have been victimized by officials for the fulfilment of their professional obligations.

The plenum of the directorate granted the request of Viktor Afanasyev, former editor in chief of the newspaper PRAVDA to be relieved of his duties as chairman of the directorate of the USSR Union of Journalists, and elected 55-year-old Ivan Laptev, editor in chief of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, USSR people's deputy, and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to this post, until the organization's congress is held.

Vadim Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, took part in the work of the plenum.

Medvedev Addresses Session

PM0203145190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Journalists Hold Council"]

[Text] The role of the mass media in perestroyka was discussed at a plenum of the board of the USSR Journalists Union held 28 February. On the agenda were questions of the leadership of the USSR Journalists Union and the convening of its seventh congress.

It is a paradoxical fact that the USSR Journalists Union itself has been little affected by the changes taking place in the country, the plenum noted. A result of the serious complaints leveled against the work of the union's leading organs by a number of the country's journalists' organizations has been the question of confidence in the USSR Journalists Union presidium and board. After debate those taking part in the plenum approved the powers of the leading organs by a majority of votes. At his personal request V.G. Afanasyev was relieved of the post of chairman of the USSR Journalists Union board.

The plenum was addressed by V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He dwelled in detail on the tasks facing the mass media workers under present conditions and in particular in the period of preparation for the 28th Party Congress.

Those taking part in the plenum elected USSR People's Deputy I.D. Laptev, chief editor of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, chairman of the USSR Journalists Union board.

I.A. Zubkov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Journalists Union board, spoke on the second question. He announced that the need for radical transformations in many echelons of the union sets multilevel tasks demanding immediate solution. This has given rise to the need to convene a conference of the country's journalists this year, without waiting for the deadline stipulated by the organization's statute.

V.V. Chikin, chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, described the idea of creating an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Journalists Union, which has been put forward by a number of oblast and kray organizations. He announced that a working group has been created which is to elaborate the statute of the new organization and prepare the Russian journalists' constituent congress. USSR People's Deputy M.N. Poltoranin provided information on work on the draft Law on the Press.

Those taking part in the plenum decided to convene the Seventh USSR Journalists Union Congress in late July and early August of this year and recommended that it discuss basic avenues of the union's radical renewal and the new statute. Norms were set for delegates' representation at the congress. And the procedure for their nomination and election has been left for the local journalists' organizations to determine.

The plenum adopted a USSR Journalists Union statement. It speaks of firm support for journalists and leaders of the mass media who are being subjected to unjustified attacks and persecution by officials or so-called meetings democracy. The USSR Journalists Union will resolutely defend newspaper, journal, radio, and television workers, using all necessary legal means for the purpose.

G.V. Pryakhin, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, spoke on several questions of the USSR Journalists Union's publishing activity and the social protection and wages of workers in the mass media.

Medvedev Meets Party Committee Secretaries

LD0103165190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] A meeting took place at the CPSU Central Committee today between Comrade Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Party Central Committee, and a group of secretaries of party committees from the country's higher education establishments. They are in Moscow to discuss the formation of an All-Union council of secretaries of the party committees of higher education establishments.

Addressing the assembly, Comrade Medvedev paid attention to the importance of mobilizing the intellectual potential of communists in higher education toward seeking ways of renewing the CPSU quickly and decisively.

Medvedev Comments on Plenum Discussions

LD2302233190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev today visited the Moscow Energy Institute. He acquainted himself with the work of the faculties and laboratories and had numerous conversations.

Comrade Medvedev then met the students and teaching staff. In the focus of attention were questions about the recent plenum of the party Central Committee and the platform which it adopted.

[Begin Medvedev video recording] There is only one solution. The solution is that we must move still more resolutely and still more consistently along our chosen path: Along the path of serious restructuring of economic and political structures; along the path of serious renewal of the entire face of our society. There is no other way. I think the main drama and the main point of the precongress document adopted by the February Central Committee plenum is precisely this. Many arguments and doubts are cited as to where this step leads. Some say it's a step or half-step to the left, others say it's marking time, so to speak. Still others say it's almost to the right. I think it would be correct to say that it's a step forward—and a considerable step forward—in deepening our understanding of perestroyka and in seriously enriching the concepts by which we are guided concerning the development of our society and its transformation—transformation in the future.

The document says precisely and clearly that perestroyka is a process of transition from a state centralist model of socialism to a humanistic socialism, a democratic socialism. Of course, everyone's attention is attracted by the question which was posed before the plenum, which was voiced at the plenum and has been reflected in the document, of the introduction of a presidential form of government. Public opinion at times associates the introduction of a presidential form of government with our troubles, with the weakening of power, with the increasing emergence of elements of spontaneity in economic development, with rampaging interethnic passions, with centrifugal forces, and so on and so forth. In other words it is associated with certain misfortunes for the eradication of which a strong hand, so to speak, is needed, a stronger seat of power is needed.

What can be said about this? I think there is a portion of truth in these arguments, and it would be incorrect not to agree with them. I think the strengthening of central state power is indeed a timely part of the agenda for this reason too: That is, by reason of the situation that has developed in our country.

But at the same time, I would like to say this: That all the same, this is not the most important thing. It is not from some situation of emergency and not from some extraordinary circumstances that the necessity of such a measure should be deduced. Rather, it flows from the process, from the very process of the emergence of a civilian society and of a state based on the rule of law. [end recording]

Abalkin Discusses Struggle Against Conservatives

AU0802210090 Vienna Television Service in German 1830 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Christian Schueller report from Moscow]

[Excerpt] Nothing in the Kremlin today seems to show the political storm that blew through it over the past three days. As one of the first foreign guests, Austrian Economics Minister Schuessel is briefed about the dramatic decisions in the Central Committee—firsthand. Deputy Premier Abalkin is considered a pioneer of perestroyka, one of Gorbachev's closest advisers. From him the Austrian guests receive a frank report on Soviet reality after five years of reform policy.

[Begin recording] [Abalkin] After yesterday's decisions, one can say that only now can perestroyka really start.

[Schueller] And what about the conservatives in the party leadership? Have they now been defeated?

[Abalkin] The struggle against the conservatives is a long struggle. There is no use in proclaiming an early victory. One has to expect a long, hard struggle. [end recording] [passage omitted]

'Arrogant' Statements on Perestroyka Cited

LD0802200990 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] The attitude of the world to the recent full-scale meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party is the subject of a commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin:

It is difficult to sum up the statements on the issue by the leaders of many countries, political parties, and the media. There is a certain similarity in the comments. The comment of a spokesman for the German Social Democratic Party seems characteristic. He said the Soviet Union has taken an impressive step to make the state system even more democratic and the significance of the plenum goes far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Its resolutions have brought closer the all-European home in which all European nations could live in peace and harmony.

There have been many comments in the same vein. It would seem that we in the Soviet Union should be happy about the understanding in the world of the changes in our country. But, frankly speaking, the condescending and conceited tone of some of the statements seems unacceptable. When President George Bush said that the Americans are inspired by everything that can bring closer the day of true democracy for Soviet people, I find the statement arrogant and lacking respect, to say the least. Neither can I agree with those who say that the positive processes in the Soviet Union are logically the result of a tough policy of the West and that pressure should be continued and the military potential built up to make the Soviet Union take new steps to democratization in the domestic scene and the normalization of international relations.

Those who make such statements seem to have forgotten that it was the Soviet Union that outlined the concept of new thinking and is carrying it out into life. As a result, the sliding to a nuclear nightmare and the destructive arms race have been stopped. This is undoubtedly a big asset to perestroyka and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. We do realize that broad international cooperation will help to tackle our domestic problems, but the concept of cooperation implies equality and mutual respect of the sides.

Bakatin Hits 'Profound Failure' of Law Enforcement

PM1502161390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 1

[Extract from speech by V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, at the USSR MVD collegium session 10 February; first paragraph is introduction: "Minister's Theses"]

[Text] A session of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] collegium was held yesterday. There was one question on the agenda: The results of operational and service activity in 1989 and tasks for 1990.

From the speech of V.V. Bakatin, USSR MVD minister

Statistics that only present part of the truth are well known to you. But we ourselves cannot describe our own work in any way other than as a profound failure of the whole law enforcement system, particularly of the USSR MVD, in the fight against crime and the struggle for social order and guaranteed social and state security.

We have to take the initiative and rectify the situation quickly and as decisively as possible. We simply have no choice. This is literally a question of life and death. We must bring back respect for the law! We must make everyone respect the law, if you like.

To turn to the question of the depoliticization of the organs. It is being actively discussed in the press today. Let us call a spade a spade. This question is being thrown at us sometimes with national overtones, sometimes without them. But, speaking of depoliticization, in practical terms we are discussing repoliticization. These attempts are far removed from the socialist orientation in the MVD organs.

Today we must admit that we have handed the streets over to criminals without a struggle, perhaps because of objective circumstances caused by an unending wave of rally democracy.

Let us return to the streets and restore order to them!

A few days ago, I had to walk through the center of Moscow between 11 and 12 o'clock at night. There were no extraordinary incidents apart from some drunkards and suspicious girls. But in that time I did not meet a single militiaman! Maybe that was just by chance. But where is our patrol service? Is it patrolling the brightly lit streets by car, while the officers (forgive me) go to keep an eye on the rallies? It is not by chance that the proportion of murders committed on the streets has increased from 14 to 25 percent.

It is also essential to reduce the numbers guarding all kinds of offices and to switch the manpower thus released to beef up the patrol service.

Drug addiction: It seems that we have decided that this does not threaten us. Representatives of Western services come and visit us, and they are always surprised. "How lucky you are as regards the drug addiction situation." Comrades, this is genuine self-delusion! A great misfortune awaits our people if we deal with this problem so ignorantly and treat it like a formality.

The safekeeping and confiscation of weapons: We have developed a lighthearted attitude to the large-scale crime committed by officials, as listed weapons are stolen or just taken in rayon and city militia departments. Which is what happened in Armenia when 38 rayon organs surrendered their weapons and only one showed any resistance. In every case of treasonable surrender of weapons, the chief must be automatically dismissed and criminal proceedings instituted!

The attitude to organized crime: Unfortunately, even the MVD apparatus still does not understand that it is not a question of a special section in our work. The departments that have been created can only give an analysis of these higher forms of crime. But everyone must struggle! Everyone! Practically all crime, apart from petty hooliganism, is becoming organized. It is imperative to learn to get to the source and find the organizers of organized crime, using intelligence and technical methods to penetrate the criminal environment.

As a minister, I plan to personally supervise the struggle against corruption within the USSR MVD system. In the past 3-4 years, this work has broken down completely.

The suppression of mass disorder because of interethnic conflict. We must acting from two seemingly mutually exclusive directions. The first is to establish cooperation and contacts with all informal organizations except for those that occupy openly extremist stances. And to cooperate with all honest and decent people! But the second is to deal in a tough and uncompromising way (which we are not doing at present) with all extremists and instigators.

Razumovskiy Chairs Cadre Policy Session

LD0302211290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] A regular meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Party Building and Cadre Policy took place today. The main provisions of the concept of draft rules of the CPSU for the 28th Party Congress were examined. It was deemed expedient that the rules should be brief and contain only the fundamental norms of party life. It should be free of excessive regulation and create the greatest possible opportunities for the independent creative activity of communists and party organization—and mainly primary organizations, as the party's foundation—for new political thinking and bold and original practical deeds. Proposals concerning procedures for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress were discussed. The commission came out for making the procedure for electing delegates as democratic as possible, one which would allow communists to participate directly in both nominating candidates and electing delegates to the party congress. The commission's proposals will be submitted to participants in the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Restructuring the work of party organizations and communists at places of residence was examined. The commission meeting was chaired by Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Pugo, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo chairman of the People's Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, and Manayenkov and Usmanov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the commission's work.

PRAVDA Carries 'Democratic Platform'

PM0203192190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Text of "Democratic Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress" adopted at "all-union conference of party clubs and party organizations" held 20-21 January in Moscow, published under the rubric "Discussion Page No. 11"; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction, followed by letter to PRAVDA from the coordinating council of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU";]

[Text] The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress states that communists, nonparty people, and everyone who is not indifferent to the party's role under conditions of perestroyka are invited to discuss this document. It emphasizes, moreover, that the party is ready to consider alternative drafts in addition to comments and suggestions.

Many of our readers ask the PRAVDA editors about this in their letters. Today we publish one of these documents.

To the PRAVDA Editorial Board

Esteemed Comrades!

We offer for publication in the party's central organ—the newspaper PRAVDA—the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. It was adopted at the All-Union Conference of the Country's Party Clubs and Party Organizations in Moscow 20-21 January 1990. While having a number of positions in common with the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, at the same time it is fundamentally different from the Central Committee's document both **conceptually** (the concept of turning the CPSU into a parliamentary party, not a vanguard one) and **in substance**.

We believe that only under conditions of broad internal party pluralism, in the course of free debate, having an opportunity to familiarize themselves with all the viewpoints and platforms that exist in the party, will communists be able to draw a conscious conclusion and clearly determine how they want to see their party in the future.

We hope that the words of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform about readiness to "consider alternative drafts" will not be at variance with deeds.
[signed] The coordinating council of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU."
February 15, 1990.

Democratic Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress

I. CRISIS IN SOCIETY AND THE PARTY

We communists of 162 party clubs and party organizations in 102 cities and 13 of the country's union republics, united on a democratic platform, actively support the radical changes begun in all spheres of social life in our country on the initiative of the party's progressive forces.

At the same time we are seriously concerned at the destiny of perestroyka in connection with the crisis state both of society as a whole and of the party itself.

Rooted in history, the crisis is gripping more and more spheres of the life of society. The reforms are hanging in midair. Inflation is growing. Despite the measures being taken, the population's food supply is deteriorating. The range of scarce commodities is increasing constantly. The accident rate in large-scale technological systems is assuming a menacing nature.

Tension is growing all the time in interethnic relations. A disastrous ecological situation has taken shape in many parts of the country. Crime, particularly organized crime, is growing.

The political reform, the legal reform, the handover of real power from the party apparatus to the soviets, and the creation of legal guarantees of glasnost and socialist values are being implemented extremely inconsistently.

All this is increasing the dissatisfaction of the masses, leading to a fall in the leadership's prestige, and creating increased social tension and political instability in society.

The ruling party bears the main responsibility for the further deepening of the crisis, which is bringing society to a dangerous point. Under contemporary conditions the CPSU is itself going through a crisis which embraces all aspects of the party's vital activity: Ideological, political, organizational, moral.

The starting point is **the crisis of communist ideology** and, above all, of the version of it by which the CPSU was guided for many decades. Under modern conditions, in light of the new political thinking, the groundless and immoral nature of many of the means and methods which were used to achieve the proclaimed goals and the incommensurability of the cost with the actual results of "real socialism" are obvious. The dogmatic ideas about the following are in need of fundamental revision: The historic mission of the working class; the dictatorship of the proletariat; the inevitability and necessity of socialist revolutions; non-market socialism; the possibility of people's power without political pluralism; the natural increase in the leading role of ruling communist parties; the supremacy of public over private interests and of international over national interests. So far only the first steps have been taken on the way to renewing the party's theoretical baggage, and the process of the CPSU's comprehension of the real processes of perestroyka, which in many ways is being implemented with old and undemocratic methods, is increasingly dragging, lagging behind social requirements and creating an ideological vacuum in society.

The most important manifestation of the crisis is the increasing ideological and political demarcation within the party. The following main trends have now taken shape deep within the CPSU and coexist with each other:

1. The conservative-Stalinist trend campaigning for the cosmetic repair of party structures and against any serious changes both in the party and in society;

2. The moderate-reformist (centrist) trend advocating partial transformations which will make it possible to go over from a direct, overt partocracy to the CPSU's indirect rule within the framework of a one-party system;

3. The radical-reformist trend struggling for the radical reform of the CPSU in the direction of a modern democratic party of a parliamentary type operating under conditions of a multiparty system.

The covering up of fundamental disagreements, the suppression of dissidence in the party by means of organizational measures, and the desire to preserve the mythical unity at any price are leading to a further deepening of the ideological crisis in the CPSU and to a weakening of the party's ideological and political influence among the masses.

The crisis of ideology is inseparably linked with **the political crisis of the party** and of all of society. Having become statewide and holding undivided sway, the present ideological system defined the paths of social development for entire decades, leading the country to totalitarian state socialism. So it would be wrong to see the crisis of the CPSU only as a manifestation of modern contradictions in its development. The crisis has its origins in the times of the development of the totalitarian system of power in our country, the merging of the party and the state, and the turning of the CPSU into the nucleus of this system, which has the monopoly on ownership, power, ideology.... For many years now the CPSU has not been a political party in the true sense of the word, as a public movement and a mass democratic organization.

Now that the crisis of the totalitarian system and of the whole preceding model of our development is apparent, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the neo-Stalinist, antidemocratic model of the party and its place and role in the political system are totally at variance with the modern processes of social development. The party's progressive strata had sufficient healthy forces to turn the leadership's steering wheel and begin perestroyka, but the party in its present state cannot cope with the task that has fallen to its lot of taking the perestroyka processes to their logical conclusion. Having given a boost to the economic and political reform, at the same time the CPSU has not undertaken a fundamental revision of its role in society or its own democratic reform, increasingly lagging behind the positive social processes and becoming the chief brake on perestroyka. The continued retention of the monopoly position of the party or, more accurately, of the party and state apparatus in society, is extremely dangerous not only for society but also for the party itself, because it leads to its degradation and the loss of its prestige and influence among the masses.

The serious lagging of the party's democratization behind democratization in society was clearly apparent during the spring elections of people's deputies, the work of the First Congress of Soviets, and the session of the country's Supreme Soviet.

The elections revealed both the voters' growing mistrust in the party and state apparatus and in the candidates from the nomenklatura system and the people's broad support for independent, democratically-minded candidates, including communists.

The work of the session and of the congress graphically demonstrated that power is still in the hands of the apparatus and that the Politburo and the Central Committee do not intend to revise their functions. Millions of Soviet people saw for themselves that without changing the party's position in society and reorganizing the CPSU itself on a democratic basis it is impossible to ensure the full handover of power to the soviets and, thus, the implementation of fundamental perestroyka in society.

But this strategic laggardness of the CPSU made itself particularly keenly felt during the miners' summer strike, when the local authorities and the central apparatus proved quite unready to manage the situation and when a virtual dyarchy took shape in a number of regions, in which the strike committees became the real power while the party and state structures possessed power only nominally. The ubiquitous reelections of managements, trade union committees, and party committees and the demands for extraordinary party forums to be convened are a very serious warning to the ruling party.

A further deepening of the tendency to lag behind could lead to defeat for the party in the elections to republic and local organs of power, whose consequences would be disastrous for the CPSU.

The organizational crisis of the party is also inseparably linked with the ideological and political crisis. The present party structures, which began to take shape at the beginning of the century and finally became ossified during the thirties and forties, were meant to win and hold on to power and served to ensure the monolithic unity of the "order of swordbearers," to crush all democratism, pluralism, and dissidence in the party, and to adapt the party apparatus for direct management of the economy and culture.

The overcentralized, antidemocratic, strictly hierarchical structure of the party of a totalitarian, neo-Stalinist type came into direct conflict with the interests of millions of ordinary communists, with the requirements of perestroyka, and with the values of democratic socialism.

The chief cementing link of an undemocratic nature for both the party and the whole political system is the principle of democratic centralism.

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM:

a) does not ensure genuine pluralism of opinions in the party or the possibility of upholding these opinions with the help of organizational means and criticizing the decisions adopted;

b) does not ensure the protection of the rights of the minority, which frequently generates innovative ideas, and thereby dooms the party to constant stagnation;

c) does not give the right to make decisions to those whom they directly concern, prescribing the obligation for lower organizations to obey higher ones on all questions;

d) prohibits the creation of horizontal ties in the party, as a result of which the party apparatus becomes all-powerful, uncontrolled, and capable of manipulating the opinion both of individual communists and of entire party organizations;

e) dictates iron executive discipline which rules out the creative principle and activity from below, thereby leading to the leveling of party ranks and turning communists into an appendage of the party apparatus;

f) does not allow CPSU members who are elected people's deputies to express the will of their voters as opposed to the will of higher party organs.

The second important source of the party's undemocratic nature is the nomenklatura system of selecting and placing cadres for absolutely everything, which has led to the "partyization" of all leading posts and the formation of a party and state elite which has its own corporative interests, has been corrupted by irresponsibility, is surrounded with privileges, is bogged down in corruption and favoritism, abuses power, and part of which is closely linked with the shadow economy and organized crime.

The moral crisis of the party is apparent and in turn gives rise to a **crisis** of confidence on the part of the population and also of ordinary Communists toward leading party workers and the whole party. The processes of a decline in the number of people wishing to join the party, an increase in numbers leaving the party, and a fall in the number of subscribers to the party press are symptoms of a progressing disease.

All these manifestations of an all-party crisis attest that the old model of the party no longer works. What is more, as shown by several years' experience of perestroyka in our country and in a number of other East European countries, it is not self-reformed from above. Therefore, what is needed at the contemporary stage is not the improvement and perfection of existing party structures and relations but a fundamental democratic reform of the party, presupposing a transition from the totalitarian model of the party to a modern democratic model of a party of a parliamentary type within the framework of a multiparty system.

It is the strategic task of the Democratic Platform and of all the party's progressive forces to strive for the consistent implementation of this reform from below, in its radical version.

II. RADICAL REFORM OF THE CPSU

In today's conditions, the paramount task is to elaborate a concept of democratic reform of the CPSU and, on its basis, an anticrisis platform for our party. This reform must become the central link in the totality of democratic reforms aimed at final elimination of the regime [na okonchatelnuyu likvidatsiyu rezhima] and at transition to democratic socialism.

The Democratic Platform offers its concept for the reform of the CPSU. In this, we proceed from the premise that the reform's implementation and the transition to political pluralism cannot be instantaneous. It presupposes stage-by-stage transformations which are considered and prepared. Whereas haste in the implementation of reform could lead to chaos and anarchy, to a loss of society's manageability, delay and excessive caution are fraught with the danger of a possible restoration of totalitarianism and the collapse of perestroyka.

We perceive two main stages along the path of implementing the party's reform, whose content is as follows:

First stage. Transfer of powers of authority from the monopoly-rule party to the soviets, and democratization of the party.

The beginning of this stage was marked by the "March" revolution —the spring 1989 elections of USSR people's deputies. Its content is the gradual curbing of the party's functions of power. The party renounces direct interference in economic, social, and spiritual life and curtails the sphere of its cadre policy, concentrating its attention on ideological and political leadership. Supreme power is transferred to the Congress of People's Deputies, and to soviets at local level. All this is implemented within the framework of the concept of separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The party's leading role in society ceases to be a constitutionally enshrined monopoly and is based exclusively on its prestige and its ability to retain the role of initiator of perestroyka processes.

There occurs a separation of the radical and conservative wings in the party and the formation of various platforms, groups, and factions.

Simultaneously, there is an ongoing formation of a civic society's democratic structures and creation of new political organizations and movements which prepare conditions for the emergence of different political parties. We believe that only an alliance of the CPSU's progressive wing with the people's independent democratic movement would be capable of providing a real social base for perestroyka, extricating it from its present state of crisis.

The implementation of these transformations within the first-stage framework requires:

1. Review of the USSR Constitution (repeal of Article 6) and adoption of a Law on Public Organizations (or a Law on Political Parties), which would guarantee the freedom to create political parties and their equal rights, and would define their political status.

2. Implementation of reform in ideology, which would be expressed in a concentrated form in the new party program.

This is how we perceive such a reform:

a) renunciation of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism. Utilization of that part of the Marxist legacy which has retained its significance in modern conditions. In the future the party must make extensive use of the leading achievements of human thought, rejecting any approaches and schemes which hinder the process of renewal and creative quest;

b) truthful admission of the enormous responsibility borne by the CPSU for the results and consequences of the totalitarian regime in our country. It is necessary to completely and unreservedly condemn the model of state socialism which has driven our society into a profound crisis;

c) scientific determination of the objectives of reforms being implemented, final elimination of the totalitarian regime, and transition to democratic socialism based on the priority of universal human interests and values: The principles of democracy, humanism, pluralism, social justice, nonviolence, solidarity, and tolerance for other world philosophies and social systems.

3. Implementation of a reform of organizational structures and intraparty relations on the basis of a new, democratic CPSU Statute.

The reform's objective: Replacement of the principle of democratic centralism by fundamental democratic principles (electability, glasnost, replaceability, subordination of the minority to the majority subject to the statute's guaranteeing the protection of the minority's rights) and complete renunciation of the nomenklatura system.

For this purpose we propose the introduction of the following fundamental amendments to the CPSU Statute:

—to introduce direct elections of primary party organization and of rayon and city party committee secretaries, of party committee members, and of party forum delegates with multiple candidacies, election platforms, secret ballot, and free nomination of candidates;

—to restore the freedom of factions and groupings and of ideological streams by repealing the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress resolution "On the Party's Unity";

—to consolidate the possibility of creating horizontal structures within the party (like, for example, associations along goal, functional, professional, and other lines);

—to remove party control organs and party mass media from subordination to the party's executive organs, making them accountable only to the congress or conference;

—to ensure that party congress or conference delegates retain their powers throughout the period until the next forum (provided a delegate is not recalled);

—to eliminate special privileges and advantages for members of the elected aktiv and apparatus, which undermine the party's prestige;

—to replace the nomenklatura system by elections, competitions, and other democratic methods for cadre selection;

—in view of the awakening national self-awareness of peoples and the growing trend toward autonomy in the republics (and possible renegotiation [perezaklyucheniye] of the treaty on the formation of the USSR), and as the necessary conditions ripen, to switch to the federal principle of building the CPSU in conformity with the building of our state, and to create a Russian Communist Party.

The time limits and nature of this transitional stage will be largely determined by the limits of political and ideological pluralism within the party itself: The swifter and the more radical the process of the CPSU's democratization, the smoother and less painful will be the transition to full power by the soviets and the shaping of a multiparty system.

Stage two. The transformation of the CPSU into a parliamentary party operating under a multiparty system and in a rule-of-law, parliamentary state.

It seems to us that the possibility of moving toward this stage is linked, first, with the final assertion of the full power of the soviets and the creation of a new, parliamentary, rule-of-law state; second, with the appearance of mass political parties and organizations capable of really participating in the implementation of power and assuming the responsibility for running the country; third, with the transformation of the CPSU into a genuinely modern and democratic party ready to enter into dialogue with other political forces, not least those in opposition to it. All this will make it possible to switch to a parliamentary system with proportional representation for parties in organs of power in conformity with the direct will of the voters. The preparations for and holding of routine (or extraordinary) elections of USSR people's deputies would be a logical starting point for this stage.

Advocating our party's retention of its leading positions, we believe that the CPSU should acquire its right of political leadership exclusively at elections and reaffirm its theoretical and practical activity and its ability to constructively solve the problems facing society.

During this period the party focuses its attention on four main functions: The program function (the elaboration of socioeconomic, political, and other programs to be presented as alternatives to the country's parliament); the political function (the struggle to win in the elections a majority of seats in organs of power at all levels and, in the event of victory, to form a government and implement its election program); the ideological function (defending its ideological positions and views under conditions of ideological pluralism, conducting propaganda and agitation work for its own ideas, and winning over citizens to side with and join the CPSU); and the organizational function (organizing intraparty relations on a genuinely democratic basis).

The party's structure is simplified and decentralized as much as possible, and superfluous intermediate components between the Central Committee and primary party organizations are eliminated.

Intraparty life is further democratized in line with the principle that decisions taken by a party organization within the framework of its powers cannot be revoked by higher party organs.

A mechanism is created for holding referendums on the fundamental problems of the life of the party and its individual organizations.

The CPSU parliamentary faction obtains extensive autonomy in its activity and is subject only to the party congress.

At this stage the final organizational demarcation between radicals and conservatives in the party takes place. The various ideological trends, platforms, and factions which have emerged at the previous stage could become the basis for the emergence of several political parties offering different models of socialism and ways of achieving it.

These are the general outlines of the political, ideological, and organizational transformations in the CPSU proposed by the Democratic Platform.

The most effective means of discussing and adopting the concepts for the party's democratic reform, in our opinion, is to hold a partywide discussion within the framework of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. Bearing in mind the exceptionally complex situation in which the party and country find themselves, the Democratic Platform insists that an extraordinary CPSU congress be held with the following agenda:

1. The crisis in the party and ways of overcoming it.

2. On the transfer of power to the soviets and the party's new place in society's political system.

3. The main avenues for the fundamental democratic reform of the CPSU.

4. The election of a new Central Committee, Politburo, general secretary, and chief editors of PRAVDA and other party organs.

While advocating fundamental party reform, at the same time we have no illusions that the conservative section of the party and the party apparatus will willingly go along with such transformations. There will be a stubborn struggle. We are convinced that if the CPSU wishes to retain its leading positions in the future based on the people's confidence, there is no real alternative to democratic reform. In the event that healthy forces within the CPSU fail to carry out fundamental democratic transformations, the crisis will inevitably lead the party either to political bankruptcy (as in Poland) or to an iron hand (as in China).

We call on all those who adhere to democratic principles and advocate the democratic reform of the CPSU to stand up and be counted, to rally around each other, and to create something which does not contravene the party statutes—a Democratic Platform and a path to party reform and the creation of horizontal structures; to create party clubs, interregional associations of communists, and councils of party organization secretaries who hold similar political positions; and to win a majority in official structures. We call on them to nominate and elect delegates for the party congress on the basis of these platforms.

Official Discusses Draft Party Rules

LD0103232890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1650 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] At the next CPSU Central Committee plenum new draft party rules will be reviewed. During their preparation proposals which came from almost 500,000 of the country's primary party organizations were taken into account. How will the new party rulers differ from those in current use? Vladimir Korablev, all-union radio correspondent, asked (Vladimir Ivanovich Chuprunov), sector chief of the party building and cadre work department of the CPSU Central Committee, to talk about this.

[Begin recording] [(Chuprunov)] Formerly our rules were, however, oriented in the spirit of the administrative-edict system, when the main requirement for a CPSU member was his obligation to unswervingly carry out the party directives, that is, to be more of an executive than a creator. However, the new approaches to the rules consist precisely in giving room for every communist and every primary party organization to develop their initiative. The basis of this is the proposals from primary party organizations, from communists, which today are reaching us in the party Central Committee.

[Korablev] What is the nature of these proposals and what is their essence?

[(Chuprunov)] Their main essence is precisely a plan of the development of democratic centralism.

[Korablev] In this regard I would like to ask you this question: At the moment very many people are expressing themselves, both communists and nonparty members, who reject this principle, considering that democratic centralism is the main factor restraining the healthy development of the party.

[(Chuprunov)] I am an adherent of the idea that we must, of course, radically change democratic centralism. Moreover, we must change it precisely in the direction of democratization. When it is said that we should completely remove this principle, it seems that here an important mistake is made. It does not take into account the nature of that party we want to see today. We want to see a united, organized, one, strengthened on precisely the initiatives of primary organizations. If there is no connecting link in the party and we completely reject the principle of democratic centralism, then we will all go, as it were, into our own private rooms and there will be no organizational nucleus.

[Korablev] What will be the content of democratic centralism in the new draft party rules?

[(Chuprunov)] It is first of all the broadening of rights of primary party organizations in the use of forms and methods, in the use of those same financial means which, naturally, they need today for their activity, the formation of their ranks, the granting of the right of the minority to defend their positions. That is to say, the principle we are talking about is more aimed in the direction of democratization.

[Korablev] So, the opinion of the minority will be taken into account, not only that of the majority?

[(Chuprunov)] Unquestionably. They must be given the opportunity, not only to put forward, but also to defend, these positions. Such a situation must be provided for in the rules. It will fit exactly into the democratization of the work of our party organizations.

[Korablev] Vladimir Ivanovich, amongst those proposals which have arrived at the party Central Committee, what, most of all, has concerned communists?

[(Chuprunov)] Well, regarding the formation of party ranks, on granting primary party organizations the right to decide completely on acceptance into the party, on the abolition of the candidate probation stage. There are very many proposals on leaving the party, requesting that these issues be decided at grass roots level, and that a communist who has decided to break with or leave the party, in order... [changes thought] he has this right, without certain consequences for his future work.

There are very many proposals from party veterans on how they can participate in the work of party organizations, regarding visiting meetings, paying dues, on the honorary title of party veteran, right up to the proposal to change the badge of 50 years' service in the party. I would also note a number of proposals—there are very many of these proposals—concerning the use of financial means in the party.

[Korablev] How will this issue be resolved?

[(Chuprunov)] Recently much has been done here. In particular, above all, the proposals are concerned with the openness of the party budget. That is, people are above all asking for this issue to be opened up.

[Korablev] Well, and what will be used in the future from those proposals arriving on this issue?

[(Chuprunov)] This primarily concerns the supply of financial means to primary party organizations. Evidently, the percentage of dues levied on wages will be changed to a certain degree. That is, approaches here will be precisely in the direction of democratization.

[Korablev] The primary party organization will be able to dispose of a part of the funds from party dues by itself?

[(Chuprunov)] Yes, without question, by itself. It can use them for those purposes it considers necessary, right up to setting the additional payment for party work to its secretaries or other activists it considers necessary.

[Korablev] Vladimir Ivanovich, tell me please, how will the structure of party organizations change? Will party town committees and rayon committees exist, or will they be abolished?

[(Chuprunov)] The Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics will receive full independence within the composition of the CPSU in dealing with all issues, including structural ones. Party oblast committees and party rayon committees will also receive it, who, within the limits of their areas, can deal with these structural formations. [as heard] If the party oblast committee believes, at the request of communists, it is not necessary to have party rayon committees in a town, but just to have a party town committee, this right will be granted to the party oblast committee to resolve it at a local level.

The draft party rules, which will be reviewed at the next Central Committee plenum, will be put forward for broad discussion. It is completely natural that communists, nonparty members, and those who have not yet expressed their attitude, can take part and send their proposals to the party Central Committee. They will all unquestionably be taken into consideration during preparation of the final version for the 28th Party Congress. [end recording]

Cooperatives' Emergency Conference Held

PM2102095990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by A. Protsenko: "Cooperative Members' Emergency Conference"]

[Text] An emergency conference of the union of united cooperatives of the USSR was held 17 February in Moscow, in the movie and concert hall of the "Izmaylovo" hotel complex. Those taking part discussed the political and economic situation in the country and the state of the cooperative movement.

Now uniting about 4.5 million people in their ranks (together with those working under agreements and those with more than one job), the country's cooperatives last year produced goods and rendered services worth 40 billion rubles (R). The cooperative sector's contribution to the socioeconomic development of a whole series of the country's regions has increased markedly.

But, as the conference noted, recently both centrally and locally various departments and republican organs of management and local soviets have been adopting legally binding acts aimed at curtailing the cooperative movement, infringing cooperative members' rights, and contradicting union legislation, primarily the law "on the cooperative movement in the USSR." According to expert assessments, the result of this could be that this year throughout the country as a whole there will be a reduction of at least R10 billion in the volume of work and services performed by cooperative members.

The conference decided to appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet demanding that the self-assumed power of the central departments and local authorities be restricted and that the necessary measures be taken to establish real equal rights for the state and cooperative sectors of the economy.

A resolution was adopted on the creation of a political committee for preparing for the constituent congress of a party which, according to the initiators' design, could be joined not only by cooperative members but also by workers at leased enterprises, individual farmers, and members of various public and informal organizations advocating the speediest transition to a market economy.

Poor Forecasting Compounds Societal Problems

PM2202121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Viktor Khatuntsev article under the "Plain Speaking" rubric: "What Does the Future Hold...."]

[Text] What will happen tomorrow? Confidence in the future is not an ordinary component of our individual world outlook. The more certain a society's future, the more cohesive and efficacious the society. You have to agree that today we still lack such collective confidence. Expectation, alarm, hope, or lack of faith—these are typical of PRAVDA's mailbag nowadays. And it is a perfectly objective reflection of the people's mood.

Those who are on the verge of succumbing to panic can only be counseled to take a look at the events of the last few years in their broad historical dimension and ponder the motherland's future as it might affect history as a whole, the history of both our country and of world civilization. The stability of daily life in times past is self-deceptive, because the world was moving further and further away from us. Yes, any break is painful. It causes hot and cold flashes, it produces symptoms of convulsion and anemia like any other fresh outbreak of a chronic illness. What will tomorrow bring? Only whatever we ourselves create.

The beginning of the year was marked by an outburst of rally passions. The expression of will at popular assemblies is perfectly democratic, but it is also necessary to recognize the danger contained in extreme manifestations of "soapbox politics." Calls to overthrow this, that, or the other, to oppose by force, or to resist the authorities, are capable of destabilizing our future and the entire course of perestroyka. Maturity of social processes ought to consolidate democratic principles rather than subjecting them to fresh trials. People ought to heed the calls for civic accord issued by the head of the state and the party. In his speech at the opening of the third USSR Supreme Soviet session, M.S. Gorbachev clearly identified the desirable image of our future democracy: "The rule-of-law state which we wish to create should be distinguished primarily by a situation in which the multitude of views and interests existing in society are given an opportunity to freely express themselves, vindicate themselves within the frameworks of political structures, and attain their objectives by political means."

It is good that commitment and social activeness bring people out in the squares where they can express their positions and their views. But the experience that is accumulating so fast also suggests another idea—the tenser the atmosphere, with emotions dominating reason, the more acute the danger of extremism and anarchy. And these are already obvious antipodes of democracy.

All the healthy forces of perestroyka have sufficient patience and common sense to prevent the boat overturning. It is becoming increasingly dangerous, however, to stick to the role of observers and passive onlookers—the list is approaching a critical level. There is no point waiting for political demagoguery to take the form of actions. Should this happen, the country's future would be altogether uncertain, and even stability in the world would be shaken.

An individual's wisdom and a civilized society's maturity are actually demonstrated by their effective skill to foresee, to forecast, to anticipate the future both in general outline and in tangible specific manifestations. We have our own experience of the cognition of truths which may be simple but have only recently regained the status of eternal and universal truths. For decades people sacrificed their "today" for the sake of attaining a mythicized ideal whose prototype was known to just one single "genius and infallible man." After that things went to the other extreme, and reports started dazzling people with an abundance of specific numerical computations—the number of eggs per capita that citizens would enjoy soon, the quantity of steel and cast iron needed to arrive at the bright "tomorrow." And finally, the pressure of total apathy, when nothing present or future depends on you, when you have to make the best of life without looking beyond your own compartment. A society's indifference is equal to its uncertainty about the future. The future was being built for us inside high-level offices. Unfortunately, now we know how it was being built, how it was being planned, but it is difficult to correct—this includes Afghanistan, the devastation of unpromising villages, the useless land reclamation....

The gift of social forecasting is, in essence, a component of the democratic process. When the movement of perestroyka forced us not only to shake off the lamentable dust of the past, not only to recognize the critical tension of the present, but also to ponder, without any self-deception or self-delusion, the question of "What does the future hold" in store for us—that was the time when we more or less clearly realized how unaccustomed we were, how we had forgotten, how detached we were from the responsibility of keeping an eye on the shape of things to come. It proved far more tranquil and far safer to remain in the familiar state of indolently waiting—be it for instructions from the top, or supplementary subsidies. Many of the surprises which descended upon us in the past few years can be described as unforeseen simply because we proved incapable of anticipating them

Is it likely, for example, that the Ministry of the Coal Industry was unaware of the grave situation prevailing in the coalfields long before the miners' strikes began? Or [that nobody had foreseen] the calamity of the clashes on interethnic grounds. Why is it that every time tragedy descends like a bolt from the blue—surprisingly and insidiously, first in one region then in another? All phenomena, even natural ones, have their preconditions, signs, and laws governing them. The ability to forecast them is valuable for politicians and for politics in general because it offers time and chances to alter the situation, to maneuver, to address people's reason and conscience.

The modeling of our economy's future, the consumer market, structures of ownership, and forms of labor represent a special topic. PRAVDA's mailbag contains numerous letters whose writers ponder why many good intentions frequently either yield the opposite result or give rise to such side effects that it might have been better never to start implementing them. What is the answer? We are not doing too well when it comes to specific socioeconomic forecasting. And even though it is becoming the rule that drafts of the most important laws are submitted for trial by unionwide public opinion, there is still an obvious shortage of profound and competent analysis, of a mechanism to work out all consequences, without any exception, of decisions that are made and innovations that are introduced. Perhaps, with the passage of time, the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is now maturing, will turn into a kind of "time machine" reproducing the visible outlines of transformations from the future. For the time being, all we can hear are rejoinders by various parliamentarians: "But what would happen if..."

This eternal catch of ours, this sly "if" is always with us and totally negates a multitude of sensibly conceived and legislatively enshrined actions. The editorial office mailbag makes this clear: Whether it is a kolkhoz chairman blocking lease contracts, or a rayon soviet executive committee effecting a wholesale shutdown of all cooperatives on the territory under its jurisdiction... There is no chance of us succeeding in the science of foreseeing and forecasting if, like always, we continue to rely on numerical calculations and all-embracing dogmatic tenets without taking the mentality of social strata into account.

But let us be realistic: It is impossible to foresee everything, and to forecast everything is a thankless task. But think of the number of mistakes that could be avoided if we were nonetheless to learn to acquire even a slight knowledge of what lies ahead, of what is to be expected and what is to be hoped for.

Poll on Citizens' Socioeconomic Concerns Cited

PM0103105590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Commentary by N. Zorkaya, researcher at the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, under the rubric "Opinion Poll and Sociologists' Commentary" and the general heading "Public Opinion": "Ideals and Priorities"]

[Text] The majority of people polled believe that improving the people's well-being is the country's most important problem.

The terms can be disputed, so to speak. For example, what do the majority of our compatriots understand by the idea of a "progressive country"? As became clear, 55 percent of participants in the poll believe that the Soviet person today is primarily short of material prosperity. Moreover, they would agree to earn a small wage in exchange for a guarantee of stability in their own situation.

The opinion poll results show that equalization trends are inexorably dominant in public opinion, and the problem of obtaining, and, more importantly, distributing material production, is beginning to play an almost predominant role. When asked what is the most important task for the country today, most people—38 percent!—said: to provide the people with material well-being; and 29 percent—to establish complete justice in distribution, with no privileges or advantages. Far fewer people—12 percent each—advocated priorities such as restoring moral principles in society and restoring national culture.

Roughly one-third of the participants in the poll showed a clear leaning for the democratic remodeling of the country's social and political life, and 29 percent advocated radical economic reform. But it must be noted that only 15 percent of those polled did not express any readiness to specify who receives "more than they deserve." The rest expressed clear intolerance and even aggression with respect to their more enterprising or more successful fellow citizens.

The smallest number of those polled describe as urgent for the state such points such as restoring the country's leading position in the world and returning the country to the path of building genuine socialism (five and nine percent respectively). The hidden nostalgia for the vanishing image of a "country of victorious heroes" and "country of pioneers" is apparently already becoming a historical rather than contemporary concept. Judging by the replies, the majority are more worried about the real state of affairs than about the creation of an "image" in the eyes of other peoples. The pendulum of social interests has clearly swung from ideals elevated to the status of a cult, to fetishistic pragmatism.

[The article is accompanied by a diagram showing percentage support for the following priorities: "To return to the path of building genuine socialism"—9 percent; "To restore to the country its leading position in the world"—5 percent; "To guarantee material well-being for the people"—38 percent; "To establish genuine justice without privileges or advantages"—29 percent; "To remove all restrictions on enterprises' activity and all limits on wages"—7 percent; "To revive the countryside and the agricultural way of life"—24 percent; "To revive moral principles"—12 percent; "To give every people the right to decide their own future by themselves"—12 percent; "To revive national culture"—17 percent; and "To build a free democratic society"—19 percent]

Illegal Petroleum Exports Exposed

LD0303212490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Report by Correspondents V. Anuchin and Ye. Abramov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] No doubt we still picture only feebly the scale of illegal exports of raw materials and technology from our country. At least, since this subject was raised, our editors have received a stream of reports from the most varied towns on abuses in the area of exports. These two tankers, one under the Norwegian flag, the other registered in Murmansk [video shows that the vessels are called the "Hydro" and the "Shuya"] were to take on board 15,000 tonnes of oil products intended for export and deliver them to Sweden. This cargo was brought to Murmansk by the foreign trade firm Kirishi Neftekhimeksport, but the vessels did not leave the Kola Gulf. The cargo was detained.

[Begin recording] [G. Yu. Moshkov, head of the department of the oblast KGB direcorate - identified by caption] The alarm was first raised by railway workers. They drew to our attention the fact that petroleum waste was coming out of white oil tank wagons. Verification then showed—and this has been established with the aid of expert laboratories—that a clean licensed product was being exported in place of petroleum waste. It was being taken abroad and resold for the price of petroleum waste. An investigation is now underway which is to name specific culprits. [end recording] That was 15,000 tonnes only on two tankers. But there's more in these vats at the Murmansk bulk plant and in railway wagons awaiting unloading. These have now been sealed. It's a good thing the railway workers noticed but what about the workers at the Murmansk bulk plant who load the product onto the tankers and have to provide customs with an analysis of the fuel? They have said nothing. It is legitimate to ask: Who received the difference between the high-grade fuel and the petroleum waste and who personally gave permission for this contraband? [video shows ships in port; KGB official in office; vats at port; wagons in siding; bulk plant]

Government To Combat Narcotics Abuse

LD1502001190 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—The Soviet Interior Ministry, other interested organizations and councils of ministers of union republics have developed measures to combat abuse of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and illegal drug trafficking. These measures are expected to be included in a state anti-crime program for 1991-1995.

Sources at the Soviet Interior Ministry told TASS that the Soviet Council of Ministers was instructed to create a special body at the Soviet Government to coordinate activities of ministries and departments to combat drug abuse.

The statistics on drug abuse in 1989 testify to the importance of this problem: Drug addicts committed over 28,000 crimes, including 44 premeditated murders, 46 assaults and 571 robberies.

Over 65,000 people were administratively punished for drug-related violations of law, including almost 49,000 for illegal sowing of drug containing crops. A total of 1,168 kilograms of narcotics were withdrawn.

Drug users commit up to 30 to 40 per cent of robbery and up to 80-90 per cent of pickpocketing. One in three convicted drug users participated in robberies.

Up to 70-80 per cent of property crimes in Central Asia, the Far East and the Northern Caucasus are committed to get money for drugs.

Last year 3,000 square meters of illegal drug containing crops and 96.4 million square meters of wild hemp were destroyed. Over 27 tonnes of narcotics and narcotic raw materials were confiscated. Almost 32,000 drug users were identified and registered by health authorities.

MVD Briefing on Weapon Confiscation Effort

PM0103101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 7

[V. Zaykin report under the "At the USSR MVD" rubric: "How Many Weapons Are We Looking For?"]

[Text] Internal affairs organs currently control approximately 157,000 facilities where firearms are stored, along with 5,000 explosives dumps. A briefing at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was devoted to analyzing the reasons why weapons seizures are becoming possible.

Over the last few years a steady trend has taken shape in the country toward a reduction in crimes involving smoothbore hunting guns. There has been a 63.5-percent reduction, if you compare last year with 1975. There were fewer crimes of this kind last year than the year before. This is attributable to the fact that the militia confiscated weapons from those owners who abuse liquor, suffer from mental illness, or violate public order.

The situation here could be deemed satisfactory were if not for events associated with interethnic conflicts. Alas, thousands of firearms have fallen into the hands of extremists today along with hundreds of thousands of units of ammunition and tonnes of explosives. Last July, for instance, in the Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] criminals seized 5,069kg of explosives and 4,840 firearms. By the end of the year militia organs had confiscated 1,600kg of explosives and 2,400 firearms.

In Armenia and Azerbaijan this January and February alone there were approximately 6,000 cases of weapons seizures. In January (along with those that were voluntarily handed over) internal affairs organs confiscated approximately 4,000 firearms and 600kg of explosives from the population. The situation was aggravated by the fact that appeals from the authorities and the militia for the weapons seized to be handed over were disregarded by the leaders of informal organizations. Moreover, some of the hunting weapons confiscated in the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] November 1989 through January 1990 at the decision of rayispolkoms [rayon soviet executive committees] were returned to their former owners.

The situation with regard to the safekeeping of weapons in general educational schools arouses concern today. There are more than 60,000 schools in the country with firearms storage facilities. Some 40 percent of the total number of thefts are committed here. Public education bodies are extremely slow in introducing experience of storing weapons in centralized areas—at interschool training combines, shooting galleries, or DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] clubs.

In the last five years weapons have been stolen 140 times from armed guard subunits. Almost one in two cases involved robberies committed on armed guard posts. Today more than the hunt is on for 500 "Nagan" system revolvers with which the guards were armed. The main reason for this is that weapons are sometimes easy prey to criminals and people of declining years, often in poor health, are accepted for work as armed guards.

Economic

Defense Industry Conversion Problems Discussed

Future of Conversion

PM0303211990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

["Interview with A.P. Reutov, USSR deputy minister of the Radio Industry," by L. Teushchakov; no date of interview specified: "Along the Razor's Edge of Conversion"]

[Text] Moscow—"I was involved in the development of all this equipment at various times," A.P. Reutov, USSR deputy minister of the radio industry and corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said, pointing at the models of space ships, aircraft, and missiles in his office... He paused briefly, then added: "Look at what I am struggling with now"—and he spread a whole "deck" of shaving equipment on his desk as if playing patience.

[Teushchakov] How do you explain such a sharp turnabout?

[Reutov] It is primarily due to the growing shortage of everything under the sun. For example, the current shortage of shaving equipment on the domestic market runs at about one and a half to 2 billion items a year. The state spends millions of dollars to purchase them and this, by the way, was recently reported by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA ("The Sharpest Shortage," 17 February 1990). Of course, this cannot continue indefinitely. And so, we were instructed to organize the production of razors in addition to other civilian output. For this purpose we intend to create a modern automatic plant based at the "Vega" Science and Production Association in Moscow, using advanced Western technologies.

[Teushchakov] And when will this happen?

[Reutov] If everything proceeds according to plan, we will perhaps be able to manufacture our first output in the next one or two years, and will then steadily build up our production.

[Teushchakov] Aleksandr Pavlovich, you did not actually say why the Ministry of the Radio Industry received these instructions?

[Reutov] I was told that this is conversion.

[Teushchakov] Were you not taken aback by this?

[Reutov] Frankly speaking, not only was I taken aback, I was actually indignant to begin with. I thought to myself at the time, which was about 18 months ago: How is it possible to solve a problem without even studying it beforehand. Get on with it, I was told, and do it! Nobody wants to know whether you are prepared, whether you would improve or worsen the situation along the given avenue. Honestly, it is impossible to endlessly apply the principle that if someone is drowning it is up to him to start swimming.

[Teushchakov] So what is happening, are you keeping afloat?

[Reutov] Now I am confident that we will keep afloat. Initially—I will make no secret of this—it was frightening. First, we had to work out the meaning of conversion. Second, to grope for ways to implement it. It is well known that, according to world practice, conversion is taken to mean the elimination of military production and the organization of civilian production in its place. And this, as you can figure out for yourself, is no simple matter.

[Teushchakov] What is the main complexity?

[Reutov] When we are making specialized equipment, we have a sufficiently stable clientele. And here, as the saying goes, the rules of the game are known in advance. But things are much harder when it comes to civilian output. At times you have to frantically look for customers. We approach oil industry workers, medical personnel, agricultural workers, internal affairs personnel. We offer our services. More often than not they would be only too pleased to enter into cooperation deals with us, but they lack sufficient money. Unfortunately, the Ministry of the Radio Industry is not all that rich, either. And this is what happens. In the conditions of defense sufficiency, subsidies for specialized equipment are being cut back. You would have thought that the funds thus released should have been made available to us. You work out for yourselves, we were told, what you could make that would be of use to the population. We should be given a hint what items are most urgently needed today. But, and I repeat, our funds should not be taken away. The monitoring of their expenditure could be taken on by, for example, the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission. If this were the case, we would have the firm knowledge that we could count on the released funds. But things are different in practice. Neither we nor our clients have received any additional money for civilian needs.

Let me say that we used to manufacture tape recorders, television sets, radio receivers, computing equipment, and school computers even prior to conversion but, if truth be said, in smaller quantities. Therefore, we are marching along familiar paths in this direction. But when it comes to new avenues, the quest is painful.

[Teushchakov] Could errors have been avoided?

[Reutov] In my view, as soon as perestroyka was conceived, we should have all put our heads together—we have so many clever people in our country—to work out together what was needed for the country as a whole and for individual categories of the population. We needed to single out the most important avenues and develop the relevant scientifically substantiated and comprehensively targeted programs. If that had happened, we and our development workers could have got down to work. Some institute may have been right away geared to new products. By today we would have probably reached a completely different level. But we build plants for one purpose, then start converting them for another. A waste of both time and money. It is bad when a serious job is done off the cuff, without precise coordination.

[Teushchakov] On the whole, Aleksandr Pavlovich—if I have understood you correctly—you are not an opponent of conversion.

[Reutov] Sooner or later, we would have still arrived at this point as part of the normal process of life. We could manage to do a lot even now, provided the scientific and technical potential is correctly geared and all its potential is analyzed in detail. But here is the point: When people speak about conversion, at times they think—there you are, we will bring in the defense industry, we will reduce something there by 50 percent, and everything will be fine. This is, of course, illusory conversion. Take this example. A plant is producing, say, 100 means for a special purpose, and it is suddenly told by "those on high": Cut it down by one-half. But we cannot shut the shop down just like that, all its technology is geared to these 100 items. True enough, we could switch to single-shift working. Nonetheless, it is impossible to produce something else there without changing the equipment. And so, enterprises are rather looking for ways to shut down the remaining 50 percent of their capacity. We cannot make, say, television sets or other mass consumer goods at a specially fitted plant. It is wrong to have an intellectually geared production unit manufacturing simple items. An unaffordable luxury! The economy is faltering, the situation is at times almost chaotic, and mainly because there is a shortage of well-considered actions. In my view, the defense sectors are almost the sole exception. Every program is well thought out from beginning to end, everyone knows who is responsible for what. To put it briefly, there is confidence and demand.

[Teushchakov] Obviously, the time has come to adopt a law on conversion?

[Reutov] Without any doubt. As far as I know, we should have had a State Conversion Program back in the fourth quarter of last year. But it is still not ready. Therefore, the law on conversion will not be discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet's third session which is now under way. Why the delay? Incidentally, the Ministry of the Radio Industry has its own suggestions and could take part in preparing the draft law. Conversion raises a whole package of questions which are difficult to solve. According to the prevailing opinion, this a process whereby major benefits could be achieved without serious costs, just by assigning targets. But this is not so. You cannot imagine how difficult it will be to solve this task without the appropriate investments and the necessary allocation of equipment. Take for example the plant for the manufacture of safety razors. It would be expedient to allocate to us funds in freely convertible currency for the creation of a modern shaving equipment production unit with a foreign partner's participation. These funds could be taken from the sums allocated for the purchase of shaving equipment on the external market, with subsequent repayment from proceeds of the sale of finished products through the USSR Ministry of Trade.

In the conditions of today's conversion, most cases present the problem of developing technology to start with, then finding interested consumers (several of them preferably), and only then starting mass production. This demands the organization of development work on a competitive basis, the selection of the best suggestion, and the development of advertising. For the time being all this is done in conditions of risk, which demand that a special monetary fund be set aside. The financing of conversion today can be secured through funds set aside for the transitional period under the military-industrial complex (for major development work on consumer goods); science and production organization funds built up from contributions by enterprises belonging to the science and production association in question (for smaller-scale development work); or allocation of funds for the transition of plants manufacturing small-series military equipment to the manufacture of large-series national economic equipment. I think that all these questions can be solved provided they are not brushed aside.

[Teushchakov] Aleksandr Pavlovich, you are known in our own country and abroad as an eminent specialist in the radar sphere and chairman of the International Radio Navigation Committee. Tell me, is conversion making its way also in this sphere?

[Reutov] And how! Especially in the development of Earth observation radar systems. This includes monitoring ice conditions, river floods, highway conditions, and various agricultural crops. Take as another example the avenue involving the landing of aircraft. Some time ago I was involved in developing the radio engineering system for the "Buran" orbital craft. Today this experience has been found suitable for improving the system for landing passenger aircraft even in the most complex conditions.

Our experience proved highly useful also in the work on developing the joint "Loran-C" and "Chayka" radio navigation link in the North Pacific and the Bering Sea. Joint efforts on the development of such a service are advantageous not only for the United States and the USSR but also for the entire world navigation community. I would describe this process as intellect conversion.

[Teushchakov] Nonetheless, coming back down to Earth as the saying goes, what positive developments have there been for the better?

[Reutov] We are intensively seeking new partners in conversion. Now we are developing new programs for the Ministry of Health and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. A very interesting project, in my view, is an automated system to combat theft of state and personal property which was developed for the country as a whole and for Moscow in particular. The total value of the program is about 0.5 billion rubles [R], and protective signaling equipment worth R338 million will be sold to the population. The program's implementation will begin in 1990-91, and the entire series will run until the end of the five-year plan period. All this comes from the realm of our social inventions, so to speak. After all, everyone acquiring our equipment will be protected against unpleasantness. The way the system works, if a thief were to try to break into just one apartment, the principle of collective self-defense would come into operation in the block. And suddenly the criminal discovers that his time has "run out." We are developing universally applicable systems for environmental protection, highway traffic monitoring, and safekeeping of personal and official motor vehicles. We expect that people will be interested in innovations and will start placing orders—and we will start receiving the money we need for the implementation of the aforementioned programs. For the time being, however, we are scratching around, living from hand to mouth.

[Teushchakov] Many people spoke with alarm about the future of conversion at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum. How about you, Aleksandr Pavlovich—are you optimistic or pessimistic?

[Reutov] It is no good claiming helplessness. Yes, slight changes for the better can be seen. It is necessary to galvanize the entire scientific, technical and engineering potential without any exceptions. To make skillful use of the workers' abilities. I am convinced: If we were to adopt this approach, we would not only hold our ground but would also get stronger and advance further. This is a multifaceted activity. It cannot be oversimplified. But there is no need to fear it, either. It may look impossible but it can be done. There are plenty of industrious hands and brilliant minds in our country. The only point is, these hands and minds must not be pushed, as the saying goes. It is necessary to get out of the habit of slamming fists on the table, to give full freedom to economic accountability and economic autonomy. If this were to happen, we could be taking off during this five-year plan period. Without fail! Subject, of course, to one more condition. Provided we stop shifting the entire burden of conversion onto Russia alone. Traces of this trend can be seen. Contractual relations with enterprises in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics, in Moldavia, are being breached. Everyone wants to produce nothing but civilian output. This desire is understandable to a certain extent. But what about the defense potential? I think that it ought to be maintained by all republics, it is after all in our common interest.

It was announced that the USSR Council of Ministers accepted as a basis the state program for the defense industry's conversion in the period through 1995, which was submitted by the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for Military-Industrial Questions, and the USSR Ministry of Defense. Following the appropriate additional work, this document will come into force.

Conversion in Moscow

PM0503113390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Yu. Arkhangelskiy, first deputy chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration for Industry, by G. Fedotov; place and date not given: "Conversion in the Capital"]

[Text] It was back in early 1989 that the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [Mosgorispolkom] set about drawing up programs of joint work with defense complex enterprises.

What stage is this work at today? What can be expected as a result of the conversion of Moscow enterprises in the immediate future?

Yu. Arkhangelskiy, first deputy chief of the Mosgorispolkom Main Administration for Industry [Glavmosprom], gives his account.

[Arkangelskiy] I think it is pretty clear that in the very near future conversion at military plants will be a most important source of extra resources for the implementation of the city's social programs. This work was set in motion by last April's joint decisions by the Moscow City Soviet and USSR Ministry of General Machine Building. It was after that that the first six city defense industry enterprises, including the "Kompozit" Science and Production Association and the Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building Technology, were switched to civilian production.

Around 20 Moscow enterprises have now been affected by conversion. And this will make it possible, in the current year, to considerably increase the production of a number of scarce consumer goods and, by the end of the next five-year plan, produce them in amounts worth about 3 billion rubles [R] per year in defense sectors alone.

[Fedotov] What will be arriving on store shelves in the very near future?

[Arkhangelskiy] The "Mostrikotazhmash" science and production association has started producing "Severyanka" knitting machines and the plant named for Likhachev has started producing microwave ovens—as a result of the expansion of parts supplies by Ministry of the Electronics Industry enterprises in Moscow. A razor blade production line has started up at the Kuntsevskiy platinum needle plant.

Many "military" technologies are already being used in the capital's health services and bakeries. At brickyards they have started using methods proposed by a defense enterprise, which will enable them to produce higher quality bricks twice as fast.

There are problems too. State normative documents have not yet been adopted to regulate conversion and provide, in particular, for production equipment pricing and a taxation and credit system. The thing is that at the moment the taxation system does not provide for defense complex enterprises' involvement in meeting city orders for civilian products. This is due to high (70 percent) payments from profits into the budget. I believe that the production of output ordered by the Mosgorispolkom should be carried out on preferential terms.

[Fedotov] Yuriy Nikolayevich, the ecological situation in the city has been arousing public criticism for a long time. Will technologies developed at military enterprises help here?

[Arkhangelskiy] The defense complex, incidentally, is also contributing to atmospheric pollution. At the same time, it is the main supplier of equipment that makes it possible to compensate to some extent for the presence of ecologically harmful production operations in Moscow. For example, the Main Administration for the Creation and Utilization of Space Technology and the "Kometa" Central Science and Production Association are supplying city services with technical facilities for environmental monitoring. The Khrunichev Plant recently started producing industrial ozonizers to purify drinking water. Other defense eneterprises are accelerating the production of instruments to monitor the presence of oxides of nitrogen and carbon in the air and catalytic converters.

So here, as in the solution of other acute problems, we are relying heavily on the defense sector.

Chemical Plant Converts

LD0303180790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] A mining and chemical plant in East Siberia, which previoulsy specialized in defense-related commodities, has sent consumers the first consignment of civilian items. The formerly secret (Priyargorskiy) plant, re-equipped and with capacities, is part of the nationwide conversion of military industries. With few military orders, it is planning further conversion. At the moment some 400 Soviet industries produce equipment for the light and food industries, medical instruments and consumer goods, alongside with defense-related items.

Conversion Completed in Kishinev

LD0403161390 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 pp. 1, 3

[Summary] The production of military goods is ending completely at the Alpha works in Kishinev. Its main product now will be color televisions.

The Mezon works in the Moldavian capital has begun mass production of Elektronika-302-2M tape recorders. A first industrial batch has already gone on sale. The works will produce almost 20 million rubles' worth of consumer goods this year.

Overall, the Moldavian defense industry will double its consumer goods production in 1990.

Foreign Loan, Aid Figures Published, Explained

PM0203101590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Feature on foreign debt under the rubric "Press Focus": "Unique Document—Who 'Owes' Us 85.8 Billion Rubles?"]

[Text] "To Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

"Deputies' question: "Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich!

"Before the Congress decides on the proposed government measures to improve the economy we ask you to tell deputies:

"1. The scale of foreign states' debt to the Soviet Union and its size state by state, as well as the terms and repayment procedure.

"2. The size of nonreturnable aid to foreign states, various organizations, and individuals planned for 1990.

"3. The state of the country's gold reserves as of 1 January 1985, annual inflows and outflows beginning from that date and indicating the form of the latter [s ukazaniyem statey poslednikh], and the state of gold reserves as of 1 January 1990.

"If necessary, the question of holding a closed session could be resolved.

"USSR People's Deputies A. Shchelkanov, A. Sobchak, A. Yezhelev, Yu. Boldyrev, and others." [question ends]

[Reply by V.G. Panskov] "Esteemed comrade deputies!

"In connection with your question I can report the following:

"1. Foreign states' debt to the Soviet Union as of 1 November 1989 stood at 85.8 billion rubles [R]. Figures on debt broken down by country are attached. The debt terms and repayment procedures are regulated by agreements negotiated with each country.

"On the basis of the aforesaid agreements, R7.2 billion is to be repaid in 1990, R39.4 billion in the 13th Five-Year Plan, and R34.5 billion after the 13th Five-Year Plan.

"2. The amount of nonreturnable aid to foreign states planned for 1990 is R1.6 billion.

"3. As for figures on the country's gold reserves, these are a commercial secret.

"At the same time I can report that persons empowered by the USSR Supreme Soviet can obtain full information on these stocks.

"V.G. Panskov, USSR deputy minister of finance." [Panskov ends]

Attached to the reply is a detailed table which will undoubtedly be of immense interest.

[In the table the headings denote: A—Total debt as of 1 November 1989; B—of which, principal [osnovnoy dolg]; C—Written off as of 1 November 1989 including interest; D—Deferred 1986-1989 including interest. All figures in millions of rubles.]

Countries	A	B	C	D
Grand Total	85,845.6	83,089.9	545.1	17,398.2
I. Socialist Countries				
Albania	127.8	80.3	19.6	0
Bulgaria	433.6	433.6	0	0
Hungary	622.5	622.5	0	0
Vietnam	9,131.2	8,856.1	406.4	1,568.7
GDR	110.0	110.0	0	0
DPRK	2,234.1	2,234.1	0	417.6
China	6.2	6.2	0	0
Cuba	15,490.6	15,092.0	0	2,360.4
Laos	758.2	758.2	0	49.8
Mongolia	9,542.7	8,981.3	57.2	2,031.5
Poland	4,955.0	4,952.1	0	3,157.7
Yugoslavia	394.0	375.6	0	0
Total:	43,805.9	42,502.0	483.2	9,585.7
II. Developing Countries				
Algeria	2,519.3	2,447.7	0	560.0
Angola	2,028.9	1,930.2	0	768.0
Afghanistan	3,055.0	2,898.6	0	624.0
Bangladesh	6.6	6.6	0	0
Benin	31.6	30.4	0	12.1
Burundi	14.8	14.8	0	0
Burkina Faso	4.3	3.9	0	0
Ghana	9.6	8.7	0	0
Guinea	258.3	256.8	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	66.0	63.2	0	12.7
Grenada	0.2	0.2	0	0
Egypt	1,711.3	1,711.3	0	8.2
Zambia	206.0	151.4	0	23.3
India	8,907.5	8,907.4	0	0
Indonesia	404.5	330.9	0	0
Jordan	369.0	355.8	0	99.5
Iraq	3,795.6	3,514.5	0	1,414.8
Iran	1.0	1.0	0	0
YAR	979.6	955.6	0	285.1
Cameroon	0.6	0.6	0	0
Cambodia	714.8	714.5	0	29.8
Congo	199.5	174.0	0	83.7
Libya	1,707.3	1,584.6	0	360.1
Madagascar	100.6	92.9	0	36.0
Mali	285.0	271.6	1.2	88.4
Morocco	2.2	2.0	0	0
Mozambique	808.6	722.6	0	363.0
PDRY	1,847.6	1,835.7	0.8	581.2
Nepal	2.0	2.0	0	0
Nigeria	26.7	21.8	0	0
Nicaragua	917.3	837.6	0	473.0
Cape Verde	7.2	7.2	0	0
Pakistan	173.8	169.0	0	0
Peru	541.1	541.1	0	50.5
Sao Tome and Principe	4.8	4.7	0	1.8
Seychelles	0.2	0.2	0	0
Senegal	1.6	1.6	0	0.1
Syria	6,742.6	6,514.6	1.7	992.7
Somalia	260.8	228.2	3.5	0
Sudan	3.8	3.2	0	0
Tanzania	310.3	269.6	0	88.6
Tunisia	17.7	17.7	0	0
Turkey	91.8	91.7	0	0
Uganda	36.4	35.5	3.0	0.8
Central African Republic	1.0	0.8	0	0
Chad	2.2	1.7	0	0
Sri Lanka	1.1	1.1	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	1.5	1.4	0	0.2
Ethiopia	2,860.5	2,849.7	51.7	854.9
Total:	42,039.7	40,587.9	61.9	7,812.5

The table is taken from the Leningrad USSR Journalists' Union Leningrad Branch newspaper CHAS PIK No. 1, February 1990.

From the IZVESTIYA Editorial Office: In its commentary CHAS PIK notes that full and objective information is entirely necessary in order to assess facts and trends.

It should be noted that debt is a normal phenomenon in world trade and, within sensible limits, is entirely permissible. The Soviet Union is also a debtor. And, although our foreign debt is approximately half as big—around R40 billion—it is burdensome enough for the economy, since we need to pay off a considerable proportion of our debts in hard currency or corresponding hard-currency goods.

Now for a few words on the meaning of the the above figures. First and foremost, we must disappoint those who, on seeing them, decided that here is our golden goose—let us call in our R85 billion and use it to solve our many problems.... We should not count seriously on these debts being repaid soon. In all likelihood, the total under the heading "written off" will increase.

In the opinion of a specialist on third-world economics—Ye. Arefyeva, a leading scientific staffer at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute—these figures unexpectedly illustrate the propaganda slogan about the "selflessness" of our state. Only it is hard to believe that it was planned that way. Judging by everything, this "selflessness" is the result of economic, ideological, military, and political shortcomings. For instance, unpaid-for military shipments make up part of [sidyat v] the debt of Syria, Cuba, Angola, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. On the other hand the debts of quite developed countries such as India, Egypt, and Algeria are hard to explain from the standpoint of their economic situation.

We also need to stress that help to underdeveloped countries, including selfless help, is necessary, but effective trade is the only possible kind of trade.

Republic Statistics Committees Release Reports

LD0303192190 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—The results of last year's economic development, published by republican statistics committees today, make clear that restructuring of the national economy, its social reorientation, and financial normalisation are among the leading trends.

Last year's economic and social development targets were not reached in many key fields in the Caucasian republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Baltic republic of Latvia, the Central Asian republics of Turkmenia and Tajikistan. Labor discipline declined in many industries and losses of work time increased, as did workpower fluctuation.

In a number of republics, including Azerbaijan, Moldavia and Latvia, the consumer goods production growth rate was greater than that of means of production. In Latvia, for instance, the volume of industrial products went up by 2.5 percent as against 1988, while the production of consumer goods increased by 4.6 percent.

In other republics, including Moldavia, the plan targets for profits were reached in the economy as a whole, thus, profits grew in the economy of Kirghizia as a whole, while every fourth industrial enterprise failed to fulfill financial plans, and six percent of enterprises ended the year with losses.

Housing construction plans were not fulfilled anywhere. In Armenia, for instance, only 46 percent of housing were commissioned. In Estonia, the figure is 15 percent less than in 1988.

Agricultural indices were also lower than in 1988. In Lithuania, for example, labor productivity on publicly owned farms went down by one percent. In Moldavia the volume of farm produce grew by four percent as against 1988. This can be accounted for by the fact that more than 60 percent of collective and state farms, as well as inter-farm enterprises benefited from leasing relations. In Latvia, two percent of farm land were transferred to nearly 3,000 newly formed individual farmsteads. The agroindustrial complexes in Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Armenia showed little stability last year. Armenia's agriculture suffered a setback following the 1988 earthquake and the blockade by Azerbaijan.

Bankers Conference Views Role of Budget Deficit

LD0203100890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 1 March carries a five-minute report by correspondent Igor Zorin on a "major all-union conference of Soviet bankers and financial experts" which concluded in Moscow "30 minutes ago." The conference dealt with the search for optimum ways of using credits and finances to influence and improve the efficiency of production.

Zorin said that he did not manage to participate in the sittings of six sections of the all-union conference. He selected one section, the first, and perhaps the most important. This section discussed the role of the budget in raising the efficiency of social production.

He asks Lidiya Petrovna Pavlova, head of a department of the All-Union Correspondence Course Institute of Finances and Economics, doctor of economic sciences, how the budget's role can be raised in improving the efficiency of social production. The role of the state budget needs to be concentrated and realized precisely in such a way that the efficiency of social production is raised. A number of industries which are vitally important for economic processes, including the complex of transport industries, the energy-bearing industries, the fuel and power engineering complex must be accorded priority financing, "despite the fact that in present-day conditions we are developing market relations."

Zorin asks: "How, in your view, should the functional role of the state budget change today, well, given the formation of the market, something we are striving for at any rate?"

Pavlova responds that "the functional role of the state budget should essentially be realized in the process of the market itself. A certain proportion of industries of the national economy will change over to market forms of ties—these are: the light industry, the supply of the population with food, etc. And here the role of the state budget remains as it was before: a sustaining, supplementing role.

"Loss-making enterprises are a second factor. It is my profound conviction that in the conditions of a market economy a certain subsidy financing should not be withdrawn from them, inasmuch as an immense proportion of the 15 percent of loss-making enterprises which exist in our country are essential for the functioning of the economic mechanism and for resolving the task of raising the efficiency of social production. On the other hand, to a very considerable extent, the enterprises cannot be blamed for the results of this unprofitability. It is the economic and price ties and proportions which have arisen, which are to blame. Financial experts must take into account what construction of new, similar enterprises will cost the state. Perhaps, this subsidy structure [dotatsionnost] should be maintained for the time being in the conditions of a market economy. That is to say, the role of the market is not declining here. But, of course, questions of job placement, of providing our enterprises with skilled manpower—this is an overall state task and the role of the budget here is not at all in decline. And one more very important problem is the future of joint enterprises. And here the state budget should be introduced more vigorously in the conditions of a market economy."

Zorin asks: "Lidiya Petrovna, how has it happened that our country has found itself with a budget deficit, for which we hold the first place in the world?"

Pavlova answers: "I would not call all budget deficit terrible. Yes, the figures are large."

Zorin: "One hundred and twenty billion."

Pavlova: "Yes, 120 billion. This is a figure, which, as is believed now, was endorsed by the Supreme Soviet, although, in reality, if we take last year's law on the state budget, the figure was a different one—192 billion. This is the first point.

"Second, one must distinguish between the concepts of budget deficit and of budget fulfillment in cash terms. If the state borrows money from the banking system and from the population in the course of the year and settles by the end of the year—the proportion of such funds which are returned by the end of the year is considerable in the total amount of the budget deficit—then, in the international classification, terminology, this is not regarded as a deficit: this is regarded as budget fulfillment in cash terms.

"Well then, these amounts need to be refined [ochistit]. On the whole, this refining process is already in progress. The state must use precisely the financing and credit mechanism, the mobilization of additional reserves. There is no manna that falls from heaven. Everything must be earned. There exists a good English proverb: Free cheese is found only in a mouse-trap. Everything else is achieved, on the whole, by the greatest effort and trouble, and this is the only way this issue can be resolved."

Moscow TV Shows Steel Being Exported as Scrap

LD0203112190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 1 March, in the "Vremya" newscast, carries a four-minute report from Quay No. 15 of the Kaliningrad Commercial Sea Port by correspondent G. Sablin.

Sablin highlights the fact that tank spares and armored vehicle axle-shafts made of alloyed steel, which is in short supply in the USSR, are being prepared for export as scrap metal to an unspecified FRG firm. About 2,500 tonnes of high-durability alloyed steel have been brought to the port to be loaded on ships. The so-called scrap metal includes new axle shafts for armored personnel carriers.

In a video interview, I.Ya. Shumskoy, director of the local office of the Soyuzvneshtrans association, says that the metal is being dispatched by the Toyeral joint-stock company. At first, it was said that the recipient of the metal would be a British firm, Razno End Co. Ltd. but after further inquiries it turned out that the final recipient will be an FRG firm. Shumskoy surprised the correspondent by saying that at the present time this arrangement is a normal legal business deal. He points out that Toyeral has a licence for the export of the material. Video close-ups shows documents with the names "Toyeral" and "Razno End Co. Ltd."

The correspondent rounds off his report by saying: "Indeed, a licence does exist for the sale of this steel, which consists of technical supplies for service units. The licence was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The Toyeral joint-stock company can well be called a younger brother of ANT, an organization involved recently in exporting goods in short supply. It was created in May last year by Instruction No. 837 of the USSR Council of Ministers. It was created—and I quote—for the purpose of seeking out additional sources for the abundant provision of the USSR domestic market with consumer goods. True, I would not rush in this affair to accuse the enterprising traders of insufficient patriotism. It would be far more apt to ascertain why this wonderful sentiment abandoned the representatives of the Main Armored Troops Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the time when the deal was struck." Video shows correspondent on quayside alongside tank tracks and vehicle axle shafts. Various ships are shown berthed in the port.

Following the reportage the presenter in the studio, Igor Zorin, goes on to say: "Our correspondent reports that the material connected with the suspicious Toyeral cargo has now been handed over to the Kaliningrad Oblast Procurator's Office."

Scientific

Cargo Vessel Progress M-3, Mir Dock Smoothly

LD0303025190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0156 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 March [TASS]—The docking of the cargo vessel Progress M-3 and the Mir manned space station was effected at 0405 Moscow time [0105 GMT] on 3 March 1990.

The mutual tracking, approach, berthing, and docking were carried out with the help of the automatic equipment on board. These processes were controlled [kontrolirovalis] by the flight control center and also by cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin.

The vessel Progress M-3 docked with the complex on the side where the module Kvant is. Fuel for the station's combined propulsion unit, food, water, equipment, apparatus, and mail have been delivered into orbit [to the space station].

According to telemetric information and crew reports, the manned complex's on-board systems are working normally.

Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin are feeling fine.

Moscow-Antartic Station Satellite Hookup Shown

OW0503064490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 1 March in its scheduled "120 Minutes" program carries a seven-minute report showing the television hookup between a studio in Moscow and the Mirnyy Polar Station in Antarctica. Introducing the report, the announcer says: "Yesterday, on 1 March, a television bridge was established for the first time between the Antarctic and Moscow. Here is what my colleague Leonid Kushnarenko has to say":

Video cuts to show another studio in which correspondent Kushnarenko is shown interviewing A.N. Chilingarov, deputy chairman of the USSR Goskomgidromet [USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology]. They are seated at a table on which lies a poster showing a map of the Antarctic under the title "International Expedition"; there are photos around the border showing the expedition participants. A title in the lower left corner reads "Trans-Antarctica 1990." Kushnarenko notes that seven months ago an international trans-Antarctic team left King George Island and "will arrive at the Mirnyy observatory tomorrow."

Chilingarov discusses the background of the expedition as a television monitor in the background shows a color bar test pattern with the words "En Direct de Mirnyy" visible over it. The test pattern is suddenly replaced by video showing an aerial view of snow-covered terrain. The studio interview is intercut with the video feed from Antarctica showing penguins, seals, and the facilities and people at Mirnyy Station.

Chilingarov notes that a 40-meter blizzard is now battering the station. He then talks to Igor Antonovich (Kovzhenevskiy), head of Mirnyy station, who is shown intermittently on the Antarctic feed. (Kovzhenevskiy) notes that the station is expecting the arrival of the international expedition on 2 March. He reports that the feed is also being relayed to Paris via the Intersputnik system and adds that "Mirnyy is the only station where Soviet television can be received and viewed. That is for now. In the future, I hope, of course, that all of our other Antarctic stations will have the same opportunity." He notes that they watch "all the television programs provided by the Orbita program."

Responding to a question from Chilingarov about the well-being of the latest air crews, (Kovzhenevskiy) reports that one crew had to make a forced landing on 19 February because of engine problems and were stranded for four days before a helicopter rescued them and that "all are alive and well." He also says that new buildings at Mirnyy station are already getting old and new equipment and instruments are needed. The feed concludes with the polar station chief wishing Soviet women a happy 8 March Women's Day.

Video cuts back to the studio where the announcer notes that poor weather in the interior of the Antarctic continent has held up the Soviet television group headed by well-known Soviet adventurer Yuriy Senkevich. He says: "Let us hope that the skiers and journalists will make contact on 3 March, and then we will report to you on the successful conclusion of the difficult journey that lasted more than 200 days."

'Zenit' Rocket Launchers To Be Used in Australia

907Q0052A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by S. Sadoshenko, special correspondent: "'Zenit' Will Fly From Australia"]

A preliminary agreement has been reached between USSR Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] and Australian businessmen concerning commercial launches of Earth satellites by Soviet "Zenit" booster rockets from a cosmodrome on the Cape York Peninsula.

"Zenit" was created at the Dnepropetrovsk Plant "Yuzhnoye" (Southern). It is a medium-class rocket with a launch weight of about 445 tons. Its height is 57 meters; maximum diameter of the rocket body is 3.9 meters.

These figures can say a great deal to specialists. By the way, the specialists already are familiar with the "Zenit." It went into operation in 1988 and in May of last year it was presented in Bonn at the Second European Conference on Aerospace Technology which discussed achievements in the area of creating space transportation systems. The Dnepropetrovsk booster was rated quite highly.

In the first place, with respect to the ecology, it is preferable to the Titan-34D (U.S.), the Ariane-4 (EEC), or the Long March 3 (China) which are being offered in the international market. In the second place, it is more accurate.

For these reasons, as well as its other advantages, the Soviet rocket could be a successful item in the international market for space transport systems. It should be added that the "Zenit" also has the capacity to orbit a piloted spacecraft. So the Australians, of course, haven't miscalculated here.

Military

Internal Troops Structure, Functions Described

PM0403145190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Lieutenant General B. Smyslov, first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, by unidentified IZVESTIYA correspondent; no place or date of interview specified: under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA: "A Special Category of Troops"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Boris Konstantinovich, events which have recently occurred in many of our country's regions have drawn the public's attention to the Internal Troops. Where are they now and what tasks are they performing?

[Smyslov] There are more than 25,000 Internal Troops servicemen on assignment at present. They are helping internal affairs organs, in close collaboration with Soviet Army units and Border Guard troops, to maintain public order and to protect the lives, honor, dignity, and constitutional rights of Soviet citizens on the territories of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the Azerbaijan SSR including Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], Tajikistan, and Abkhazia. All these units were brought in following a decision by the USSR minister of internal affairs resulting from requests by local soviet and party organs.

Generally speaking, the Internal Troops are structurally part of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their tasks are primarily to guard state installations, diverse vehicular freight, and corrective labor institutions, to guarantee the proper functioning of official organs, to escort criminals...

[Correspondent] It has often been said recently that the troops were late in arriving at "hot spots" and on occasion acted indecisively, took their time...

[Smyslov] I cannot fully agree with this. It is through no wish of their own that the troops are sent on assignment. Their use is governed by existing normative acts, even though they may not be altogether perfect. This explains a lot... At present we have everything we need to arrive wherever necessary and go into action within a matter of a few hours. Unfortunately, we have already accumulated practical experience. But let me repeat this: Decisions to use the troops are made by state organs. The law does not yet lay down regulations as to when and how this should be done. Let us hope that the USSR Supreme Soviet session will adopt a relevant document.

[Correspondent] Many people nowadays talk about the need to apply the professional principle to army manpower acquisition. Do you believe that the Internal Troops, which perform such specific tasks, should acquire their manpower on a professional basis?

[Smyslov] You know, there is a tangible trace of dilettantism in all this talk. The ideas of "professional troops" and "hired troops" are confused. We are professionals. Officers graduate from military schools, ensigns and sergeants from training units. All soldiers have undergone appropriate training. Servicemen are simply not allowed in active service until such time as they have gained the requisite mastery of Internal Troops' tactics, habits, and skills. It is a different matter that soldiers in, for example, the U.S. Army or National Guard who have identical or slightly better training are hired to serve and receive high earnings. I am in favor of professionalism and social protection for all servicemen, but on the basis of universal military service.

[Correspondent] Frequently, and especially at sundry unauthorized rallies, it is said that the Internal Troops are a totalitarian state's fist. What do you think about this?

[Smyslov] Indeed, many people perceive the Internal Troops as nothing more than a punitive state apparatus, forgetting that they ought to be guarantors of the observance of legality and protection of democracy in the rule-of-law state we are striving to create. Our society today has realized: There can be no perestroyka, no advance without discipline and order. The Internal Troops have proved that they are the real force guarding these principles. At the same time, however, it has become clear that their actions need well-defined legal regulations. If there is a law adopted by parliament and it is strictly applied, how could anyone talk about totalitarianism?

[Correspondent] Boris Konstantinovich, you have personally visited many of the regions where tense conflict situations have developed. Tell me, were you always mentally prepared to act in such complex situations?

[Smyslov] I cannot say that I was, at the very beginning, mentally prepared for the manifestations of acute enmity between representatives of different nationalities in our country; nor, as a matter of fact, were any of our servicemen. We never thought about this. Recently, however, the things I have seen keep me awake nights.

The inhuman cruelty which has emerged among a certain part of the population is especially alarming. I saw the victims of barbaric murders in Fergana and Sumgait, people turning into beasts in Abkhazia. Let alone the homes that had been destroyed and burned!.. I felt a lump in my throat when I met the first refugees 18 months ago. I had similar experiences when I was 12 years old, but that was wartime...

[Correspondent] While performing their tasks, your people often risk their health and at times even their lives...

[Smyslov] You are right. In just one month, events in the Transcaucasus have resulted in 54 Internal Troops servicemen suffering wounds and injuries of varying degrees, nine men have lost their lives, and four have disappeared without trace. The last four were three soldiers and Captain S. Osetrov at their head, who in fact saved an Armenian village from destruction 13 January. They took on an unequal fight.

[Correspondent] One last question. In your opinion, can military force be used to extinguish the numerous hotbeds of tension which develop every now and then in various regions?

[Smyslov] No, and no again. The presence of troops certainly stabilizes the situation, prevents mass crimes, and guarantees relative calm and order, but it does not eliminate the causes which led to such a development of events.

There is need for a constructive dialogue between the public, the informals, and the representatives of authority. On all these issues we need a clear-cut action program for soviet, party, and law enforcement organs at both central and local level. We need specific measures rather than bald, abstract appeals.

Accomodations for Returning Troops Poses Problems

LD0503010790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 4 March in its "Seven Days" program presented by Aleksandr Krutov carries a 3.5-minute video report by A. Tsirulnikov on the arrival in Gorkiy of the first Soviet troop echelon withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. The camera shows a night scene of T-72 tanks and a truck being unloaded from railcars. This was filmed on 3 March according to Tsirulnikov. V.N. Pankin, a battalion commander who is being intervewed as the equipment is being unloaded, says there are difficulties for the families of officers.

The camera then shows four troop carriers and a company of soldiers from a tank division lined up near concrete barrack blocks. Tsirulnikov says this troop formation was in the CSSR for almost 22 years, and is now returning to the Moscow Military District. A unit will be based at a military encampment in Gorkiy Oblast that has been standing empty. Interviewed outside the barracks, N.V. Kalinin, commander of the Moscow Military District, says there is room to accommodate the troops here so normal training can begin immediately. The issue of accommodation for the families of servicemen, officers, warrant officers, and long-service soldiers is a more complex one. Hostels had been made ready in the garrisons, he says, while local authorities have agreed to allocate housing in the form of student and other hostels, and some apartments. The other problem is finding places in the schools and kindergartens for the children.

Hundreds of military families are to arrive in Gorkiy Oblast alone, comments Tsirulnikov. They need material resources as well as care. Centralized assistance from the government is needed, he says. The camera shows the troop unit being welcomed by local civilians.

Baltic Republics

Heritage Society Leads in Estonian Elections

LD0503100290 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Excerpt] First of all, some of the latest figures with respect to the Estonian Congress elections. One has to say immediately that final results (?have not yet come in). As of today, 550,156 people participated in the Estonian Congress elections. Nine constituencies out of the 105 have not as yet, however, passed on their data to the elections central committee. But the placing of political forces at the Estonian Congress is clear: Candidate deputies were nominated by the Heritage Society [Estonian Society for Preservation of the National Heritage] have won most mandates, with the independents, People's Front, ERSP [Estonian National Independence Party] coming next, and the Communist Party has come fifth with its number of mandates. [passage omitted]

Estonian Party Organizations Halt Activities

LD0203142990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Meetings of the primary party organizations and of workers of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium and of the administration of affairs of the republic's Council of Ministers have been held. At the meetings it was noted that after the change to Articles 6 and 7 of the Basic Law of Estonia, where the Communist Party's leading role in society is anchored, the members of the primary party organizations, of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and of the administration of affairs of the republic's government are halting the organizational activity of primary party organizations.

Tallinn Militia Purged of Russian-Speaking Chiefs

LD0203133190 Moscow TASS in English 1310 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—Tallinn City Council has asked the Estonian interior minister to sack the city's chief crime buster, his deputy operations officer, and heads of the Investigating and Anti-corruption Departments, and to dismantle the Interior Ministry's Political Departments in the city, according to a Soviet newspaper.

The decision to purge Tallinn's militia came as a bombshell in the city, which is suffering from a crimewave, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA said today.

The city authorities decided to fire mostly Russian-speaking chiefs, L. Ciupsman, who heads Tallinn's Interior Ministry Department, told a meeting of the city militiamen.

He said T. Villig, deputy city mayor who is one of the people behind the decision, spoke to him about the "militia's political views" and then said: "We do not know where you will point your guns."

The Estonian Government decision to hand out a certain number of shotguns, without the right to hunt, for "self-defence" touched off a wave of puzzlement in the public, the paper said. The move was prompted by increasing criminal attacks on farmers living in the suburbs of Tallinn.

The news of the restoration of Estonia's Union of Defence vigilante movement was also alarming, the paper said.

The union is an heir to a militant organisation that was disbanded in Estonia in 1940. Its founders claim it aims to protect Estonians.

"I believe these are targeted and well-coordinated efforts to remove people who are inconvenient for the authorities. They will be replaced by those who will do what they are told," chief of the Criminal Department of the Morskoi district Interior Ministry branch S. Elashvilli said.

Estonian Deputies Discuss Status of Republic

90UN0957A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 p 1

[Declaration "On the Question of Estonian State Independence"]

[Text] Today, 2 February 1990, on the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty concluded between the Estonian Republic and Soviet Russia and ending the Estonian war of liberation, the Republic Assembly of ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies at all levels discussed the question of the status of the Estonian state at its meeting in the Tallinn City Hall.

The assembly recalled that:

Estonia was deprived in 1940 of its state independence, which lasted 20 years and was recognized by all countries. This took place on the basis of a deal—criminal in an international law sense—between Stalin, Hitler, Molotov, and Ribbentrop, over the course of a swindling, staged, state-legal maneuver relying on the power of the Red Army, through occupation of the state (17 June 1940) during the days when Paris was taken by Hitler's troops, taking advantage of the state of shock which had encompassed the entire democratic world.

The assembly reached the conclusion that:

Being an annexed state, Estonia has existed in the status of a province for half a century, a province which goes by the name of a Soviet socialist republic but which retains in the hearts of its people an inextinguishable aspiration to its own statehood. Over this period under the yoke of Stalinism and its legacy, our land and people, under conditions of a complete lack of legal protection, suffered innumerable casualties from terror and inordinate moral, cultural, political, ecological, and economic damage.

The assembly ascertained that:

On the basis of continuity regarding the Estonian Republic, democratic statehood remains to this day the indisputable political ideal of the people of Estonia. Our experience of the recent half century convinces us again and again that only independent statehood will serve as a guarantee of the existence and development of the Estonian people.

The assembly decided that:

It is our sacred duty as elected representatives of the people to fight to attain this ideal of the Estonian people. The basis of our struggle—before all the world—must be the all-controlling right of nations to self-determination, provisions of international law, and the unceasing validity of the Tartu Peace Treaty, especially in the eyes of the Soviet Union. For by virtue of the Tartu Peace Treaty, the Lenin government of Soviet Russia recognized the right of Estonia to state independence and forever renounced all demands with respect to the people, land, and property of Estonia.

The assembly confirms that:

Our struggle for the state independence of Estonia is exclusively peaceful in its nature. It will use only democratic means and take place in a spirit of cooperation with all ideological groupings whose activity does not contradict the principles of democracy and norms of international law. Proclaiming the ideal of Estonian statehood, we know of support for the concept of an independent Estonia on the part of hundreds of thousands of non-Estonians. The state whose restoration we are trying to achieve will respect human rights and the rights of ethnic groups on the basis of traditions of the Estonian Republic and principles of interethnic tolerance. Divergences of opinion and approaches taken by ethnic and ideological minorities must be protected in Estonia by law.

The assembly reminds the United Nations, the government of the Soviet Union, the governments of all states, and the world community that:

At the end of World War II, in accordance with the universally recognized principles of the Atlantic Charter, all states occupied during the war by the warring sides—all with the exception of three members of the former League of Nations, the three Baltic states, one of which being Estonia—were restored as independent states.

The assembly welcomes any measures of a democratic nature directed towards restoration of the Estonian Republic, and calls upon citizens to participate actively in elections of the Estonian Congress and elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet.

The assembly appeals to the United Nations, to participants in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to the governments of all states, and to the world community for their understanding and support of our legal demands, our clear right to return to ourselves that which was forcibly taken away—a lawful place among independent states, which we used to have and have continued to maintain in a moral and de-jure sense for some 70 years now. Never again must decisions and agreements among great powers determine the fate of minor peoples and states.

The assembly addresses a proposal to the USSR Supreme Soviet to begin negotiations with lawful representatives of the Estonian people on the restoration of the independence of the Estonian state.

The assembly proclaims that:

With the aim of restoring the independence of the Estonian Republic, and proceeding from the fact that the Tartu Peace Treaty continues to remain in effect, Estonia is beginning constructive negotiations, through its representatives, with all parties on whom de-facto restoration of the independent Estonian Republic depends.
Tallinn, 2 February 1990.

Latvians Protest Possible USSR Troop Stationing

LD0203173390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1620 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text of letter prepared by Latvian Supreme Soviet commission on stationing USSR Armed Forces personnel in Latvia; read in Russian by unidentified person at Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga—live]

[Text] Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich and Dmitriy Timofeyevich!

There is currently a large contingent of USSR Armed Forces personnel stationed in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]; this does not give practical opportunities for supplying them with the essential social infrastructure. Because of the Republic's limited resources, this is creating big complications in tackling social and consumer services for the population. As a result, dissatisfaction is growing both among the servicemen and their family menbers as well as among the civilian population. This is causing unnecessary exacerbation of relations between them. There is information that there is a plan to station some of the troops being withdrawan from the neighboring socialist countries on the territory of the Latvian SSR. This will still further aggravate the aforementioned negative features.

Considering what has been set out, the Supreme Soviet and Government of the Latvian SSR request that additional contingent of troops should not be brought into the republic, since, in conditions of tackling the issue of the sovereignty of the republic, this may considerably worsen the economic and political situation.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Issues Laws

LD0203205590 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 2 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Galina Kuchina ad Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga March 2 TASS—The Latvian parliament, the powers of which expired today, legislatively withdrew courts of law from under the influence of party organisations for the first time in the Soviet Union.

The debate on this issue culminated in adopting an addendum to the law on the judiciary in Latvia: "The post of a judge is incompatible with his affiliation to political parties or social and political organisations".

Today's session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet also charged the republic's government with continuing a programme to make the Latvian language a state tongue, instituted the Latvian Bank with broad powers and set up a commission on drafting measures to restore Latvia's economic and political independence.

The problems of the state language were discussed due to a flood of letters to the government whose authors complained about difficulties of the substantial Russian-speaking population in the republic to get textbooks, visual aids.

The letters also complained about a shortage of teachers, preventing quick studies of the Latvian language.

The law on banks adopted by the session defines the legal status of these organisations which may now open branches, subsidiaries and offices on the territory of Latvia and other republics as well as abroad.

The Latvian Bank is granted a monopoly right to issue bank notes and to regulate their quantity. It will represent Latvia's interests in relations with central banks of other states and may receive credits from foreign and international banks and float loans.

The commission on drafting measures to restore Latvia's economic and political independence will form working groups out of its composition. The working groups will be qualified to make proposals to appropriate legislative and executive bodies of the USSR for their joint consideration.

Stating the difficult situation on Latvia's consumer market, deputies charged the republican Council of Ministers with setting up regulations for import and export of goods across its borders from July 1.

Ethnic Tension in Latvian Society Examined

PM0103182190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with I.V. Lopatin, chairman of the Republic Council of the International Front of Latvian Working People, by N. Garifullina under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Hour of Choice"; date and place not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies adopted the Law on Constitutional Oversight after serious debate. Our conversation with I.V. Lopatin, chairman of the Republic Council of the International Front of Latvian Working People, began with the question of how this news has been received in the Baltic.

[Lopatin] We welcome the establishment of the Constitutional Oversight Committee because the nonindigenous population of the three Baltic republics has already fully savored all the "charms" of a series of republic laws conflicting with union laws. We have a situation here whereby laws which encroach on people's rights and run counter to international law are being rubber-stamped en masse.

Influenced by the People's Front, the republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers are adopting legislative acts one after another which embody the theory of giving priority to the indigenous nation. The Council of Ministers has put its signature to resolution No. 46, for example, under which people living in hostel accomodation do not have the right to join the housing waiting list. But who lives in hostels? "Outsiders" and "migrants," as a rule.

Or take the Law on the State Language, under which all official correspondence must be transferred to Latvian over the next three years. There are so many complexities involved here. For example, 90 percent of a collective are not Latvians but official correspondence is going to have to be conducted in Latvian regardless. But the most deplorable fact is that the republic does not even have the base for this at present: No one knows where the necessary funds are going to come from, and we are short of teachers.

[Garifullina] So the republic is not concerned about whether "Russian speakers" know Latvian or not?

[Lopatin] That is exactly how it is, although there are some 800,000 Russian speakers in the republic. Supporters of the state language keep saying: "The Russians are lazy and that is why they cannot learn the language." This really is nonsense. This is how we see it: As hundreds of thousands of people are required to learn the state language, the republic must offer the appropriate state program providing for a network of free language courses, the publication of textbooks, phrasebooks, and dictionaries, the training of qualified teachers, and so forth. Imagine, no one here is championing a program of Latvian language instruction with greater zeal than the International Front.

[Garifullina] But you have been opposed to the idea?

[Lopatin] Yes, that is true. We have been opposed to the idea of a state language in general, believing that respect for language cannot be instilled by a decree or pressure from above but that this respect must be cultivated while strictly observing the principle of voluntariness. But now that the State Language Law has been adopted, the International Front has become the most ardent, consistent agitator in its favor because we know what ignorance of the language threatens national minorities with in the future. The law has already claimed its first "victims," incidentally. In the city of Saldus, a pensioner expressed the wish to work as a dishwasher in a children's home, but she was refused on the grounds that she does not speak Latvian. It seems that it is terribly important to know the language to be able to wash dishes clean.

[Garifullina] Readers are increasingly telling us in their letters that the word "Soviet" is disappearing from the titles of newspapers and social organizations...

[Lopatin] Yes, since 1 January 1990 the republic Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee newspaper has been called LATVIYSKAYA MOLODEZH rather than SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH (I have given you the titles in translation). The words "Leninist" and "communist" have disappeared from many newspapers. Memorials are being pulled down in the Baltic. In Liyepaya on 22 June last year, the day the Great Patriotic War began, the city authorities removed a memorial to the city's defenders on the pretext of sending it for restoration, but no restoration is being carried out. In Kaunas' Sixth Fort, the tank which was the first to break through to the city during its liberation from the fascists in 1944 has been dismantled and consigned to the scrap heap: "It spoils the look of the city." A campaign has been launched to change street names. In Riga they have renamed part of Lenin Street, Gorkiy Street, Suvorov Street, and the Komsomol Embankment. In Yelgava they have renamed the street named for Hero of the Soviet Union Fedorov, who died during this city's liberation in 1944, and Loshadinaya Street has now been "Latvianized" into Zirgu Street. Names associated with cosmonauts, even Yuriy Gagarin, have been removed. I must say that, in general, the USSR or Russian reader is poorly informed about what is really happening in the Baltic area. I think that, for many, the frank exchange at the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee plenum and then the visit to Lithuania by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and other leaders were the first events to expose the gravity of the problems caused by nationalist groups' separatist aspirations.

Latvia has its own People's Front which aspires to the role of the main sociopolitical organization in the republic and, on its formation, proclaimed its leading role in perestroyka, although in actual fact it has long since broken ranks with the latter. It is primarily interested in ideas of national rebirth, and the International Front supports it in this, incidentally. But it has its own original interpretation of rebirth—the priority of one nation, the indigenous nation, over all others living in the republic—upholds this idea, and is pursuing it. Whereas the Latvian People's Front initially conducted its activity under the banner of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference, the masks have now been thrown off. The Second People's Front Congress proclaimed a policy of Latvian secession from the Soviet Union and the creation of an independent Latvian state outside the federation or, at best, a confederation. The same congress declared the priority of private ownership over all other forms of ownership, which, in our view, would inevitably lead to the restoration of a bourgeois republic, such as Latvia was before 1940. But if we consider that the political instability here has long been a secret to no one and has gone far enough, we cannot rule out the emergence of a dictatorship of individual or group power to rule the republic with "an iron hand" in the conditions of a transition to "an independent Latvia." Historical experience has taught us that total license and anarchy are only one step away from the establishment of a dictatorship of the "iron rod." I will be frank: The preconditions for this do exist here. Insofar as the Latvian People's Front has openly said that its main enemy is the Communist Party, as a communist of 33 years' standing I naturally cannot remain on the sidelines but am forced to oppose it together with my comrades in the movement.

[Garifullina] Are you not exaggerating the attitude of the Latvian People's Front toward the Communist Party?

[Lopatin] Let me give you an example. Addressing an unsanctioned rally by the Freedom Memorial in downtown Riga 23 August last year, one of its activists, Jansons, held forth as follows: "What is the difference between communists and fascists? The difference is that the fascist leaders have been hanged but the communists have not. They must be hanged, but the whole problem is that there is not enough soap to grease the ropes. But we will find soap for the communists."

Just imagine, people even applauded. Our television group recorded the rally and we have a film entitled "The False Fires of Perestroyka, or the Baltic Knot." One fragment of the film shows Jansons' speech at the rally. I think viewers' attention will also be arrested by an interview with one of the "Forest Brotherhood," who proudly relates how he fought against Soviet power.

In fact, a campaign has also been launched against the Soviet Army and military service. Deluded by propaganda, during the fall draft young men ostentatiously discarded their military service cards. This question was discussed recently at a session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet but, unfortunately, many people's deputies adopt an attitude of appeasement. Pressure from the People's Front is achieving its objectives. In principle, even the republic Supreme Soviet takes decisions dictated by the People's Front.

[Garifullina] And how do you assess the position of the Communists?

[Lopatin] The most burning issue of today is that of the unity of the Latvian Communist Party. It numbers about 180,000 people, with many of them really committed and hardened party members. But there are other currents, too. Some are tormented by the victory won by Lithuania, where a split occurred during its 20th Communist Party congress and an independent Lithuanian Communist Party was formed outside the CPSU. Analogous processes are taking place here too, you know.

In support of the People's Front's ideas, some members of the Latvian Communist Party are nurturing plans to create an independent Latvian Communist Party which would withdraw from the CPSU. I would like to stress that all the events taking place in the Baltic republics are developing according to practically the same model.

A meeting of CPSU members belonging to the creative unions and art and cultural institutes of Latvia was held in Riga just before the new year. The meeting adopted a resolution which demanded an end to the dictatorship of the Communist Party, the unification of progressive forces in consolidation with the Latvian People's Front, and a joint struggle for a sovereign Latvia. Allow me to cite something else from this resolution: "We are following attentively the radical changes in the communist movement in East Europe and the Baltic, and analyzing them. The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress must in our opinion be seen as a lesson at the school of nations' self-determination. And we put our signatures to the Lithuanian Communists' appeal to the CPSU Central Committee plenum." There follows a direct instruction: "Our representatives must no longer work in the elective organs of Riga Gorkom [city party committee]. We cannot allow the conservative forces which unite the Riga Gorkom apparatus to prevail."

The reason why the gorkom is their target is clear: The gorkom, just like Daugavpils and Rezekne Gorkoms, unites Communists who uphold the CPSU's unity. The stance of Communists belonging to the International Front was determined at the very beginning: The CPSU must be united, and Latvia must be a constituent part of a renewed federation. That is our platform for the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet.

[Garifullina] So it looks as though even the Latvian Communists' positions have diverged?

[Lopatin] Yes, that is true. The majority, working in industry, transportation, and communications, supports the CPSU platform. Those employed in the creative unions, in science, the mass media, and in the majority of rural raykom [rayon party committee] apparatuses are taking a different stance. According to our estimations, this is approximately one-sixth of the 180,000 Communists in the republic. That is how the disposition of forces looks in our republic today. It has been announced in the press that a group of Communists advocating an autonomous—outside the CPSU—Lithuanian Communist Party will hold its own conference 24 February. I would like to be proved wrong, but, judging by the situation, the Lithuanian version of the development of events is utterly possible.

The situation is also greatly complicated because the republic's mass media are reflecting the extreme viewpoint of one side and are subject to the strictest political censorship by the leadership of the People's Front. Latvian television and radio and the Latvian-language and even, partially, the Russian-language press are its mouthpiece, and they carry only what the Latvian People's Front believes to be necessary. Our 15-minute radio bulletin "Rakurs," which goes on the air once a week, is subjected to the shameless censorship of the leadership of the Latvian State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, which is in complete solidarity with the People's Front. Their scissors frequently snip through our tape recordings. Every "Rakurs" transmission is accompanied by the mocking comments of the radio's employees.

In the Baltic states there are 2.5 million Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, Germans, and people from practically all the union republics. Living here is becoming increasingly difficult. Many people in Latvia have already experienced psychological pressure, threats, and blackmail. The position of the Latvians themselves is the most complex. A person who sincerely, by conviction adopts the international, Soviet positions is at the prompting of the People's Front depicted as a "kangars'-'—an "enemy of the nation." The local mass media does not hesitate to report such cases.

[Garifullina] Who is in your movement—that is, the International Front—at present?

[Lopatin] Over 300,000 people are currently active in it, and these are people of all nationalities, including Latvians. Maybe there aren't that many of them, maybe 12 percent, but they are people who do not change their stance: They are Communists who do not seek a compromise with their own conscience. They love their republic sincerely and with devotion and are ready to do all they can for their people's happiness. Believe me, these are not mere words. Today you have to pay for your convictions, and the price is very high.

The situation is complex, people feel uncertain about the future, and in this connection labor productivity is falling sharply and ethnically motivated conflicts over everyday living conditions are flaring up on public transport and in the stores. The central press has already reported that Latvian state security organs have discovered arms caches. These are not isolated incidents.

At its mid-February session the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration on Latvian state independence and the restoration of pre-1940 symbols. The session also approved the highly tendentious conclusions of the commission that studied the circumstances of the 1939 treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany to the effect that Latvia was allegedly occupied by the Red Army as a result of the treaty. This decision provoked a storm of indignation among veterans of the party and the revolution, and those who participated in the Great Patriotic war. Speaking at the session, on behalf of the

International Front I laid at the deputies' door responsibility for the split which they had introduced in society by adopting this decision. We will never recognize the symbols of bourgeois Latvia because Latvian nationalists and SS men fought against the Red Army under its banners. That is why we organized, under the auspices of the International Front, demonstrations and a rally in defense of the honor and dignity of the Armed Forces, Soviet power, and socialism.

[Garifullina] How do you see the long term?

[Lopatin] I am convinced that the attempt to bring part of the population to their knees is doomed. We, the International Front, do not want the ambitious stance of People's Front activists to lead to a split. We would like to believe that common sense will prevail. What we need are dialogue between all the republic's sociopolitical forces and a compromise leading to consensus. Our opponents ought to renounce their postulate of priority: I am a Latvian and therefore I stand above other nations. That is the road to nowhere.

'Run-up' Elections Under Way in Lithuania

LD0403114790 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 4 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius March 4 TASS—Voters in 28 Lithuanian constituencies are taking part in run-up elections today to select local and republican assemblies.

I every constituency, voters will elect one of the two candidates who won most votes in the first round of elections on February 24.

About 72 per cent of voters showed up at the polling stations on February 24, electing 90 deputies to the 141-strong Lithuanian legislature. The Sajudis grassroots movement swept the board, winning 72 parliamentary seats, deputy chairman of the republican Electoral Commission Vaclovas Litvinas told TASS.

The Independent Lithuanian Communist Party has 27 representatives in the Supreme Soviet and the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the platform of the Soviet Communist Party) has 4 seats. Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and the Greens also have their representatives in the parliament.

Run-up elections in 45 constituencies were scheduled for the next two weeeks, but Sajudis leaders called for an early vote in order to hold the first parliamentary session before the extraordinary Congress of Soviet People's Deputies is held in Moscow.

Twenty-eight of the 45 constituencies hold run-up elections today, others set the date for March 7, 8 and 10.

Elections in six constituencies will have to be held anew, with the vote scheduled on April 7.

Partial Poll Results

AU0503104490 Paris AFP in English 1029 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 5 (AFP)—The Lithuanian nationalist Sajudis movement won 16 of 28 seats contested in the second round of elections to a republican parliament on Sunday, taking their total to 88 out of 141, Lithuanian electoral committee official Josef Bulavas told AFP on Monday.

The Sajudis movement favours independence for Lithuania from the Soviet Union. The Communist Party faithful to the Moscow line had four seats from the first round.

Mr. Bulavas, who was contacted in Vilnius by telephone, said that the Sajudis, which supports all candidates seeking independence, now held 88 seats out of 141 seats in parliament. The Christian Democratic Party, which participated in elections for the first time, won one seat in the second round, he said.

The Lithuanian Communist party, which also seeks independence for Lithuania, had nine members of parliament. Some of them, including Prime Minister Kasimira Prunskenie, were supported by the Sajudis. The independent Communist Party, which won 27 seats in the first round, now had 36 seats. The Communist Party linked to Moscow, which won four seats in the first round, did not win any seats on Sunday.

In two constituencies, where voters did not go to ballot stations, it will be necessary to organise another ballot, Mr. Bulavas said. The results mean that the forces favouring independence can form a quorum of two thirds of the members, and can hold a meeting of parliament on Sunday before an extraordinary session of the Congress of Deputies in Moscow.

The congress is expected to approve the creation of a Soviet president with wide-ranging powers and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet could use the occasion to proclaim the independence of Lithuania.

Lithuanian electors are due to vote in a further 17 constituencies by March 10, and for a further six seats, while new elections are due to be organised around April 10, the Soviet TASS news agency has reported.

Lithuanian Communist Party Plenum Opens

LD0303055690 Moscow TASS in English 0938 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius March 3 TASS—The plenary meeting of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the platform of the Soviet Communist Party) opened here today.

The plenum will discuss the results of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee plenum of February 1990 and the implementation of its decisions, as well as the draft platform for the 28th Party Congress. The plenum will also consider organisational matters—setting up of commissions of the Lithuanian Communist Party Provisional Central Committee on the CPSU platform.

Seeks To Regain 'Lost Influence'

LD0303202890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1834 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Mar (TASS)—The party's future and ways to radically restructure the organization in order to regain its lost influence were high on the agenda of today's plenary meeting of the Lithuanian pro-Union Communist Party provisional Central Committee.

In his report on the results of the February 1990 plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the tasks of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Miklos Burokiavicius, secretary of the provisional Central Committee stressed that the party and the entire republic were passing through a crucial period.

The results of the recent elections are placing social progress, democracy, and the standard of living of working people in question. The position is also being exacerbated by the split in the communist movement, one wing of which—the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania—has adopted a program which openly declares the need for the republic to leave the USSR. All this is making the process of perestroyka and democratization of the party extremely complicated, although it cannot halt this process.

One of the key tasks for the republic party organization to accomplish, Burokiavicius stressed, is to preserve and, in some places, restore its former structure. He noted that party conferences have already been held in the pro-union organizations in the cities of Klaipeda, Siauliai, Alytus, and more than ten rural and urban districts of the republic. It is planned to hold conferences in the towns of Vilnius and Panevezis in the near future. It is necessary, he said, to hold the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania as soon as possible.

The restructuring of the party depends in many respects on a correct evaluation of its past. We acknowledge, the report says, that the party has committed errors which must now be corrected.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform should create its own commission to evaluate this period objectively.

Speakers in the discussion said that social, political, and legal protection of the working people was the high-priority direction of the party activity. It is necessary to make use of all possible means to counteract attempts at fanning interethnic strife and attacks upon pro-union party members.

At the same time, many speakers stressed the need to seek cooperation with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and all social and political organizations and movements that adhere to the socialist choice.

The participants in the plenum were familiarized with the proposals of the Central Committee Bureau on the formation of its new structure that would organically unite the electoral aktiv and the apparatus staff.

A decision was adopted at the plenum which noted that the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee on the whole determined the main political reference points for the democratic renewal of the party and of society and that it contained a scientific concept for the country's movement toward humane and democratic socialism. At the same time, the draft should be shaped into a concrete program of CPSU activity for the period of perestroyka even before the congress.

The plenum decided to convene the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania on 21 April in Vilnius and that elections of delegates to the congress should be conducted as a rule by direct and secret ballot on a multicandidate basis. [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 3 March adds: "Taking part in the plenum was Suslin, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Organizational, Party, and Cadres Work, and other responsible workers of the CPSU Central Committee."]

Burokevicius Elected 1st Secretary

LD0403090890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The plenum examined an organizational question: Comrade Burokevicius was elected first secretary of the interim Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Party Official Interviewed

LD0303234290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Lithuanian provisional Communist Party Central Committee—on the platform of the CPSU—took place in Vilnius today.

The participants discussed the Communist Party's tasks in implementing the decisions of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and issues relating to preparations for the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania and the 28th Congress of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Begin recording] [Prof K.Z. Surblis, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, identified by caption] The decisions of the February plenum are of fundamentally important significance for the communists of Lithuania, for democratization of all sides of the life of the party organization, and for enhancing its authority and prestige among the working people. Independent party organizations are already operating everywhere and rayon and town party committees have in most cases already been set up and are getting their work under way. A count of communists is in progress: There are about 40,000 communists in the republic on the platform of the CPSU at present.

[Correspondent A. Paulyus, identified by caption] Out of 23,000...

[Surblis] Yes, of course. Many have evidently not yet determined their position, and I think it is precisely the decisions of the February plenum and the platform of the CPSU Central Committee that will help the communists of the republics to decide. We shall, I think, have the opportunity to talk about our aims and tasks, for these are currently being distorted. The Communist Party of Lithuania, on the platform of the CPSU, in fact advocates economic independence of the republic and its independence; but as we know, the difference is only, of course in how this is to be achieved. We consider that our republic may indeed achieve its goals of prosperity precisely in a renewed federation of the Soviet Union.

[Paulyus] The plenum set the date for the opening of the next congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania as 21 April this year. [end recording]

Lithuanian Communists End Law-Enforcement Ties

LD0203233190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Today's sitting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Lithuanian Communist Party decided to suspend the activity of party members in law-enforcement bodies. The resolution points out that in those bodies Lithuanian Communist Party units are to be disbanded by 1 April.

A draft of the Central Committee Secretariat's structure was also discussed at the sitting. The Secretariat is going to be smaller by half than previously. The sitting also discussed issues connected with the managing of the party's [word indistinct].

Lithuanian Commission Discusses Armed Forces

LD0503100190 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Excerpts] A state commission which is preparing proposals on the status of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces in Lithuania and on military and alternative labor service for the Republic's citizens has met in Vilnius. Deputy Liudvikas Sabutis has been elected chairman of the commission. [passage omitted]

One working group of the commission will prepare proposals on the status of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces, and the second group will prepare draft law on the alternative labor service and also amendments and supplements to the Constitution, the Criminal Code, and other laws.

Meanwhile, a general meeting of the lecturers and pupils has taken place at the Vilnius Polytechnic. It discussed problems concerning the compulsory service in the occupation army. One hundred and sixty-nine statements to the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were submitted. In them pupils at the polytechnic categorically refuse to carry out military service in the occupation army.

According to provisional figures, over 5,000 military documents have been returned in Lithuania. [passage omitted] It is reported that the actions of returning military documents will continue within the next few days in various parts of Lithuania. [passage omitted]

New Commission Chairman Elected

LD0303173190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] A state commission to work out proposals on the status of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces in Lithuania, on the military and alternative service of the republic's citizens has held a sitting in Vilnius. MP Liudvikas Sabutis, who is also secretary of the previous Supreme Soviet, was elected chairman of this commission.

One of the working groups will elaborate proposals on the status of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces. Another will be drafting a bill on alternative labor service as well as amendments to the Constitution, the criminal code and other laws.

Lithuanian Press Examines KGB Activities

LD0403151490 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Publications on the KGB are appearing quite frequently in the Lithuanian press. Still, we know so little about the activities of this organization. Thus each article on the KGB is practically a sensation here in Lithuania. A month ago the weekly GIMTASIS KRASTAS provided its readership with information revealed by a militia officer about secret observation activities carried out by the KGB on the militia. For this purpose alone the KGB has a specially equipped room in the building housing the Interior Affairs Ministry of Lithuania. The KGB did not deny the fact, so the militia officer was most probably speaking the truth.

In the most recent edition of GIMTASIS KRASTAS the talk on the issue of the KGB is continued. The third department for secret observation of the militia was set up in the years of the Andropov rule. The department keeps an eye on the activities of the militia, the jails, and the military commissariats. In 1988 department No. 4 was established in the Lithuanian KGB for the special purpose of spying on the Sajudis movement. The so-called fifth (?service) department of the KGB had been functioning in Lithuania for 10 years, which had a very special interest in the political moods of the Lithuanian people. Departments that have been recently set up in its place. [sentence as heard]

An interesting videotape was shown not long ago on the Lithuanian TV. Romualdas Ozalas, one of the leaders of the Sajudis movement, found a small old building in the very center of Vilnius belonging to a Leningrad firm. However, he did not manage to find out what kind of work is being performed in that building in its basement. The truth is that the premises of the building are full of spying equipment. It was namely from this building that a lot of important documents were flown to Moscow via Panevezys military airport.

Recently the Soviet TASS news agency has reported to the whole wide world that Soviet Army servicemen are being attacked in Lithuania. This provocation was worked out by the KGB as well, and true facts intermingled with a lot of lies were sent out to Moscow.

RSFSR

Parliamentary Elections in RSFSR Reported

Vlasov Vorotnikov, Yeltsin Elected

LD0503112990 Moscow TASS in English 1118 GMT 5 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—The names of the first winners of Sunday's parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation have been announced here. They include prime minister of the Russian Federation Akelsandr Vlasov (who ran against four rivals in the Yakut Autonomous Republic), president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation Vitaliy Vorotnikov (who ran against one rival in the Adygei Autonomous Region), member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin (who ran against 11 rivals in Sverdlovsk) and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuriy Manayenkov (who ran against two rivals in Lipetsk region), TASS was told at the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

According to the commission, the elections were sufficiently active. More than 80 percent of the voters came to the polls in Yakutiya and Sakhalin region by 1800 hours local time. Judging by reports from regional commissions, there is not a single region in the country where the turn out was below 50 percent.

The 100-million strong population of Russia was to elect 1,068 people's deputies on Sunday. The elections were contested by 7,000 candidates.

Yeltsin 'Scores 72 Percent'

LD0503120990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1050 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow [ADN-Korr]—In the elections to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies over the weekend the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Viktor Vorotnikov, gained 71.3 percent of the votes in his constituency in the Adygey Autonomous Area of Krasnodar, according to provisional results. ADN was told this this morning by the RSFSR Central Electoral Commission. The radical reformer and former Moscow party boss Boris Yeltsin scored around 72 percent of the votes cast in his constituency in Sverdlovsk. The former Soviet Interior Minister and current Russian premier, Aleksandr Vlasov, polled 57.6 percent of the votes in the Yakut Autonomous Socialist Republic. [passage omitted]

Further on Elections

LD0403201990 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 4 TASSs—By TASS correspondent:

People went to the polls in all electoral districts of the three largest union republics of the USSR—Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia—to elect deputies to the republican and local soviets (councils).

The polling was notable for a high turnout of voters.

By 1600 more than a half of the electorate cast their votes in Moscow and practially all other regions, and in some regions over 70 and even 80 percent of the electorate went to the polls, a spokesman for Russia's Central Electoral Commission told TASS late in the evening.

A keen competition was the peculiarity of these elections which were held for the first time under the provisions of a new legislation which envisages an alternative choice and a real contest of candidates.

More than 7,000 candidates had been nominated in Russia for 1,068 seats.

In some electoral districts of the Russian Federation, there were up to 20 candidates per seat. In the Ukraine, about 3,000 candidates contested 450 seats in parliament, and in Belorussia there were five candidates per seat on average.

It is now too early to judge the outcome of the polling. However, there is every indication that a new round of elections is likely to be held in a number of districts because none of candidates polled the necessary amount of votes to emerge victorious.

Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev took part in the polling for the elections of deputies in the Russian Federation.

After casting his vote at a polling station in Moscow's Oktyabrskiy district, he told Soviet and foreign journalists that these elections to the republican and local councils would become "a fundamentally important landmark in the development of perestroyka".

It is important that people who are committed to perestroyka are intent to help the process forward by widely represented in newly-elected power bodies, Gorbachev emphasised.

"I believe that we are on the right road," he said.

Gorbachev, Ryzhkov Shown Voting

LD0403202990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Mar 90

[From the "Seven Days" newscast; presented by Aleksandr Krutov]

[Text] [Krutov] Today, in three of the largest union republics, in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Belorussia, elections took place to the republican and local soviets of people's deputies. The Russian Federation. Over 6,700 candidates are standing in the parliament of Russia for 1,608 deputy's mandates. [video shows people at polling station]

Our correspondents visited the polling stations where Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzkov voted with their families. [Video shows Gorbachev, Raisa and granddaughter, daughter and another man, and others going into polling station and accepting voting papers inside it; Gorbachev shown voting; granddaughter puts in Raisa's vote; then Ryzhkov is shown accepting ballot papers and there is a small boy and woman with him. Ryzhkov and the woman are shown placing voting papers in ballot box]

The Ukraine; 3,091 candidates are standing for 450 places in the Republic's Supreme Soviet. [video shows electorate at polls Belorussia: 1,473 people have registered in 310 constituencies of the republic. Fifty mandates have been given up to public organizations here. [video shows electorate at polls]

Justice Minister on Elections

LD0403183290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Excerpts] And now it seems we have got through to Vladimir Aleksandrovich Abolentsev, member of the Central Electoral Commission for the elections of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies and Russian Federation justice minister. [passage omitted]

[Abolentsev] Figures received from localities show that the vast majority of the electorate has already voted. Well, if we look at the figures for individual krays, oblasts and towns they are: At 1600 Moscow Time [1300 GMT] 54.5 percent of the electorate had taken part in the voting; in Moscow Oblast 66.5 percent of the electorate. In more distant places: in Sakhalinsk Oblast at 2000 local time 75 percent had voted; in the Maritime kray 74 percent; in Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 83.4 percent of the electorate. So the figures—in other regions they are similar—show the high turnout of the electorate. [passage omitted]

[Presenter] When will we be told the results of the elections?

[Abolentsev] In 10 days. A report on the results of the elections throughout the republic as a whole and a list of people's deputies elected will be published by the Central Electoral Commission in the press no later than within 10 days after the holding of the general election, indicating surname, first name, patronymic, profession, party membership, place of work and residence of each deputy, and the constituency from which he has been elected. But constituency electoral commissions will publish such figures seven days after the elections.

High Turnout in Local, Republican Elections

LD0403130690 Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 4 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksyonov]

[Text] Moscow March 4 TASS—There is a high turnout of voters in today's polling during the election of deputies to the republican and local soviets (councils).

At noon local time, 61 percent of the electorate cast their votes in Sakhalin Region (Far East), 54.8 percent in Amur Region, 59.5 percent in the Yakut Autonomous Republic (eastern Siberia), 48 percent in Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories in the Soviet Far East, a spokesman in the Central Electoral Commission told TASS.

More than 100 million voters of the Rusian Federation, the largest union republic of the USSR, are expected to decide today who will get 1,068 seats in a new supreme state power body of the republic—a Congress of People's Deputies of Russia—and in local councils at all levels.

The elections are being held in Russia for the first time under the provisions of a new legislation which envisages an alternative choice and a real contest of candidates. More than 7,000 candidates were nominated for election.

Everything possible has been done to ensure openness both during preparations for elections and during the polling itself.

"The law gives the right to candidates' campaign officials, representatives of work collectives and public organisations to be present during polling and during the counting of ballot papers. We believe that the greater the openness in elections, the better to our democracy," Nina Kurzanova, member of the Central Electoral Commission, told TASS.

Voters Have 'Much Food for Thought'

LD0303093390 Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT 3 Mar 90

[By TASS commentator Lev Akseonov]

[Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—More than 100 million citizens of the Russian Federation, the largest of the 15 constituent Soviet republics, will go the polls to elect 1,068 people's deputies to its parliament and also to elect the republic's local government bodies.

Sunday's elections will undoubtedly become an important event in the republic's life. Those will be the first elections conducted under the new electoral law, the adoption of which was spurred by perestroyka.

These are truly free elections. Seven people on an average contest one mandate of a people's deputy of the Russian Parliament. Three hundred electoral districts have ten candidates running for one seat. In some constituencies voters will have to choose among 20 contestants.

Although there is one party in the USSR—the Soviet Communist Party—contestants represent a multitude of politicised associations. The majority of them put the rebirth of Russia in the centre of their election programme.

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the largest in territory and population and most advanced economically, suffered more than any other Soviet republic from deformations. Contestants promise that, once they are elected, they will do away with what they describe as the infringement of Russia's sovereignty.

They point out, in part, that the RSFSR is the sole republic that has no television of its own and a developed network of publications. Figures are cited, demonstrating that Russia conducts an unequitable change with other Soviet republics, losing billions of roubles. Demands were put forward to set up Russian trade unions, its own academy of sciences and a youth organisation.

The recipes to push Russia out of its present situation, proposed by candidates for the Russian legislature, are wide-ranging. Some call for orientating at Western models of social development, others look for guideposts in the traditions of the Russian community, and still others borrow theses from political practice of Russian pre-revolutionary parties. Briefly, a voter has much food for thought.

It is certain today that in many constituencies votes will fail to elect candidates during the first round of elections and under the law they will have to go to the polls once again in two weeks.

Preelection Situation Viewed

LD0203072190 Moscow TASS in English 0707 GMT 2 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksyonov]

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—Tens of millions of electors will go the polls on Sunday, March 4, to elect the Congress of the Russian Federation People's Deputies. Elections of people's deputies of local government bodies will also be held that day.

"The election campaign has illustrated the electorate's increased demands on candidates, their desire to see broad strata of the population represented in the republican supreme organ of power," Anatoliy Petrov, secretary of the central commission for elections of Russian Federation people's deputies, told TASS.

"The nomination campaign has been marked by pluralism of opinion and competitiveness," he said. "Citizens want their deputies to be ready to work to promote perestroyka, and be principled, honest and decent."

"As many as 8,254 candidates have been nominated for 1,068 seats, i.e. almost eight candidates for each seat," Petrov said. "The number of contenders reduced by over a thousand in the course of their registration as a result of a thorough study of all documents of the nomination meetings."

"Candidates comprise representatives of 77 nationalities. Soviet Communist party members and candidates account for about 86 percent, women—7.6 percent. Industry, construction, transport and communication workers constitute 34.5 percent of the total number of candidates."

"In 33 constituencies there is only one candidate for one seat. In 64 constituencies—two candidates for one seat. But in 20 constituencies as many as over 20 candidates have been registered for one seat."

"The election campaign has brought to light a number of deficiencies in the law on elections and it should be perfected," Petrov said.

"Candidates will now have their last meetings with electors, who on Sunday they will choose their deputies," Petrov said. [sentence as received]

Committee Examines Election Preparations

LD2702173190 Moscow TASS in English 1535 GMT 27 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Polunin]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—The local election campaign in Moscow is in many ways unique, owing to the record numbers of candidates and pressure groups behind them and to the unprecedented intensity of their rivalry.

This was the general agreement of officials attending a meeting of the City Council's Executive Committee today, which examined preparations in the capital's 1,195 city and borough election constituencies for the March 4 poll.

According to the Moscow City Electoral Commission, a total of 3,282 contenders, almost half of them Communist Party members, are running for 498 seats available on the city council.

It was reported at the meeting that another 83 hopefuls complained to the commission over refusals to include them on the ballot.

Commenting on one such case involving the nominees of Sotsprof, an independent trade union organisation, representatives of the municipal authorities explained the refusal to include these people on the slate by the fact that Sotsprof has not yet been officially registered by the City Council.

The meeting also discussed the forthcoming transition of the municipal economy to the principles of self-administration and profit-and-loss accounting later this year.

The City Council's Executive Committee said it believes that the increased independence of local government and radical economic reform in Moscow's industry will help stabilise local economic development and overcome the municipal budget's deficit of 265.5 million roubles.

Briefing Held on Moscow Crime Figures

PM1302164390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Single Edition p 4

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka report: "After the Briefing: All the Work Still Lies Ahead"]

[Text] What is speculation and where are its roots? What measures were taken by Moscow's militia to step up the struggle against crime? What are the results of this activity? What difficulties are encountered today by staffers of the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] Main Internal Affairs Administration? Answers to these and other questions were given yesterday to representatives of the mass media at 38, Petrovka Street.

Summing up the results of work in 1989, Lieutenant General P. Bogdanov, USSR deputy minister of Internal Affairs and chief of the Moscow Gorispolkom Main Internal Affairs Administration, emphasized:

"Quite a steady trend toward a slowing in the rate of growth in crime has prevailed in the city from August to this day. This is perfectly unambiguous. Moreover, it applies to crimes against the person as well as to crimes against property.

"Until midsummer, the crime curve inexorably rose and reached 40.8 percent in June. Naturally, the prevailing situation worried everybody. The city's party and soviet organs and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs took resolute measures. Additional manpower, equipment, and material resources were allocated to combat crime.

The package of measures yielded certain positive results. But they arouse no feeling of complacency, let alone satisfaction, among Moscow militia staffers.

"No matter how much we would like an improvement, the operational situation remains complex. There has been a change in the qualitative features of crime: There is a more clearly expressed mercenary orientation, aggressiveness, daring, and cruelty by individuals when committing crimes. There are more frequent cases of criminals using weapons, technical means, and various psychotropic compounds."

The following figures were cited at the briefing: The number of crimes involving the use of weapons doubled last year compared with 1988; more than 800 firearms were confiscated over the year.

There are more frequent cases of armed resistance to arrest. Militia staffers have had to use weapons 10 times more frequently than during the previous period.

It is well known that the shadow economy provides a breeding ground for the commission of group crimes. In all, 178 suspected culprits have been arrested —this is one of the specific steps taken by staffers of the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Administration.

It was said at the briefing that the Moscow militia's strength has been boosted by more than 600 men.

'Thousands' Attend Saransk Rally

LD0303231490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Correspondent's report from Saransk]

[Text] Democratic processes have reached the land of Mordovia with great delay. Delegates to 19th Party Conference were chosen privately; the election of people's deputies passed, on the whole, traditionally—uncontestedly—but particular indignation was provoked by the results of nominating candidates to people's deputies for the forthcoming elections. Almost everywhere, party and local Soviet leades secured for themselves uncontested constituencies primarily in rural districts, where to the present time the administrative-edict traditions are particularly strong and the majority of the population are pensioners.

Judge for yourself. Out of 10 constituencies Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies' elections; four are uncontested. Out of 175 constituencies for the elections of people's deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic there was only one candidate registered in 130 of them. The republican mass media treated such results of the candidates' nomination and registration is a triumph of democracy.

The electors and candidates to people's deputies sought means for having a dialogue with the leadership, but did not find them. Then they demanded that an all-city meeting in support of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress be held in Saransk. Many thousands participated in an authorized rally in the city today. Those present expressed their distrust for the CPSU oblast party committee of Mordovia and the city party committee and demanded their resignation. It was proposed that in the course of one month, democratic, direct, and alternative contested elections of new oblast party committee and CPSU city party committee members be held.

Vlasov Discusses Visit to Yakutiya

LD1602144290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, has been to Yakutiya. On the eve of his return to Moscow, he gave an interview to our correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Vlasov] I have not been to this wonderful place for 18 years. The republic gave me a start in life, let us put it like that. Here I went through a good school as a party worker, and on the whole, I still maintain deep feelings of respect for the Yakut people. I must say that much has been done. Whole economic areas have appeared, like southern Yakutiya, and cities and new settlements have been created. The diamond industry has been further developed. Transportation has developed rapidly. There are serious changes in agriculture, as well.

There were many meetings with people, and I drew enormous satisfaction from my stay and from the meetings.

[Correspondent] I understand that very many sharp questions were put to you as the head of the Government of Russia. Which of them do you think require urgent solution?

[Vlasov] These are the questions of the social transformation of the countryside. Conditions of the extreme north—prolonged low temperatures—are special conditions, in which animal breeders and workers of the Soviet economy work. And one must say that the most backward sector is exactly the absence of comfortable homes, the absence of social, cultural, and household facilities, the lack of schools, hospitals, health centers, and trade enterprises. These questions were the subject of hot discussions everywhere. Today, the problem of providing inhabitants of rayons away from the rivers, as well as Vilyuysk rayon, with drinking water is an acute one. The result of this is illnesses and a high infant mortality rate. The second problem is that of providing people with heating. Energy and fuel are lacking, although a gas line runs nearby and cheap fuel is available. At present, we must use this wealth for the benefit of the people. A concrete program is needed for the implementation of the party policy on the social transformation of the countryside. [end recording]

Orel Deputies Urge Abolition of Party's Control

LD0502105790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Orel: On 2 February the Orel regional group of candidate deputies adopted an appeal to the Russian candidate deputies. This has provoked a consolidation of conservative forces. [passage omitted]

There is a danger that these forces, by exploiting the mechanism of democratic elections, will try to maintain their positions for the next 5 years. The Orel regional group of candidates proposed to support and disseminate the following as the main theses of their program:

1. In order that power can be really handed over to the soviets it is essential to abolish the law on the party's leading role.

2. We are for complete RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] self-government within the composition of the Soviet Union.

3. We are for diverse forms of ownership and for a free choice of them for the benefit of common interests.

4. We are for direct elections of the leaders of rayons, towns, oblasts, and republics.

5. We are for a referendum law and its effective application and for the adoption of laws on human rights and forms of ownership.

6. We are for a morally healthy society and for the priority financing of education, culture, health service, and ecology programs.

7. We are for real independence for enterprises and organizations.

Orel Authoritities Criticized for Oka Pollution

PM2102160790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by own correspondent V. Kulagin: "The Oka River Won't Be Cleaned Up by Issuing Reprimands"]

[Excerpts] Orel—Another accident has occurred at the Orel city sewage works. Around 7,000 cubic meters of effluent have been discharged into the Oka.

A little over 6 months has elapsed since A. Pushkar, a colleague from Tula, and I filed a meticulous report entitled "Secret Accident" (IZVESTIYA No. 197, 1989) about a major accident at the Orel city sewage works. [passage omitted]

And now the inevitable has happened—another accident. This time in the sewage works collector situated below the heat and power station dam. According to A. Shalimov, chief of the city "Vodokanal" production administration, the sump there was undermined and suffered subsidence along with its pipes. Untreated effluent seeped down and washed away the backfill. This time around 7,000 cubic meters of sewage got into the Oka.

And again we are forced to speak of the complete disregard by the local authorities and their municipal services of the awful lessons of last year's environmental catastrophe on the Oka. After all, even A. Mertsalov, chairman of the Orel City Soviet Executive Committee, was forced to admit at a gorkom [city party committee] bureau session that the latest accident was simply bound to happen, as the sewage collector, which was built around 10 years ago, was put into service with serious technical defects. And one altogether depressing feature of this affair is that the damaged section is situated in front of the window of the office of the "Oblvodokanal" chief himself.

But the most important thing to bear in mind here is that reprimands to the leaders of municipal services, fines, and redeployment of cadres are not going to help the headwaters of the Oka recover. Economic means of protecting the river from departmental high-handedness are what is needed.

According to the oblast nature conservation committee's figures, less than half the funds required to improve the environmental situation in the Orel region are allocated each year. But only a little over half of even these reduced funds is taken up, so that we are still apparently a good way away from any fundamental measures to protect the Oka.

Leningrad's Gidaspov Interviewed

PM0203132990 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 90 p 11

[Report on undated interview with Leningrad CPSU Oblast and City Committees First Secretary Boris Gidaspov by Anders Steinvall: "Party Boss Who Doesn't Want To Run in Poll"]

[Text] Leningrad—A year after its catastrophic defeat in the parliamentary elections the Communist Party in the Soviet Union's second largest city is facing its next tough test. New defeats for the party's candidates in Sunday's local elections could completely transform the political scene in the city.

Leningrad's new party boss, Boris Gidaspov, 57, has chosen the certain rather than the uncertain—he is not running in the elections. This means that he does not run the risk of being humiliated in the same way as his predecessor and several other leading party men were in the election to the Soviet parliament in March last year.

Gidaspov was the only prominent party man from Leningrad who succeeded—but only by a narrow margin—in getting himself elected to the Congress of People's Deputies.

"For me it is quite enough to be a people's deputy. New people should approach new posts. They bring new life to the political process," Gidaspov said when—along with some other journalists—DAGENS NYHETER met him.

Gidaspov received us in the Smolnyy, the party headquarters from which Lenin once led the Russian revolution in 1917.

Gidaspov is not leading a revolution, but he has made great efforts to change the image of Leningrad's party leadership since he took office in July 1989.

"Maybe the party was too euphoric about its monopoly of power prior to the elections last year. We were not on the same level as the people," Gidaspov admitted.

The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies last year, the first democratic elections in the history of the Soviet Union, were nothing less than a catastrophe for the Leningrad party leadership.

The five most prominent party men who ran in the election were flatly rejected by the voters. Nowhere else was the party's defeat so clear as in Leningrad.

Gidaspov, who in November was also appointed the party chief of Leningrad City, has consistently tried to distance himself from the former party leadership. He seems to have realized that the old party bureaucracy has lost its credibility—what is needed now is a new image.

Putting a label on Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov is not easy, however:

—He is a conservative, but not in the same way as the many survivals of the past who are still to be found in the leadership of the Communist Party.

—He did not make his career in the party but was a scientist (a chemist) and head of an enterprise before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed him to the post of Leningrad party chief.

—He wants to give the impression of being modern and progressive, but on several occasions he has spoken out critically against the reforms Gorbachev wants to implement.

In interviews in the Soviet press Gidaspov has complained that the country has a great deal of "democracy and glasnost, but no order or organization."

The radical economic reforms advocated by Gorbachev's men have been called "fairy tales about people's capitalism" by Gidaspov. He is in favor of continued central management of vital sections of industry. He has also had a negative attitude toward private ownership, one of the most important reforms on which the Soviet parliament is working.

When the CPSU Central Committee met in plenary session early February to decide on future party policy Gidaspov made a critical speech.

He said, for example, that the platform—which says among other things that the Communist Party could envisage giving up its legally enshrined monopoly of power—does not "provide us with a rainbow of future prospects."

Asked whether he is for or against the removal of Article 6—which guarantees the Communist Party's "leading role"—from the Soviet Constitution Gidaspov gave a diplomatic answer.

"It is unimportant whether the party's role is declared in the Constitution. But I am against altering the Constitution article by article.

"I have to agree that the party's standing is not that high now. And it is falling. But that does not mean that we find ourselves in an ideological crisis," Gidaspov said, adding:

"Some of the economic decisions reached recently are behind this. I don't want to say that someone has made mistakes, but some of the new laws on which people are working are not good. We have no strategy for the transition from a planned economy to a market economy."

Leningrad, or, more correctly, St. Petersburg, was once Russia's capital and could once again find itself at the center of things now that the Russian republic is experiencing a political and national awakening.

Communists in Leningrad have been to the fore in advocating that Russia should have its own communist party—and that it should be formed in the old Russian capital. All Soviet republics with the exception of the Russian have their own party organizations.

Apace with the calls for independence from various small republics, growing numbers of voices have been raised proposing that Russia form its own party to defend the interests of greater Russia.

"I personally have changed my mind on this issue. In the past I thought it would be bad both for the country and the Communist Party if Russia were to have its own communist party," Gidaspov said.

"It was the Russian Communist Party which united the whole Soviet Union. After the events in Estonia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other republics, it seems as if Russia needs a party of its own."

Gidaspov is a member of the so-called Russian Bureau formed by the CPSU Central Committee in December last year. This Russian "party leadership" could be the first step toward a separate Russian party.

The formation of a Russian party would be the final confirmation that the party leadership has given up hope of preserving the Soviet Union in its present form.

CPSU Official Comments on Leningrad Referendum

LD1902114290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Today a referendum is ending in the Leningrad party organization. Almost 600,000 communists of the city and oblast are taking part in the referendum on the major issues that concern party members. Our correspondent is talking to Vyacheslav Georgiyevich Svetkov, deputy chief of the Department of Organizational, Party and Cadre Work of the CPSU oblast committee [obkom].

[Begin recording] [Svetkov] The main issue that causes concern and worry is the existence of the Leningrad Obkom and city committee [gorkom] in the party simultaneously. This has caused a number of misunderstandings. There has been a certain duplication, and much has been said about setting up a single committee. This is precisely the first point of the referendum.

The subsequent two issues are connected with the preparation of a conference. In the next few days a plenum of the Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom—a joint plenum—will set the date of the conference and order preparations for it. It is these two issues put to a referendum which will enable us to come to the conference with a set viewpoint on the order of nomination of delegates to the oblast conference and on the order of forming electoral bodies of the obkom organization.

Finally, the fourth issue is the expediency of setting up a republic-wide party organization in the Russian Federation.

[Unidentified correspondent] What do Communists say about this referendum? How is it going?

[Svetkov] Well, if we are talking about the idea of holding a referendum, then, on the whole, there is very positive support of this idea, and the communists are actively participating in the referendum. It is true that there are individual statements to the effect that a referendum is not envisaged by the CPSU rules in force at present, therefore it is unlawful to treat its results as a ballot. But, of course, on the other hand the referendum's basic aim was to find out the opinion of the majority of communists so that representatives of the organs of the oblast party organization can then adopt well-considered decisions supported by all communists on this or that issue, particularly on those four issues put to the referendum. [end recording]

Frolov Explains Plenum Decisions to Rayon Party

PM1502150790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting With Aktiv"]

[Text] The results of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, which adopted the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, were the center of attention 13 February at a meeting between I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and editor in chief of PRAVDA, and Moscow's Sverdlovskiy CPSU Rayon party committee party aktiv.

The plenum laid out guidelines for the party's activity at the modern phase, the CPSU Central Committee secretary stressed, and determined means of renewing it as a highly important condition for the radical transformation of the economy and positive changes in the social and spiritual spheres. The draft CPSU Central Committee platform, which shows the direction in which the party must move to be able to operate successfully in view of the new realities, takes a real step toward this.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary answered numerous questions from the meeting.

Karelian KGB Invites Journalists to Session

LD2602135790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] The regulation concerning the holding of collegiums behind closed doors has been changed for the first time by the Karelian KGB. Journalists from local newspapers and radio and television were invited to a regular expanded session. It concerned problems which cannot be solved without the control and participation of the public. The collegium made a detailed analysis of the KGB's work in rehabilitating citizens who were repressed without foundation in the thirties, forties, and beginning of the fifties. More than three fourths of the cases of innocent people who suffered in Karelia have been examined up to the present day.

Kostroma Obkom Expresses Confidence in Toropov

LD2502195490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Issues of the day and the outcome of a city-wide rally have been discussed at an extraordinary plenum of the Kostroma Oblast party committee [obkom]. Rejecting a demand from informal organizations, it expressed complete confidence in Toropov, first secretary of the CPSU obkom. At the same time, party sanctions imposed by the obkom bureau against some workers of the oblast executive committee and retail organizations were supported at the plenum. The Kostroma obkom plenum called on party organizations to step up their preparations for the elections and to eliminate the failings committed in the first stage of the elections fight.

Vladivostok Workers Want Boondogglers Punished

PM1402115190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent report: "Loud Reverberations from Cruises"]

[Text] Vladivostok, 10 Feb—The participants in a rally held today in Vladivostok demanded the convening of an extraordinary trade union conference and the resignation of the kray trade union council. It was staged on the initiative of a coordinating council of organizations representing many fishermen's, seamen's, and ship repair workers' labor collectives who are now refusing to put their trust in the kray trade union counciland are unwilling to transfer their membership dues to its account.

The kray's working people are angered by the actions of people who, while on cruises abroad, exchanged their civic honor and conscience for secondhand foreign cars (IZVESTIYA and other press organs have already written about the unseemly story of the cruises). In their speeches the rally participants demanded not only that they be severely punished, but also that the sources of the breaches of social justice be identified.

As L. Sevastyanova, secretary of the party city party committee, reported, a communists' action group is insisting on not only an early trade union conference but also a kray party conference in the Maritime Kray.

Babies Reportedly Sold on Black Market

90UN1002A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by G. Batsanova under the rubric "The Black Market": "In Line for Babies"]

[Text] In Moscow city court, they have just finished hearing a criminal case that is extremely unusual for our legal system—it was about the underground sale of children. G. Trunova, former head doctor at the Moscow orphanage No. 15, charged R6,000 for a two-year-old youngster who, according to the available medical documents, was suffering from a slight emotional illness.

It is appropriate to ask: In that case, what is the price of a healthy child? It is R10,000, according to people who have waited in line for years for the opportunity to adopt a strange child and experience in this fashion the satisfaction of family happiness. However, as official sources have shown, even this sum is not the upper limit....

Thus, the octopus of the shadow economy has again reached out and flexed its unerring tentacles. It would seem that there is nothing to be surprised at: The lower the sun, the longer the shadow. Nonetheless, the singularity of the situation consists of the fact that in this case the subject of the speculation is a product which society has already once rejected and torn away from itself like defective output, like scrap, like waste from production....

Society has rejected it once, twice, and continues to reject it. Society continues to build homes for the rejected: There are already 20 of them in Moscow alone, and they say it is still too little. More are needed if they are to handle everyone.

There is no denying the truth that everyone cannot be handled. The Moscow orphanage No. 6—a central quarantine and distribution point—is operating at full capacity. They bring the discarded children down here from all Moscow as though on a conveyer belt. Newborns in their delivery-room swaddling clothes, and those who, unfortunately, have already managed to learn the address of their home. They are official "refuseniks" (this is not in reference to dissidents!) with irreproachably obtained papers as well as anonymous foundlings discovered in the cellar of an evacuated house, on the platform of a train station or, let us say—such things have happened—in a rubbish heap....

In this home they do not just feed and warm such children. They think up birthdays, last names, first names, and patronymics for them. They try to make them pretty. They named the last child Arthur: In memory of the Roman legionnaires who conquered the wild Celts. "And why is his last name Chernyshev?" I ask. "Very simple," they answer, "the boy is dark-skinned" [chernyy]. With a very prominent African appearance, as it says in the report composed in the dormitory of the University of Friendship of the Peoples imeni P. Lumuba. "Do not abandon the child," begged the militia when the "children of various peoples" arrived to hand the youngster over at the reception center. And they answered as they were supposed to, as it goes in the song: We live a dream about peace. They said, at first the struggle, at first the revolution, at first socialism, and personal happiness afterwards. Anyway, they said, he is not an Arthur, he is Azikonda....

Time will pass and he, like the other unclaimed children, will be transferred to one of the 19 permanent orphanages where he will live and grasp the good and the eternal until he reaches three years old. At that time it is his fate to be transferred again: To the children's home.

It is enough, finishing our short excursion through all these quarantines, hospitals, and distribution centers, to come to the conclusion: The world has truly gone out of its mind. Here, in the office of the chief doctor, exactly like the one that recently belonged to G. Trunova, two lines of thinking, two irreconcilable principles meet: One is to hand over one's own child, and the other is to receive someone else's.

As it turns out, those learned, economic scholars are mistaken when they try to convince us from their high rostrums that every line is caused by a shortage. Impossible—quantity is not an issue for our Soviet line. With overcrowded orphanages, children's homes, and maternity hospitals from which 15-year-old mothers flee barefoot and in regulation gowns from fear of the disgrace, hundreds of childless Muscovites wait five years at a time for "their" orphan which they can call their son, their future, their successor. They wait, but they are unable to wait long enough.

What is this? Just one more paradox of our native slovenliness, bureaucratism, and indifference? Or is it really a crafty trap set by a ubiquitous mafia?

In the beginning it seemed that nothing could be simpler, that it was neither a paradox nor a trap, but rather an equation for beginners. In fact take two unknowns, x and y, where x equals the children awaiting adoption and y equals the parents who have the potential to adopt. Then subtract the lesser from the greater, and the result will give you the remainder or perhaps, on the contrary, the shortfall....

This is no great wisdom, but first it was necessary to put concrete figures in place of the unknowns....

I telephoned N.F. Novodvorskaya at the Directorate for Medical and Disease Prevention for Children and Mothers at the GUZM [Main Administration for Public Health of the Moscow City Soviet]. I asked Nina Fedorovna a specific question: How many children are available for adoption in Moscow today?

In official surroundings it is considered bad form to answer, "I do not know." Instead, they say, "We do not have such an indicator in our accounts." Or, "The information is being compiled." But Nina Fedorovna said specifically, "I do not know." She added, "Probably no one knows that."

Having thanked Nina Fedorovna for her candor, but not sharing her pessimism, I telephoned the department of family and marriage at the Moscow city soviet executive committee. They were very busy there working to complete a report. Nonetheless I tried to say convincingly into the receiver that if there are families then there must be children too, and if there are no children, then.... "Then there is also no data," they said and hung up the phone.

One might argue with that position, but one might also agree. For instance one might say that, in fact, the person has to exist before the paperwork, and not the reverse. As a result I telephoned people who, in the performance of their official duties, are expected to work not with the person, but solely and exclusively with the paperwork. I telephoned the directorate of medical statistics of the GUZM. The statisticians at the GUZM directed me to their bosses—the statisticians at the Moscow city directorate of statistics.

However this was only the beginning of a marathon and it is worth saying that, during the entire process, I received answers that were so much the same that it seemed they had been stamped at the same factory. Only at the Committee for Public Education of Moscow City did I nearly receive a pleasant surprise. There they cited "a need for access." As though I had not asked about the quantity of orphans but had asked instead about the number of tank or missile divisions ready to rush into battle. I realized that I had hit the bullseye. But I was wrong. It turned out that I had taken the answer too metaphorically, and that it was meant literally. No, I am sorry, we do not and cannot have secrets from the press, god forbid, it is just that the information is locked up in the office of the director, who has left, but she will return tomorrow and then.... And of course on the next morning the director appeared. And of course she could not talk about the numbers I was interested in....

The department of public education at the Leninskiy Rayon soviet executive committee was the end of my journey—at one of those subunits where, according to the assertion of an official from the Committee for Public Education, the queue for children is monitored accurately and strictly. I spent two hours with Irina Leonovna Vasilyeva studying the registry for visitors, but we were only able to discover the end of the so-called line. The beginning had been lost....

Of course, lines do not surprise us. We all stand in lines. We all live in one huge, endless line. We respect the line and value its order. Try to get an automobile, a television, or a miniature "Feya" washing machine without standing in line, or even an iron, which has also disappeared from the shelves....

As it turns out, there is no order in the line for children! As a result it can be circumvented—from the left and from the right and not on the sly but at full speed. Depending, or course, on who has what kind of incentive.... Incidentally, at that same Committee for Public Education they recalled how a man recently stopped in to see them from far away, from Armenia. He proposed a fairly equitable deal—a "Volga" model 31 in exchange for a child out of turn. They began to make inquiries, and the result was astonishing: Despite the cruel and destructive catastrophes that have befallen that peace-loving republic, and despite the enormous number of children who are without parents, there was not an orphan to be found....

The line for children is an invisible line. It does not drag cheaply-made goods out onto the sidewalk, and it does not block traffic. Nonetheless, of all the lines that exist today, for soap and sausage, for gold and oranges, this is the most frightening and the most nonsensical. Because any line exists for gain. Here there is no gain. There are only abandoned hopes.

Nonetheless, of all the lines that exist today the line for children is the purest and the most reassuring. Because it, as no other, demonstrates the wrongness of those who are convinced that the amount of humanity, love, and compassion for others is directly proportional to the quantity of sausage in society.

"We will bring order to this line," said Igor Vladimirovich Matyakin, head of the UBKhSS [Directorate for the Struggle Against the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] section of the GUVD [Main Administration of Internal Affairs] of the Moscow city soviet executive committee.

What should one say to that? When you can no longer rely on yourself, you can only trust in the UBKhSS.

Western Republics

Ukrainian Candidates for People's Deputies

90UN1001A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Tsikora, Kiev: "Candidates Have Been Named"]

[Text] It might be symbolic that the processing of data on contenders for the seats in the next term of parliament ended exactly by the time of the last session of the UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in its present composition.

The chairman of the republic Central Electoral Commission, V. Boyko, said: "As of now there are 3,091 people on the list of registered candidate UkSSR people's deputies. This means that seven people on the average are vying for each of the 450 seats in the Supreme Soviet of the republic."

The record of "competitive" struggle has been set by Kiev, where 33 candidates are competing for one parliamentary seat in one of the electoral districts.

The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission went on to say that according to their calculations, runoffs are possible in approximately one-half of the districts. This will cost the republic budget at least R4 to 5 million in additional expenses.

The working class has fielded the greatest number of candidates, 313. It is followed by the party apparatus with 298 candidates, more than 220 of whom are secretaries of large industrial associations, rayon, city, and oblast committees. However, it is important to note the following fact in this matter: The number of nonparty member candidates considerably exceeds the number of party apparatus functionaries; the ratio is 394 to 298.

V. Boyko continued: "Public organizations feel more confident in the course of the election campaign than ever before. They have nominated and ensured the registration of more than 600 candidates representing all strata of the population of our republic and its ethnic composition. There are close to 100 writers alone in the running. Of course, this credit of confidence is due to great changes in the public life of the Ukraine and the rejection of everything that is associated with the command-administrative system."

Preliminary Election Results From Ukraine

LD0503111890 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0330 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Reports are coming from Kharkov and other cities of the Ukraine on the first candidates who have polled enough votes to become deputies of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

In Kiev the situation is as follows. In many constituencies of Ukraine's capital none of the candidates has polled the sufficient number of votes. Therefore, repeat elections will be held in these constituencies on 18 March, with two candidates with the largest percentages of votes from yesterday's elections standing in each of them.

Donetsk Calm on Polling Day Despite Fears

LD0403224690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Mar 90

[From the "Seven Days" newscast; presented by Aleksandr Krutov]

[Text] [Krutov] The Ukraine: All last week there have been alarming reports coming from Donetsk. The negotiations which had been about to begin between the strike committee and the party obkom went into an impasse.

[Correspondent G. Kondaurov identified by screen caption] The election campaign in the Donbass was accompanied by turbulent events in sociopolitical life: Meetings which lasted for many hours in the towns, the calls for a political strike, the strike committee's confrontaton with the party obkom bureau. The voters, and not only they alone, feared that all this might hinder the normal voting process. And those public forces which were participating in those events acted very rationally in taking care to ensure that the day of 4 March was a day of calm reflection and free choice for the voters.

All enterprises are working today with a continuous production cycle, including the mines. Nowhere have attempts to disrupt the elections been recorded. There will now be 150 deputies instead of 500 in Donetsk City Soviet. Yet they will, of course have far more tasks, concerns, and responsibility. People expect the city soviet to finally put an end to that dirty old Yuzovka [former name of Donetsk] in the city center, which is totally unsuitable for human life; to set about practically resolving the most acute ecological problems; to concern itself with how better to provide the city's inhabitants with everything they need; to impose order in the trade sector, and to do everything so that people no longer complain about the city's transport. [video shows scenes of mass meetings earlier in the week; urban scenes with trams in operation; a rain beside a coal mine; a slum area; smoking factory chimneys; lines outside shops]

What else are the miners expecting from today's elections? What lessons have they drawn from the election campaign that has been full of many complex items? Armed with this question, we have arrived at a polling station situated at the Zasyadko mine:

[Begin A.N. Khomyachenko recording, a shift leader identified by screen caption] The workers' movement is today concerned that very few workers representatives at various levels have been proposed to the soviets. They are mainly representatives of the party apparatus, administrators at various levels, and the intelligentsia. If the soviets are elected by democratic means, then the time for mass-meeting democracy is, of course, running out, and the time of parliamentary democracy, in other words of truly democratic transformations, will arrive. [video shows interviewee in a polling station] [end recording]

Donetsk Strike Committee Calls for Resignations

LD0103221190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2052 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Television News Service" newscast]

[Text] A report from Donetsk: The local workers' strike committee has called for the holding of a one-day warning strike today. The miners are demanding the resignation of the party oblast committee and town committee. Now the miners are deciding by secret ballot whether there will be a strike or not. It has become known that at several collieries the miners' meetings have nevertheless decided to hold a strike tomorrow.

Most Miners Against Strike

LD0203202890 Moscow TASS in English 1920 GMT 2 Mar 90

[By TASS Correspondent Stanislav Gasan]

[Text] Donetsk March 2 TASS—Most miners in the Ukrainian city of Donetsk have not supported the strike recently demanded by the strike committee of Donetskugol amalgamation. It demands the immediate resignation of the Donetsk Regional Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

There are 22 coal mines in Donetsk. Only a few sections of Oktyabrskaya mine and of the Zasyadko mine have not been working.

The demand for the resignation of party leaders in this region of the Donetsk coal basin was advanced at a meeting on February 25. But collectives of many enterprises in Donetsk are against the strike. They believe that it will aggravate the difficult economic position of miners' collectives.

Nevertheless, cochairman of the strike committee N. Volynko told foreign journalists in Donetsk that a six-hour stoppage had been held everywhere in the city.

The representative of the strike committee asserted, specifically, that the Kalinin mine is not supplying coal to customers. But according to information from the coal supply directorate in Donetsk, the coal is being loaded for transportation.

Official Comments on Chernobyl Zone Guard Duties

PM0103090790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 7

[IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Mostovshchikov report under the "At the USSR MVD" rubric: Who Is To Guard the Zone"]

[Text] We received a report that internal troops had left the 30 km zone around the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES]. What necessitated this action and what are internal troops doing in the special zone?—those are questions that many of our readers are asking today.

IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Mostovshchikov asked Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal troops, for explanations.

[Shatalin] The regiment given the duties of guarding the area where there is particularly high radioactive contamination has not ceased its service, it has merely been redeployed to a testing ground at the internal troops' training center near Kiev. This maneuver was prompted by considerations of personnel safety. The point is that our soldiers have been forced to live and serve for a long time within the 30 km zone, where lengthy residence may affect health. Servicemen are now fulfilling their obligations using the duty-tour method like civilians who work at the AES and have access to the zone.

In response to the question of how long the internal troops will be performing this job, the commander noted that the use of internal troops to guard the zone is now illegal. In accordance with the recent USSR Council of Ministers resolution, the militia must henceforth do this. However, the militia itself is at present delaying the transfer of power.

Firearms Thefts Concern Ukrainian Officials

90UN0984A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 3

[Article "In the Procuracy and MVD of the Republic"]

[Text] Lately the cases of firearms and ammunition theft became more frequent in educational institutions, savings banks, shooting galleries and post offices in some of the oblasts of the republic. All in all there were over a hundred such cases last year. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Procuracy and the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] have analyzed the reason for these acts. What causes particular concern is the unsatisfactory provisions for the safekeeping of the small caliber guns and drill and pneumatic guns in secondary schools. In 1989 alone these schools lost to theft 48 of such guns and over 30,000 cartridges.

For instance, seven small caliber rifles and about 4000 cartridges were stolen on the night of 28 December 1989, from the Pogrebishchenskaya secondary school of the Vinnitsa Oblast. The guard was absent there and the guns were not locked up. In Kiev, a ninth grade student of secondary school No. 228, Yu.P. Volotovskiy, stole a small caliber rifle after a class in military training and later killed a teacher. He has been sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Cases of irresponsible storing of firearms were uncovered in some of the schools of the Dnepropetrovsk, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Nikolayev, Chernigov, Chernovtsy, Khmelnitskiy, and Kharkov oblasts and in the city of Kiev.

Criminal negligence in storing firearms is evident in some other places. Sometimes it leads to tragic results. For instance, a certain V.V. Yudayev stole a revolver and a flare-gun from the safe in the Kharkov branch of the All-Union Administration for the Preparation of Circus Programs. With these guns he committed two murders. The oblast court sentenced him to capital punishment—to be shot.

There are also frequent violations of the established order of purchasing, storing, and using hunting rifles by the people. In many places the guns are within easy reach of people other than the owners, including children, which often ends in a tragedy. Last year such negligence resulted in 190 accidents, in 168 of them the people died. Out of that number 17 were children.

Especially dangerous are the increased occasions when teenagers make their own arms and explosive devices. In Krivoy Rog, for instance, every second group act of teenage hooliganism last year was committed with such arms. Thirty seven people became victims of it.

The law enforcing organs of the republic are taking measures to install the correct order of storing firearms and to prevent illegal possession of guns. Over 3,000 guns and about 30,000 cartridges were confiscated due to violations of this order. Administrative measures will be applied to 3,295 people.

The Procuracy and the MVD of the republic instructed their subordinate bodies to provide control over the enforcement of the law which aims to ensure the safekeeping of firearms and ammunition. Strict legal measures will be applied to the citizens and officials guilty of violating these regulations.

Archbishops Synod Holds Moscow News Conference

90UN0976A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 4

[P. Lukyanchenko report on news conference by the Russian Orthodox Church Archbishop's Synod in Moscow; date not given: "Difficult Problems of the Church"]

[Text] A press conference on the results of the Archbishops' Synod which ended on 31 January was held in Moscow in the official residence of the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs) in St. Daniel's monastery.

The press conference was opened by the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill. He reported that in recent months among the Orthodox clergy serving in the western oblasts of the Ukraine, there had developed a movement in favor of the so-called Ukrainian Autocephalic Church. Unfortunately, Archbishop Kirill said, these legitimate aspirations of the western Ukrainian church were voiced illegally from the canonical viewpoint: The "Ukrainian Autocephalic Apostolic Orthodox Church of the Greco-Ukrainian Rite" was proclaimed unilaterally. Bishop Ioann (Bodnarchuk) proclaimed himself to be the "supreme hierarch." As it says in the Determination of the Archbishops' Synod, Bishop Ioann who was called to the meeting of the Holy Synod, refused to come and announced that he had withdrawn forever from the jurisdiction of the RPTs. Noting Archbishop Ioann's lack of repentance, the Holy Synod stripped him of his holy orders and his monasticism.

Archbishop Kirill went on to report cases of Eastern Rite Catholics driving Orthodox believers out of the temples with the threat and application of physical force and by that time they had disturbed the normal course of life of the Orthodox parishes in the Western Ukraine. In keeping with an agreement with the Vatican, during the period 12-17 January 1990 in Moscow there was a meeting of representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the RPTs in which they jointly drew up "Recommendations for Normalizing Relations Between Orthodox and Catholics of the Eastern Rite in the Western Ukraine."

Archbishop Kirill said in conclusion that the Archbishop's Synod had granted independence to the Ukrainian and Belorussian exarchates of the RPTs and had given them new names: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Belorussian Orthodox Church.

Then questions were answered.

BBC: How many temples have been taken over by the Uniates. Were there any victims during this takeover?

IRINEY, archbishop of Lvov and Drogobych: As of today in our eparchy, 200 of the 1289 parishes have been taken over by Eastern Rite Catholics. Clergyman Vasiliy Bochalo died of a heart attack immediately after the negotiations with the Uniates who had seized his temple.

LAZAR, archbishop of Ternopol and Kremenets: About 30 temples have been taken over in my eparchy.

MAKARIY, archbishop of Ivano-Frankov and Kolomyya: As of today 140 of the 620 temples in the eparchy have gone over to the Greek Catholics. I wish to note that nonchurch people are helping the Uniates to take over temples—representatives of the Rukh [Ukranian People's Movement for Perestroyka] movement.

FILARET, metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia: In the western Ukraine there are many unused temples which could be turned over to Greek Catholics. In cases where there are two churches in one population point, one of them could be turned over to the Uniates. The issues can be resolved peacefully through a joint commission with the participation of representatives of the Holy See, the Moscow Patriarchate, and also Orthodox and Catholics from the western Ukraine.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: How many parishes in the western Ukraine before 1946, that is, up until the time of the "self-disbanding" of the Uniate Church, belonged to the Greek Catholics?

KIRILL, archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad: Almost all of them. We shall not talk now about how this church was eliminated. But the reality is that since that time two generations of believers baptized in Orthodox temples have grown up.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: According to the information coming from the western Ukraine, the Orthodox temples were defended only by their senior priests, and the parishioners did nothing.

KIRILL, archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad: That is not quite true. On 31 January we received a telegram which reads as follows: "During the night of 30-31 January of this year in the city of Sambor under threats from the Uniates, the authorities turned the Orthodox temple over to them. On 31 January at about 1900, the temple was surrounded by about 2,000 Orthodox believers and an ultimatum was given: If the Uniates do not release our temple the Orthodox will take it by force." On 1 February at 1300, another report was received from Sambor to the effect that the Orthodox had forced the Uniates out of the temple.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: Why was the agreement with Rome about the regulation of the Uniate conflict so late? Why was it not concluded, say, a half year ago when the confrontation in the western Ukraine had not yet become so fierce?

FILARET, metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia: We do not think that it was too late. At the beginning of 1989 when the first signs of a confrontation appeared, a delegation from the RPTs was immediately sent to Rome with a letter from the Most Holy Patriarch Pimen to Pope John Paul II. Then the pope sent a letter of response. In November 1989 this question was discussed at a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev and John Paul II. The most holy patriarch and the pope of Rome exchanged messages again.

Belorussian Komsomol Discusses Growing Tension

PM0203170190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Statement by Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] Minsk—The statement by the Belorussian Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Bureau has produced a widespread public response in the republic.

Despite its outward stability, the statement says, there is growing internal tension in the republic. Official structures are unwilling and unable to enter into a dialogue with the people or social organizations and movements. This was seen particularly during the election campaign. The incomplete nature of the election law, the inflexibility of electoral commissions, and the pressure on "unsuitable" candidates are all giving rise among the republic's population to new emotional outbursts, rallies, and lack of confidence in the leadership's willingness to change anything for the better.

The Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee Bureau believes it necessary to take urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the republic. In this regard it states that only a consolidation of all the republic's healthy forces can guarantee the irreversibility of perestroyka. It would be expedient for official structures to enter into a dialogue with representatives of all democratic movements.

The statement condemns the sluggishness shown by the leadership of the republic and the country on the questions of eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee Bureau believes that both former and current leaders of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [BSSR] should assess their actions in an honest, party fashion in the context of the irreparable damage done to the Belorussian nation.

Belorussian CP Finances Made Public

LD0203095390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1127 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Correspondent Vladimir Bogdanov report]

[Text] Minsk, 1 Mar (TASS)—For the first time, the budget of the Belorussian Communist Party has been published in the local newspapers. The party has 678,000 members and candidate members. Their subscriptions form the main source of the party's income, accounting for 55.7 million rubles last year. This sum financed more than 99 percent of all expenditure; the remainder—R300,000—was obtained through the sale of buildings, vehicles, and property being transferred to the national economy; lease payments for the use of premises; and other revenue.

Most of the expenditure—R31.2 of the R56 million spent in all areas of organizational and political work in the party—went toward the upkeep of party committees and of staff members released from primary organizations. The Central Committee apparatus of the republic's Communist Party cost R1.3 million last year.

For the first time, the primary party organizations were left three percent of their monthly subscriptions. However, some party organizations believe that this is not enough to conduct effective propaganda and hold free events.

The ecological situation in Belorussia is now extremely bleak; the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station is taking its toll. The government is doing everything it can to help the victims, and the Communist Party has made a contribution of its own: Facilities intended for party needs have been dropped from the construction plan to speed up the building of houses for people resettled from the contaminated areas.

Caucasus

Transcaucasus Air Defense Unit Repels Raiders

PM2802145190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondent article: "Alarming Report: Night Attack"]

[Text] 26 Feb—The main staff of the Air Defense Forces has received a dispatch from the Transcaucasus: "The radar company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Isayev has engaged in combat operations to repel an attack on its position..."

This morning the details of the night attack became known. Events at the company high in the mountains went like this: At midnight the alarm signal sounded and Lieutenant I. Turkin, the duty officer, ordered the radar operators to begin perimeter defense. At that time the assailants opened small-arms fire in an attempt to capture the position. The extremists were driven off by return fire.

"This company often comes under fire," the dispatch from Major General V. Sakhno, first deputy chief of the Air Defense Forces Radio Technical Troops, comments. "It has been fired on from both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. Several times personnel have had to repel attacks aimed at capturing weapons. In this situation some other radiotechnical troop subunits have to go on alert duty also. All these subunits have come under fire and grenade attack. As we can see, some people are continuing to flout the laws and common sense and are sending people to their deaths in an attempt to capture weapons."

Demonstrations Mark Anniversary of Baku Violence

Mourners March to Nagorny Park

AU0203202190 Paris AFP in English 1731 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 2 (AFP)—One million people took to the streets in Baku Friday to commemorate the death of Azeris in the army crackdown on inter-ethnic violence on January 19, TASS news agency said here. Demonstrators marched to Nagorny Park in the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan where victims numbering about one hundred were buried. Baku's former Lenin Park was renamed after the disputed Autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region, a largely Christian Armenian enclave lying inside Moslem-dominated Azerbaijan.

TASS said the march also drew Azeris from other Soviet republics.

Transcaucasia's Moslem chief Sheikh Holeslam Pashah Zadeh said Azeris "will continue their fight with peaceful means."

Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and Baku's Jewish community also addressed the crowd.

Muslims Gather at Burial Place

LD0203214490 Tehran IRNA in English 1535 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Ardebil, (E. Azerbaijan prov.), Mar 2, IRNA—Thousands of Azeri Muslims gathered at the burial place of the martyrs of recent incidents in Baku, the capital of the Soviet Azerbaijan to commemorate the 40th day after their martyrdom.

The ceremony started with Friday congregational prayers at various mosques throughout the republic.

Since Thursday night, Radio Baku has aired statements prohibiting any public gatherings in places other than the martyrs graveside. The statements also called on the people to observe order and tranquility throughout the day.

The radio also broadcast a statement of the Baku Martial Law Administration officials Friday morning banning trafficking of all motorised vehicles throughout the city between eight hours in the morning till 18 hours in the afternoon.

In previous statements, the administration extended curfew regulations in Baku on the eve of the ceremonies, saying that no vehicle was allowed to enter Baku as of Wednesday to prevent any possible disorder and unforeseen incident.

The administration had also stated that military forces will be reinforced at all industrial and economic centers as well as roads leading to the city.

Civic Memorial Service Held

LD0203225990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today, on the 40th day since the tragic events, a civic memorial service was held in which many thousands of people took part.

[Correspondent M. Mamedov, over the sound of music] This song is called Eralykh, which means parting. It is possible to say that more than any other, this song fits today because hundreds of thousands of the people of Baku have come to Nagornyy Park to take their leave of those whose lives were taken from them by the blind lead of bullets. A special fund has been set up in the republic to provide aid to the families of the dead and wounded. Not only does it receive money but it receives foodstuffs, clothes, and medicines as well. In an word, everything is being done to dull, in whatever way, the aching pain of heavy losses. Millions of flowers lie on the graves where the people of Azerbaijan plan for an imposing monument to be erected. It is very hard for our people today, but they are strong precisely because they become more united than ever at times of the greatest difficulty and grief. There is no doubt the best monument to those who died will be a renewed Azerbaijan in which there will never again be violence. [video shows black flag; then aerial view of the crowds surrounding a central circle; close-up of crowds filing past to lay their red flowers; people weeping; close-up of a photograph of a boy who died; scenes of the city, people moving toward the park]

Muslims Gather in Julfa Area

LD0303114390 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Forty days after the martyrdom of the victims of the recent events in Baku, thousands of Muslims in Soviet Azerbaijan gathered yesterday on the bank of the Araks River in Julfa area to honor the memory of the victims. According to a Central News Unit report, the mourners, dressed in black and carrying banners with verses from the Holy Koran, chanted religious songs, beat their chests, and praised the role of His Eminence Imam Khomeyni—may his noble soul be sanctified.

Nagorno-Karabakh Situation Termed 'Contradictory'

LD0303122190 Moscow TASS in English 1153 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Baku March 3 AZERINFORM-TASS—The socio-political situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region remains contradictory and explosive. A strike in Stepanakert is going on, with the exception of vital services.

A campaign of boycotting the republican organising committee for Nagorno-Karabakh was launched. The local leaders hinder a dialogue between representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani population and the formation of a parity section of the organising committee. This conclusion has been drawn by the republican organising committee for Nagorno-Karabakh upon analysing the outcome of February developments.

Notwithstanding all obstacles and psychological pressure, the organising committee does everything necessary to normalise the situation.

Ways and methods for the accomplishment of tasks by law enforcement agencies were considered at a meeting of the public prosecutors of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas of the republic.

They emphasised the need to strengthen contacts and cooperation between the personnel of law enforcement agencies to maintain the public order and to expedite the examination of criminal offences committed on an inter-ethnic basis. Railway, motor and air traffic has been fully restored. More than 700 railway cars with goods have reached Stepanakert.

More than 1,500 passengers use buses every day to ride along 60 routes. The bus service along the Baku-Agdam-Shusha route has been restored. Roads running across Nagorno-Karabakh to Kelbadzhar district have been de-blockaded.

The functioning of Stepanakert airport has been normalised. Regular Baku-Stepanakert flights have been resumed. Air services now link the regional centre with Tbilisi and Mineralnye Vodiy.

Representatives of various ministries and departments of the republic visited the autonomous region in February. They encouraged prompt restoration of power transmission lines in a number of residential areas and resolution of matters concerning water and gas supply and medical service for the population.

The delivery of food and medicines to mountain villages has been organised with the participation of the military. Control over the filling of the Sarsang water reservoir and the supply of water to farmland has been established.

The organising committee works in close cooperation with the military commandant's office.

SOVETSKIY KARABAKH newspaper is published and local radio station broadcasts get on the air. Measures are being taken for the delivery of mail to the population on time.

Within the month more than 50 leaflets were issued and about a hundred texts of information and reports were disseminated by means of public-address vans.

Measures are being mapped out jointly with commanders and political officers to bring peace and tranquility to Karabakh. Through the local press, radio and reports by military commandant, the population of Stepanakert are informed daily on how measures are implemented.

Interior-Ministry troops and Army units carried out 20 special operations in residential areas in and out of Stepanakert. A number of so-called self-defence detachments have been disbanded as a result. More than 1,557 violators of passport registration regulations and people violating the state-of-emergency decree have been identified since the beginning of the year.

More than 137 units of firearms, 46,516 units of ammunition, a large amount of uniform, and food stocks for militants have been discovered and confiscated.

A large amount of work is being done to establish dialogue with members of the Armenian community of the region and to identify forces that can resist the onslaught of nationalist feelings. Assistance to refugees is being promptly rendered, and the payment of allowances, pensions and wages has been organised.

The work being done by the organising committee finds support among people of the republic and the region, which is illustrated by their telegrams and letters.

No Deterioration on Azerbaijan-Iranian Border

PM0103121690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[S. Mostovshchikov report incorporating interview with V. Sakharov, deputy chief of USSR KGB Border Forces Staff Operations Administration; date, place of interview not stated: "On the Iranian Border"]

[Text] TASS and AZERINFORM have released a fresh report on events on the Iranian-Soviet border. The report indicates that in the last three days alone, 207 people crossed illegally from Azerbaijan into Iran, and 128 from Iran into Azerbaijan. It has also become known that on 27 February four inhabitants of Nakhichevan were detained while violating the border on their return from Iran. A foreign pistol, bullets, and large sums of money were confiscated from them.

Has the situation on the border really deteriorated again? IZVESTIYA put this question to V. Sakharov, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Forces Staff Operations Administration.

"There has been no deterioration in the situation," Vitaliy Viktorovich said. "On the contrary, we are observing a decline in tension. True, crossings in both directions continue to occur regularly. But this situation is in no way comparable with what was happening before. And therefore we have no grounds for particular anxiety.

"I think order will soon be established on the border."

Measures To Assist Azerbaijan Refugees Attacked

NC2702094390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] It is common knowledge that the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision on additional measures to help the refugees who have been forced to leave the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic since 1 January 1990.

Why has such a decision been adopted at the present time? Were there no refugees in our country until 1 January 1990? Were Azerbaijanis not expelled from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast toward the end of February and in early March 1989? They were the first Soviet refugees after the clashes.

AZERINFORM correspondents Azad Sharipov and (?Gaza Girifin) reply to these questions in their article which has been published in the newspapers. The correspondents point out that they do not agree with the government's decision on the basis of the constitution, plurality, democracy, and reconstruction.

KGB Gives Thanks for Help to Refugee Families

PM0103124490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 8

[Unattributed report: "Sincere Gratitude"]

[Text] The USSR KGB leadership and the Military Council of the USSR KGB Border Forces express sincere gratitude to Soviet citizens and labor collectives who sent money to help the families of servicemen forced to leave the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in connection with the well-known events.

Azerbaijani, Armenian Rayon Officials Meet

NC0103114090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 27 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] We wish to draw the attention of our listeners to a report the AZERINFORM correspondents have sent from Lachin. They point out that the meeting that was held in Lachin on 24 February was the continuation of the dialogue that was established between the leading officials of the bordering rayons in Azerbaijan and Armenia through the mediation of the military command headquarters of the state of emergency rayon on 10 February.

The leading officials of the internal affairs organs in Azerbaijan's Kubatlinskiy, Dzhebrail'skiy, Zangelanskiy, and Shushinskiy Rayons and their counterparts in Armenia's Kafanskiy, Megrinskiy, and Sisianskiy Rayons addressed the meeting on the normalization of the situation in the border regions of the two republics.

A decision was adopted to resume the dialogue in Armenia's Sisianskiy Rayon within a period of 20 days.

Speeches by Armenian Deputies Deepen Conflicts

NC2702094990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] USSR Deputies Balayan and Grigoryan have addressed a meeting at the USSR Defense Ministry. The text of their speeches has been published in Armenia's AVANGARD newspaper under the heading: "The Strategy of Existing."

Meanwhile, Balayan also conveyed an open letter to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Many of the points discussed in the speeches and the letter relate to Azerbaijan. Claims were again put forward for land. Slanders and calumnies were again leveled. An effort was once again made to deepen interethnic discord further.

An article published in today's KOMMUNIST by Kyamran Adilov, who is a doctor of historical sciences and a noteworthy scholar, clearly explains the purpose and nature of these speeches and this letter.

Armenians Being Moved From Village in Azerbaijan

NC0203154090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1000 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Report by Mavr Danielyan from the press conference at the Armenian Pan-National Movement's Administrative Board; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Meetings with journalists have become customary here, but this time the press conference had nothing to do with the situation on the republic's borders, though the issue was mentioned. The main topic of the press conference was the impressions Rafael Kazaryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium, member of the Karabakh Committee, and corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, gathered during his visit to France. [passage omitted]

At the end of the press conference, Yevgeniy Grigoryan, member of the Armenian Pan-National Movement's Administrative Board, gave information about the situation in Getashen subrayon. Army helicopters are transporting inhabitants of Azat village, whose belongings are being taken by road, to Krasnodar Kray for resettlement under Army supervision.

Now, it is Kamo village's turn. Will the soldiers be able to protect that village, or will its inhabitants be deported too?

ARTSAKH Bimonthly Literary Magazine Debuts

NC0103115890 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 28 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The first issue of ARTSAKH [Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast region in Azerbaijan], a literary, artistic, social, and political bimonthly magazine is available. Mikhail (?Sudin), Zori Balayan, Silva Kaputikyan, Vaagn Davityan, and other renowned writers have written articles welcoming the new periodical. The quality of the first issue is enhanced by the works of major artistic photographers.

Central Asia

People Killed Following Tashkent Oblast Rally

PM0303221590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 1

[M. Alimov report: "Tashkent, 3 March"]

[Text] Late yesterday evening Uzbek Television interrupted its broadcasts. M.M. Miirkasymov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers made an urgent announcement to the republic's inhabitants: On 3 March in Parkentskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast there was an unsanctioned rally. The rally participants demanded that several hundreds of Meskhetian Turks be immediately removed from the rayon's satantoriums, having been temporarily evacuated there following an interethnic conflict in the neighboring Bukinskiy Rayon.

The mob who had been provoked to unlawful actions by irresponsible instigators started to storm the rayon militia department and other public buildings. As the chairman of the republic's council of ministers reported, people were wounded and killed. Having expressed sympathy to the families of those who died he gave an assurance that in the immediate future all those guilty of organizing the disorders will receive the punishment they deserve.

Each inhabitant of the republic, M.M. Mirkasymov declared, must do everything in his power to defend the processes of democratization.

Situation Described

PM0403175390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Orlov dispatch: "Outrages in Tashkent Oblast. Tragic Consequences of Unauthorized Rally in Parkentskiy Rayon"]

[Text] Tashkent—A few days ago IZVESTIYA (issue No. 54) reported an incident in Tashkent Oblast's Bukinskiy Rayon, from where more than 4,000 Meskhetian Turks were either evacuated or left of their own accord. Fortunately, there were no casualties at that time, only a few homes were burned down. More than 600 persons were housed in Parkentskiy Rayon's "Kumyshkan" Sanatorium. The subsequent development of events seemed to follow a familiar scenario.

To begin with, there were leaflets demanding the resettlement of Meskhetian Turks. Leaders of Tashkent Oblast and law enforcement organs tried to ease the tension, held conversations with local residents, but this—as it now transpires—was fruitless. Groups of people started gathering in the center of Parkent from early morning on 3 March.

An unauthorized rally, attended by between 4,000 and 5,000 persons began at about 1000 hours. The crowd then attempted to capture the party raykom [rayon committee] and invaded the rayon internal affairs department building. Rampaging youths destroyed it and set it on fire.

M. Mirkasymov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, and S. Mamarasulov, first secretary of Tashkent Party Obkom [oblast committee], who arrived at the scene, spent several hours trying to stop the pogromists. Staffers of the law enforcement organs, using their shields, managed to break through to the rayon internal affairs department building, lift the blockade, and release the besieged militiamen.

At the same time, the "Kumyshkan" Sanatorium started receiving threatening telephone calls. Additional forces had to be deployed there, and 10 buses were used to move the Turks to a different rayon.

According to the oblast internal affairs administration, the events in Parkent, where law enforcement organs were forced to use arms, resulted in 17 civilians being wounded and two killed. Twelve militia staffers and 44 Internal Troops servicemen suffered bodily harm or were wounded. One militiaman was killed. He, Senior Lieutenant A. Khumsanbayev, was beaten and kicked to death by the mob. The militiaman's six children are now orphans.

The republican and military prosecutor's offices have launched an investigation.

Uzbek Prosecutor Cited on Organized Crime

PM0203164490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Extract from KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA under the rubric "Highlighted by the Press," taken from "an interview with I. Chitakov, acting deputy prosecutor of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic": "'Cheap Justice Is Costly'"—date, place of interview, name of interviewer not stated]

[Text] "...There was a rallying of the criminal milieu on an interregional and intersector basis and corruption flourished, enabling criminals to make use of the apparatus of power and management for their own ends and 'get their hands on' the law enforcement organs....

"According to Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics, several dozen criminal clans are now active in the republic, each of them uniting several organized criminal groups. The biggest of them operate in the capital and the capital's oblast, the Fergana Valley, and the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. In the last three years the republic's law enforcement organs have rendered harmless 20 bandit formations and stopped the activities of 800 organized criminal groups. They were responsible for more than 7,200 crimes...."

Meskhetian Turks Speak of Desire To Return Home

PM2302153190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Z. Valeryev article: "Press Conference by Meskhetian Turks"]

[Text] Meskhetian Turks have held a press conference in Moscow for Soviet and foreign correspondents.

The question of returning home, the numerous speakers said, is now being raised very acutely for the Turks, who were dispersed throughout the country following the events in Uzbekistan. Of course, ethnic problems are the most complex problems of all. The events of recent months are graphic proof of that. Haste in this area is impermissible. But, in the opinion of most of the speakers, the resolution of the Meskhetian Turk question has been unjustifiably delayed. Yu. Sarvarov, chairman of the Interim Organizing Committee for a Return Home, reported that the people are merely living on the hope of returning to their homeland. The speaker also drew attention to the need to allocate funds, without which the problem of a return will be unresolved.

Committee Secretary T. Aslanov cited figures on refugees from Uzbekistan: There are currently 2,311 Meskhetian Turks living in Smolensk Oblast, 2,236 in Kursk Oblast, 3,152 in Orel Oblast, and 2,111 in Voronezh Oblast. Thousands of resettled people are living in Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays. People have also been resettled in the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Their difficult position in their current places of residence—where they often have no suitable accommodations, cannot find jobs, and cannot gain residence permits—was discussed. Cases were cited of people working on kolkhozes [collective farms] not being paid. Nonetheless, the speakers were grateful to the Red Cross and other organizations for the aid given in the first few days after the dramatic events in Uzbekistan began.

The only place in the Soviet Union where Meskhetian Turks could live—E. Pain, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Meskhetian Turk Problems working group, is convinced—is their historic homeland. It is necessary to embark forthwith on talks with the Georgian public. The rumors that people in that republic are hostile toward the Turks do not tally with reality. After all, the Georgian people have always been known for their great kindness.

Group Evacuated From Town

AU2202095890 Paris AFP in English 0323 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 22 (AFP)—A crowd of about 1,000 Uzbeks attacked police forces protecting a group of Meskhet Turks as they were evacuated from a small town in strife-torn Uzbekistan, Moscow Radio's Interfax publication said Wednesday. Four policemen were injured when the crowd, which had threatened to move the Meskhet Turks out themselves, attacked the convoy leaving Karabak, near Tashkent, in the central Asian republic Tuesday, Interfax reported.

The demonstrators gathered on the village square, demanding the immediate departure of the Meskhet Turks and warning they would do it themselves, despite calls for calm from Uzbekistan's Prime Minister Mirakhmat Mirkasymov. The authorities then intervened, moving the community to a nearby spa resort as a preventive measure, Interfax said.

Thousands of Meskhet Turks, who are Shiite Moslems, fled Tashkent's Fergana Valley last year after being attacked by Sunni Moslem Uzbeks in clashes which left more than 100 people dead.

Aspects of Uzbek Election Campaign Faulted

90US0571A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent R. Tell: "Pre-Election Struggle in Uzbekistan Proceeded In Keeping With the Old Canons"]

[Text] Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic—"We can safely say that the current election campaign in Uzbekistan has proceeded behind closed doors. The local press which the party organs have on a leash did not utter a word when passions raged concerning the nomination of candidates. What do the lists of contenders show? First of all, a small percentage of workers and especially women. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of ranking functionaries of the republic will run in the elections 'in proud solitude.' They include secretaries of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the military commissar of the republic, and other major party and soviet functionaries. Thirdly, the voters encountered unworthy behavior by some members of electoral commissions who hampered the undesirable candidates nominated 'from the grassroots' but not endorsed by 'the top.' Thus, Chairman of the District Electoral Commission Yu. Vilkov (a former party functionary) steadfastly tried to prevent the registration of T. Chirkova acting against the will of the voters.

"One thing is clear: Anti-perestroyka schemes have already left an unfavorable imprint on the authority of the future deputy corps of the republic."

[signed] F. Semernin, CPSU member since 1945

Our reader's categorical conclusions reflect just one aspect of the mixed picture of the pre-election struggle in Uzbekistan. His data are based on publications in the local press. Meanwhile, actual practice shows a much broader spectrum of political interests—beginning from the tendency to shelter "the bosses" from competition, already outlined by our author, to the lack of ability and desire of the voters themselves to defend their position.

At the Central Electoral Commission, they also understand this. For example, member M. Teshabayev, candidate of legal sciences, believes that "we did not manage to completely overcome the inertia of old apparatus thinking and old directive-driven methods of regulating the election process." According to his data, there will be no pre-election struggle in more than one-third of the electoral districts. It is not just the leaders of various ranks are comprising "the single-mandate people;" there are quite a few workers, kolkhoz [collective farm] members, and representatives of the intelligentsia.

What were the reasons for this? One reason was given by V. Chukalin, an electrical engineer from Tashkent. An action group in Electoral District 198 tried to gather people to nominate a candidate at the place of residence, and... it did not work. "People who have gotten used to not interfering in the affairs of state over many years continue to live in keeping with the old canons at present as well.... I wish we would not sleep through our new life," concludes the engineer.

However, this is not the case everywhere. The signs of social apathy are found next to stormy manifestations of social activism. In District 168 of Bukhara which I happened to visit there were as many as nine contenders for the mandate of a people's deputy of the republic, ranging from the former first secretary of an oblast committee to a worker. A colleague of mine, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent Vilor Niyazmatov, is also running here. Among the many voices of pre-election platforms, his program is marked by specific content, useful pursuits, and breadth—from the legal foundation to parliamentary practices themselves. Despite the voters enthusiastic reception of Vilor Rakhmatullayevich's initiative to restore the monuments of Bukhara (actually to renew the entire ancient city) which is supported by USSR people's deputies, a difficult struggle lies ahead.

My colleague says: "I was the second to register, and I did not at all expect that so many most worthy competitors would come forward in the same district: A party functionary, a meritorious worker, a people's writer, the chairman of the oblast TV and radio committee, the rector of an institute, an employee of the Internal Affairs Directorate, and others—as if they had put together a team 'to throw the contest.'"

This opinion is not without foundation. Associate Professor of the Bukhara Pedagogical Institute S. Saidov reinforced it in his presentation naming the neighboring districts with one person running in each, including I. Salimov, first secretary of the Bukhara City Party Committee; U. Nasyrov, the mayor of the city; Yu. Sazhnev, second secretary of the oblast party committee, and others. Incidentally, some of them were in attendance right there, but did not want to explain themselves to the audience.

I was also told about other facts. For example, in Kagan, which is adjacent to Bukhara, where a representative of the engine depot ran as an alternative candidate to the "city fathers," the former was accused of... playing up to the voters. What for? Because the depot began to repair the roads in strict conformance with the plan.

One of those who are in a position to have the events programmed enlightened me: "My dear, we use any dent in order to have it our way, but—take note—within the law."

As if to confirm the above, an anonymous phone call came to the office of the correspondent: Please see our comrade!

Tamara Georgiyevna Chirkova turned out to be a charming and energetic woman. She works as an instructor at a medical vocational school in Tashkent. The collective of the Uzgiproselstroy Institute nominated her as an Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic candidate people's deputy without violating the law in the process because Chirkova lives in the same rayon.

The law was violated in another matter. Representative of the Central Electoral Commission E. Tsoy, who organized the verification of a petition by Tamara Georgiyevna, received evidence to the effect that in a number of subdivisions of the institute there were no elections of delegates to the conference of the collective. This means that the results of voting are not valid.

To my mind, Chirkova's election program is beautiful; it is based on internationalist interests and human values. Her competitor, director of the Tashmetrostroy Trust G. Shtern, is not afraid of pre-election struggle and treats Tamara Georgiyevna with complete respect. Nonetheless, Chirkova was not registered as a candidate.

Eduard Chergenovich thinks: "We may consider the attitude of Yu. Vilkov, chairman of the Electoral Commission, toward her to be biased. According to my observations, he offered resistance whenever possible, however—I stress once again—within the law on elections. By now, the train has left the station, it is too late to change anything."

This is how T. Chirkova, a woman who decided to stand up for herself and her right to be elected, was left out of the pre-election battles. Alas, there is no petition from the collective which nominated her at the Central Electoral Commission. The procuracy and the courts rejected her lawsuit. Only her anonymous defenders, with their eyes closed in fear, relate to us the designs against this openly nominated candidate.

Is this how one's rights need to be defended? If we are going to fight for our candidates by hiding in the corners, staying away from meetings with him, whispering in the lobby, and failing to speak from the rostrum, who is to blame for the failure to replenish the corps of deputies with authoritative and respected people? Who is to blame for our right to elect and to be elected remaining on paper? After all, we have not exercised this right....

Frequently, the one who starts the game in chess wins. This pre-election "game" was started by the soviets put together in old times. They are taking advantage of their right to make the first move as they understand it and in keeping with the tradition of "distributing the seats" at elections which goes many years back. This makes a democratic alternative for the voters combined with activism and the ability to defend one's lawful rights all the more necessary. By all signs, this difficult lesson has not yet been learned in Uzbekistan.

Expanded Tajik Central Committee Plenum 3 Mar

LD0303073190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0302 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] An expanded plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee will open today in Dushanbe. It will discuss the question of priority measures to stabilize the situation in Dushanbe and in the republic, and tasks connected with preparations for the 21st congress of the Tajik Communist Party.

The plenum will also listen to a report from the Central Committee bureau of the republic's Communist Party about the results of checking on a statement made by I.K. Khayeyev, a member of the bureau of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

Results Reported

LD0303212290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1930 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] [Neich] Five minutes or so ago, my colleague, correspondent Muzafar Madzhidov rang from Dushanbe and he, too, has some important news from the party life of the republic. I'll ask him to answer if he can hear us: We can hear you, Muzafar. What's happening there?

[Madzhidov] The 18th plenum of the Central Committee of the Tajikistan Communist Party continued for exactly 15 hours. This is the third plenum now to have been held in the last 20 days in the republic to deal with the problems connected with the well-known and tragic events of February. At this plenum, too, priority measures to stabilize the situation in the city of Dushanbe and the republic were discussed. The participants in the plenum noted that the events of 11-14 February were planned acts with the aim of destabilizing the situation in the capital to start and then in the republic and of (?destabilizing) the work of the party, local soviet and economic bodies to implement political and economic reforms. The instigators of these acts made use of the fact that many social and economic problems remained unsolved.

To achieve their political, (?mercenary), and selfish interests and their set objectives which have nothing in common with the tasks of restructuring, certain destructive forces made use of the most varied methods—extremist methods included, like threats, blackmail, pogroms, fires, and robbery—in attempting to inflame interethnic strife. The measures adopted in this situation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and the government of the republic and the involvement of communists from the broad masses of the public enabled the wave of extremism to be repelled; robbery, looting and violence to be stopped; and Dushanbe gradually to be returned to its normal course. The participants in the plenum drew attention to serious shortcomings in the activities of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, party committees, primary party organizations, and leading local soviet and law and order bodies which do not always deal with urgent matters in good time, react promptly to changes in the situation or take fully into account the national features of the republic. Many decisions often remain only on paper. In the resolution adopted on this, the plenum expressed the conviction that the communists and working people of the republic will support the activity of the Central Committee by being organized and united, will be able to overcome the most important problems and to ensure the work of the party organizations on the basis of restructuring and the necessary pace of social transformations. The next issue was that the plenum adopted a decision to convene the 21st congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan on 24 May, 1990, i.e. this year and approved the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 21st Tajikistan Communist Party Congress.

The plenum of the Tajikistan Central Committee Communist Party adopted a resolution opposing the arousal of tension on the grounds of relations between the nationalities, and the participants spoke in favor of determinedly strengthening the union of people of different nationalities and the friendship of the people's of the USSR as a most important factor in the complete stabilization of the republic, they called for any manifestations of chauvinism, nationalism, separatism, religious fanaticism to be repulsed.

[Neich] Muzafar, thank you for your report. May I just ask you to dictate this news to our typists so that it is heard tomorrow on the first progam at least, not only on our Mayak [second program] evening panorama? Okay?

[Madzhidov] Nilolay, at the very end....

[Neich] Sure, you're on the air. Carry on if it's something very important.

[Madzhidov] I also wanted to say that the most important thing is that the plenum heard and discussed information from the bureau of the Central Committee of the Tajikistan Communist Party on the results of verification of the statement from the chairman of the Council of Minister of the Tajik SSR, Comrade Khayeyev, on attempts to dismiss and appoint a head of government unconstitutionally.

[Neich] And what decision was reached?

[Madzhidov] The plenum adopted a decision on this matter, as a result of which severe penalties were imposed upon those who took part in this illegal act. In particular, Buri Karimov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR and chairman of the Gosplan and Nurt Tabarov, Tajikistan's minister of culture, were expelled from the CPSU.

[Neich] Right, thank you. Our agreement is still valid, isn't it?

[Madzhidov] Fine, yes.

Tajik Commission Summarizes Election Results

LD0303175990 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0020 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] A meeting of the Tajik SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) people's deputies election commission was held in Dushanbe on 2 March. The issue of registration of people's deputies elected on 25 February was discussed at the meeting. During the discussions it was stressed that 91.3 percent of eligible voters participated in the polls. Elections were held in all 230 constituencies. People's deputies were elected in 117 constituencies. No one was elected in 112 constituencies, where there were more than two candidates. In accordance with Article 51 of the Tajik SSR Law on the election of Tajik SSR people's deputies repeat ballots will be held there. In one constituency where there was only two candidates, neither of whom was elected, repeat elections will take place in accordance with Article 52 of the election law.

The republican election commision in accordance with Article 48 of the election law, has registered all 117 Tajik SSR people's deputies elected on 25 February; name lists will be published in the republican press.

Also discussed at the meeting of the election commission were petitions and complaints received by the republican election commission since the election campaign as well as issues concerning organization of repeat ballots and election.

Soccer Match Allowed Despite State of Emergency

LD0303151290 Moscow TASS in English 1459 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Dushanbe March 3 TASS—Armoured vehicles can still be seen in the streets of Dushanbe and the curfew has not yet been lifted, but changes for the better are felt in the air.

One important sign is that Dynamo Kiev, a Ukrainian soccer team, are arriving to play against the hosts, Pamir Dushanbe, at the city's largest stadium.

The decision to give a go-ahead to the match on March 5 was made by the city's military commandant, Major-General Mamadaez Navzhuvanov in response to popular requests.

This decision is viewed as unprecedented under the state of emergency which was introduced after the tragic events in February. It was made possible by the stabilization of the situation in the capital of Tajikistan, Navzhuvanov stressed, no extremist sallies have been reported in the city in the past few days.

Most industrial enterprises operated on Saturday as their collectives decided to make up for the lag in production as soon as possible.

The press center of the Tajikistan Interior Ministry reported that more people had been detained on charges of complicity in pogroms, arson and attempts on human lives between February 12 and 14. Work is under way to localize instigators who provoked the eruption of violence to achieve their own criminal objectives. Investigation is expected to disclose both their identies and the forces they represented.

Much is being done by party and soviet workers. Members of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee and the republican government have visited dozens of work collectives, educational establishments and suburban communities to discuss the situation.

Kirghiz Presidium Issues Decree on Public Order

LD2702021590 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1300 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Excerpts] On the implementation of the decree of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium on responsibility for the actions directed against public order and citizens' safety:

The Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution, supporting the numerous statements by working people, veterans of war and labor, and young people aimed at strengthening public safety, law and order, and discipline, and scotching inflammatory false rumors and fabrications, in implementing the decree of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet of 22 February 1990, on responsibility for the actions directed against public order and citizens' safety.

It is resolved to instruct the local soviets of people's deputies, ministries, departments, and mass media to organize in labor collectives, in citizens' homes, in the pages of newspapers, on radio and television all-around explanation of the provisions of the decree of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and of the need for its close observance.

Decree on responsibility for actions directed against public order and citizens' safety:

For the purposes of ensuring public safety, strengthening order and discipline, and preventing inflammatory rumors causing panic among the population, the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To prescribe that the production or possession for purposes of distribution or the distribution in handwritten, printed, verbal, or audio-visual form, of materials containing a threat to public order or people's safety, calls for pogroms and forced eviction of citizens, for the seizure or destruction of their property, or directed at causing panic among the population, unless covered by crimes envisaged by Article 68 and other articles of the Criminal Code of the Kirghiz SSR. This will incur the imposition of a fine ranging from R200-500 or corrective labor for a term of up to two months with up to 20 percent of earnings going to the state, or adminstrative arrest for up to 15 days with the confiscation of the means of production and distribution of the materials. The distribution of inflammatory false rumors and fabrications of the same content and for the same purposes incurs the imposition of a fine ranging from R100-300 or corrective labor for up to one month with up to 20 percent of earnings going to the state or adminstrative arrest for up to 10 days.

Actions coming under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the current decree perpetrated repeatedly within one year following the application of measures of administrative liability or by a group of persons and also involving minors in such actions incur the imposition of a fine ranging from R500-1,000 or corrective labor for up to two months with up to 20 percent of earning going to the state, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days with confiscation of the means of production and distribution of the materials.

2. The protocol on the administrative offense is compiled by the authorized official of the Internal Affairs body or executive committee of the rayon, town, urban rayon, settlement or rural soviet of people's deputies. [passage omitted]

3. The present decree comes into force from the moment of publication.

[Signed] Akmatov, chairman of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
Myrzaliyeva, secretary of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
City of Frunze, 22 February 1990.

Kirghiz MVD Views Rumors, Meetings

LD2702143690 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGHIZIA in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 1

[Announcement of the Procurator's Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic: "Who Profits from Rumors"]

[Text] During the last few weeks there have been rumors in the republic's capital and its suburban areas about a possible destabilization of the situation. Individual irresponsible persons have been increasing the tension.

An analysis of the concrete operational situation allows us to conclude that in the republic there is no real basis for such rumors, which are far from being harmless. At meetings which took place on 25 and 26 January and on 5 February, which had not been sanctioned, participants raised urgent issues concerning social and economic problems, the migration of people, young people's employment, and speeding up the implementation of the law on a state language. At the same time there is a lot of exaggerated fabrications on this account. Competent organs are taking decisive measures to uncover those who are spreading rumors, and to curb provacative fabrications. At meetings of labor collectives it was indicated more than once that the Kirghiz people would never foment interethnic strife. Its history over many centuries bears witness to this. Frankly speaking, the situation is being aggravated, in the main, by the people who are politically immature, who are incapable of analyzing the situation or foreseeing the future development of events.

The party, soviet, and law and order organs carry out active work on the consolidation of healthy forces of society, and on the channelling of their energy toward the solution of urgent social and economic issues.

At the present moment the operative situation in the republic is fully under control.

The working people of multinational Kirghizia can be sure that the state organs of the republic are capable of ensuring complete observance of the law and public order. The organs of law and order have at their disposal sufficient forces and means for maintaining the required public order. However, recent events in Dushanbe and other regions show that unsanctioned mass meetings of people influenced by provacateurs and hooligans can result in tragedy.

In this connection the Procurator's Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic call on the population to be reasonable and to refrain from rash and unlawful actions.